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Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in late 1991, the Russian Federation has experienced a 
process of rapid fiscal decentralization. Its 88 regions (oblasts) have been given responsibility for a 
growing proportion of budget expenditure, while an overhaul of the revenue allocation system has 
left them with real control for the first time over revenue collected locally.1 By 1995, 46% of all 
budget expenditure in Russia was spent at the oblast level or below — slightly more than the 407c 
of total expenditure in the USA spent at state or local level in the early 1980s (Glendening and 
Mann Reeves, 1984, p.l 28). Decentralization of funding in the social sphere has been even greater: 
about 90% of health care expenditure and 857c of education expenditure is now a sub-national 
responsibility.
Decentralization has accompanied market reform in countries across Central and Eastern 
Europe: Russia is not unusual in this respect.2 Enlarging the role of regional and local authorities 
has been a natural way for central governments to respond to demands for local autonomy and 
greater economic efficiency, while — conveniently — offloading part of their own fiscal deficits. 
However, the extent of this process has been greater in Russia than elsewhere, while Russia’s size 
and diversity also make its position somewhat unique. Geographically the largest country in the 
world, Russia occupies a land mass which covers one eighth of the world’s surface: its 150 million 
people are scattered across a territory which includes rich agricultural land, thick forest, dry 
steppe, arctic desert and, most importantly, some of the world’s most valuable resources. Some 
20% of the world’s oil, 157c of its coal and 257c of its diamonds come from Russian soil, as well
1 The Russian Federation as it stood at the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 was composed in theory 
of 89 political and economic units, but in practice Chechnya has never been a participating member. Of 
the remaining 88 units, only 49 officially have the Russian title ‘oblast’ (there are also 20 republics, 11 
autonomous oblasts, 2 metropolitan cities and 6 krai), but 1 follow convention in using the term 
generically. There are minor differences in the status of these types of region, but all have the same fiscal 
responsibility.
2 See Bird et al.(1995).
as a host of other minerals and precious metals. Much of this wealth is concentrated in a handful o f 
regions in Siberia and the Far East.
Many of these areas have reaped immediate benefit from market reforms such as price 
liberalization and the lifting of barriers to trade. Tyumen Oblast, a West Siberian region with 
extensive oil-fields, is one example; the diamond-rich republic of Yakutia in the Far East is 
another. But not all have been successful. The nature of Soviet industrial policy led to the 
development of areas which climate and terrain would have declared uninhabitable and which are 
now far from profitable despite their raw material resources.3 Towns like Norilsk, located 200 
miles north of the Arctic circle in Taimyrskiy Autonomous Area (average January temperature -- 
minus 18°) are the result: the revenue from nickel mining is insufficient to support the town that 
has been developed around the mines.4 Despite their natural wealth, some of these regions have 
much in common with the industrial regions of European Russia, where heavily protected 
industries also have little chance of surviving the transition to the competitive market. The 
priorities of the central planners have exacerbated the plight of these regions by the 
overconcentration of machinery production in particular and the focus on the ‘productive’ sphere in 
general, leaving an underdeveloped service sector and little diversification for regions to fall back 
on (Sutherland and Hanson, 1996). The effects are immediately evident to anyone who has 
travelled just a few hundred kilometres outside Moscow to Novgorod (whose electronics industry 
was primarily geared towards military demand, now collapsed), Pskov (traditionally dependent on 
engineering and electricity) or Tula (machine construction for light industry and for agriculture), to 
name a few. The European regions which are surviving the transition relatively well tend to be well 
positioned as commercial hubs and to possess a foreign exchange bourse; examples are Moscow, 
St. Petersburg, Samara and Nizhniy Novgorod (see Hanson, 1996).
Fiscal decentralization in the context of such significant regional differences clearly raises 
disturbing possibilities for less well-off regions. Widening disparities in regional incomes and 
employment opportunities can only be addressed in the medium term through a regional 
development strategy which encourages investment in depressed areas and considers the long term 
viability of the regions at the periphery. But decentralization against this background adds a whole
3 See Dmitrieva (1996), especially Chapter 2. Dmitrieva argues that the shift of productive forces and 
population into the regions of Siberia, the North and the Far East was motivated partly by military 
considerations -- to expand the area of economic activity -  and partly by the desire to develop new 
mineral resource deposits, but that the likely long-term profitability of the strategy was not a factor taken 
into account.
4 ‘Socialism in one company’. The Economist, January 10th-16th, 1998.
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new layer of concern to the picture: if what is at stake is not only employment but also the quality 
of key public services such as health care and education then the implications for the inhabitants of 
poorer regions are that much more severe. There could also be long term consequences for the 
region’s development. The problem is all the more acute given the background of economic crisis. 
Russian GDP has fallen by an estimated 40% since 1990, while poor tax collection has meant 
falling government revenue even as a share of GDP (see Cheasty and Davis, 1996, p.5). These 
trends are illustrated in Figure 0.1. If this is the general situation, how much worse for the regions 
hardest hit.
A number of authors in the past few years have picked up on the challenges decentralization 
poses to Russia and have begun to analyse the ways in which these challenges have so far been 
addressed. Christine Wallich in particular has been a pioneer of research in this area, and my own 
work has been much simplified by the foundations she has laid.5 However, Wallich and other 
researchers have generally been interested in the equity implications of decentralization as just one 
among a series of other concerns, and as such equity issues have received less than full attention. 
Many questions about how the development of the fiscal system has affected regional equality
5 Wallich (1994). Other early work by Western authors on intergovernmental relations in post-Soviet 
Russia includes Bahl et al (1993) and Le Houerou (1994). In the Russian literature Boiko and Lavrov 
(1995), Khodorovich (1995), Lavrov (1995), and Dmitriev (1996) are key references.
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therefore remain unanswered. For example, analysis of the effectiveness of intergovernmental 
transfers in equalizing regional budget revenues have so far been very preliminary. So have 
attempts to quantify the extent to which disparities in government spending by region have 
increased over the period. In addition, one whole aspect of the question has been entirely neglected, 
as all work which has been done has concentrated on the inter-regional level, ignoring issues 
relating to the sub-regional or local level. In practice decentralization has spread beyond the level 
of the region, with considerable responsibility given also to local authorities. Regional aggregate 
levels of revenue and expenditure may therefore mask substantial differences in the resources 
available to local authorities within a single region.
This thesis aims to fill in part of this information gap by addressing each of these three issues 
in turn. I begin in the First chapter by examining the provisions made for intergovernmental 
transfers to redistribute revenues from richer to poorer regions. I ask how successful these have 
been in achieving their aim of equalization, where there are two necessary conditions for success: 
the allocation mechanism must be fair, in the sense that transfers go to the regions most in need o f 
them, and it must also be sufficient — transfers made must be large enough to make a significant 
difference to the revenue distribution. If transfers do not go to the most needy regions, there is an 
additional issue of interest: is this just the result of inefficiency or is it due to the exercise o f 
influence behind the scenes? Indicators of both regional needs and regional influence are used to try 
to answer these questions.
The story is given an added angle by the fact that a change in the allocation regime took place 
in 1994. Until then, no official transfer mechanism existed: while in the first post-Soviet years 
much effort was made to come up with rules determining the allocation of revenue sources to 
different levels of government, the need for a transfer system was completely overlooked. 
Intergovernmental transfers did take place in practice, but they were governed by unclear rules and 
determined in closed-door negotiations. In 1994 an official transfer system was introduced for the 
first time, with allocations determined by a (largely) transparent formula. As the chapter looks at 
budget data for each of the three years 1993-1995, it offers the opportunity to explore how far the 
introduction of the formula made a positive difference to the allocation process.
Chapter 2 turns to look at the implications of the post-transfer revenue allocation for regional 
standards of public services in practice, and specifically for standards of provision of education. 
Why education? In part, education is chosen simply as a way of focusing the analysis on a single 
sphere as a representative of others: if quality of education is very different across the country, then
4
we might expect quality of other government goods to be so too. But it is also chosen because of 
the importance of equality of access to education in particular* both from the perspective of the 
individual and from that of the region: if disadvantage spreads to the provision of education, 
regional economic inequalities are likely to become more engrained and harder to reverse, creating 
a vicious cycle of decline.
Using data on per pupil spending on compulsory education in 1991 and 1995, this chapter has 
three main aims. First, it asks how large disparities in education are, and how far they have grown 
during the course of the transition. This is a more difficult question than it might appear because of 
the importance of regional variation in wages and other provision costs: I discuss the problems 
involved in adjusting for these cost factors and try to separate the expenditure differences which 
are driven by differences in costs from those resulting from revenue disparities.
At the same time, I attempt to explore the nature of the relationship between oblast revenues 
and education spending. Naturally we expect that higher revenues will lead to higher expenditure. 
But is education treated as a necessity, receiving little priority from oblast budgets once a basic 
level has been covered, or as a luxury, so that an increasing share of any extra income goes to the 
education sector? This issue has important implications for the transfer system: if it turns out that 
education benefits little from extra revenue there may be a case for a system of conditional grants if 
central government wants to encourage greater education spending.
Finally, the chapter identifies the regions to have seen the biggest cuts in education expenditure 
during the transition, and asks whether any generalizations can be made about their relative 
position at the outset. Can it be said that they are on balance regions which were relatively 
privileged during the Soviet era, or alternatively that their position was worse than average? The 
intention is to explore whether the new regional inequalities created by the transition are reinforcing 
those of the Soviet regime, or whether instead a new hierarchy is being created.
Chapter 3 sees a change in focus, from the regional to the local level. As noted, all the existing 
literature on intergovernmental relations concentrates on the relationships and disparities between 
the 88 oblast level units, as do the first two chapters of this thesis. There are good reasons for this: 
the scale of economic disparity between oblasts makes the topic interesting and important, while 
data constraints present an obstacle to the analysis of the sub-regional level. However, the fact is 
that many of the government services generally classified as the responsibility of the ‘sub-national’ 
level actually fall under the control of local rather than regional level authorities. This is
5
particularly the case in the education sector, where almost all pre-primary, primary and secondary* 
schooling is now the responsibility of the local (raion) authorities rather than the oblast.
In this chapter I therefore reproduce the themes of the first two chapters, but at the sub-oblast 
level. I first explore the way in which the oblast ensures that revenue is equalized between richer 
and poorer raions; and then look at the results in practice for equality of educational opportunity 
across the region. I do this through a case-study of a single oblast, Novgorod, in North-West 
Russia. The chapter is the result of five weeks field research in Novgorod in June and July 1997, in 
which I interviewed officials in the oblast and raion administrations. Novgorod is one of the poorer 
Russian regions, but it is also considered among the most progressive, and therefore it may not be 
possible to generalize to other regions on the basis of everything I discovered there. Unfortunately, 
it proved hard to gain access (for reasons which are probably obvious) to other, less well-regarded, 
regions which would have been interesting as contrasts. However, I try to make it clear how much 
of the information in the chapter is likely to be typical.
Studying Russia involves enormous data problems, problems of both access and accuracy, and 
it is worth saying a few words about these at the outset. The Russian State Statistical Committee 
(hereafter referred to by its Russian abbreviation, Goskomstat) publishes a growing number o f 
economic and living standard indicators with breakdowns by region. With one or two exceptions 
noted in the text, all non-budgetary oblast level data used in this thesis have been put together from 
a variety of Goskomstat publications, all listed in the references. Budgetary data proved more 
difficult to obtain as these are the preserve of the Ministry of Finance and remain unpublished. I 
was able to gain access to them indirectly through a variety of sources: I received general budget 
data for 1991-1994 from the World Bank, for 1995 from Alexei Lavrov of the President’s 
Administration, and more detailed breakdowns for education expenditure from UNICEF 
International Child Development Centre in Florence. The data on Novgorod used in Chapter 3 
come from the Novgorod Oblast Statistical Committee, the Statistical Department of the Novgorod 
Oblast Education Committee and from the Budget Department of the Novgorod Oblast Finance 
Committee. I am extremely grateful to all of the above for their help.
The quality of the data used is of course a separate issue. Given the chaos created by the 
transition, the substantial changes which are still being implemented in measurement techniques, 
and the very high levels of inflation which persisted during several of the years under analysis, 
there is good reason to believe that the data used here will not fully and accurately represent 
reality. On the other hand, it seems plausible that they will paint a picture which at least
6
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approximates the truth, rather than drawing up an entirely independent scenario. At the same time 
of course they are the only data available -  the alternative is simply no research of this type on 
Russia. While aware of the shortcomings of the data I use, I believe that they give us more useful 
information than is offered by no data at all.
There is, however, one large problem affecting all monetary data which is worthy of special 
consideration. This is the problem of regional price variation, and the absence of an adequate 
deflator to adjust for it. While Consumer Price Indices (CPIs) for each region allow us to adjust 
monetary measures to make them comparable over time, no satisfactory price index exists to make 
them fully comparable across regions at any given point: the CPI takes each region back to a base 
of December 1992=100 for that region rather than a base of December 1992=100 for (say) 
Moscow. This clearly poses a huge obstacle to the analysis in both Chapters 1 and 2. The only 
available substitutes for a comprehensive deflator are the cost by region of a basket of 19 basic 
foodstuffs and the average nominal wage by region in various sectors of the economy. I use a 
combination of these to reach a working solution in each chapter, maintaining, as above, that these 
solutions (though far from perfect) allow us to go further than would be possible with no solution 
at all. Given the importance of this issue, the extent of price variation and the available deflators 
are discussed at greater length in an Appendix to the thesis, which gives the details of all price 
indices used.
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Chapter 1
Are intergovernmental transfers equalizing?
1.1 Introduction
A system of intergovernmental transfers aimed at redistributing revenues across regions is a 
key requirement of any fiscal system in which expenditure responsibilities are decentralized. All 
such systems will have some degree of regional economic inequality, and the purpose of 
decentralization is not usually to allow richer areas to provide better services than poorer areas 
can afford, but rather to improve efficiency of provision and to increase local autonomy over 
how public funds should be spent and — perhaps — over the share of local income to spend 
collectively. Disparity in the quality of service provision which different regions can sustain is a 
side-effect which transfers must address if all individuals are to be treated as equals, both by 
the tax system and as pupils, patients or other beneficiaries of government services. Naturally, 
the greater the degree of disparity between regions in their own revenue-raising capability, the 
greater the need for a system of equalizing transfers. Similarly, the more important are the 
responsibilities given to regional authorities, the more important is the transfer system.
Oddly enough, in Russia, whose giant land mass covers eleven time zones and includes 
arctic desert, tundra, fertile farmland, military plants, oil fields and industrial wasteland, the 
need for transfers was initially overlooked in the restructuring of the fiscal system. In the 
confusion of the early transition, new laws established expenditure responsibilities for each 
level of government and laid out in detail the principles of revenue assignment, but no provision 
for a transfer system was made. In practice, of course, transfers proved essential and ad hoc 
mechanisms were introduced early on to accommodate them. In 1992 and 1993 they were made 
on the basis of non-transparent criteria in closed-door negotiations, but in 1994 an official 
transfer system was introduced, based on a specific fund and with allocations governed by a 
formula mechanism.
9
It is not immediately clear, however, that either negotiations or formula have resulted in the 
targeting of these transfers to the regions most in need of them. A number of recent studies 
have pointed to a series of problems. (See Bahl et ah, 1993; Le Houerou, 1994; Wallich. 1994; 
Kirkow, 1996; and in the Russian literature Boiko and Lavrov, 1995; Lavrov, 1995; and 
Ptitsin, 1996.) They have highlighted in particular the degree to which some transfers continued 
to be allocated behind closed doors even after 1994, the inappropriate criteria chosen for the 
formula, and the fact that a number of (wealthier) regions have been allowed to negotiate their 
own more favourable terms with the centre with obvious implications for would-be recipient 
regions. Some have pointed to the high number of regions receiving formula-based transfers as 
an indicator of an inadequate degree of targeting in the system (Lavrov, 1995b), while others 
have claimed that particular groups do well more because of political status than economic 
need. Solnick (1995), for instance, is among several who claim that regions with republic status 
do better than others.6
However, no study appears to have examined in detail the characteristics of the regions 
which do receive funds and attempted to quantify how far transfer receipts can indeed be 
explained by factors other than regional needs. There have been attempts to analyse the net 
revenue flows between Moscow and the regions, which include transfers as well as the tax 
receipts passed on from regional level to the centre. Using data for 1992, for example, 
Treisman's (1995) results suggest a more important role for political muscle than regional need 
in determining these flows, while McAuley (1996) finds a significant role for needs variables 
using 1995 data (although without attempting to control for political influence). However, first, 
these two sets of results cannot be compared as they use different methodology. No study 
seems to have looked at flows in more than one year. Second, while the balance of revenue 
flows may be interesting in itself, it is really rather a different issue; the net flows disguise the 
impact which transfers in particular are having.
Hence while the current provisions for transfer allocation are generally perceived to be 
unfair, the debate is not explicit about the degree to which they are unfair, which regions are 
suffering, and in particular about whether recent developments have improved the allocation or 
rather made it worse. In this chapter I try to address these issues. Using data for 1993, 1994 
and 1995 I ask how far intergovernmental transfers made for equalizing purposes have in 
practice reached those oblasts that need them, and how far, in contrast, their allocation can be 
explained by alternative factors such as regional influence and negotiating power. I also ask
6The fact that a number of regions pressed for republic status between 1993 and 1995 suggests that 
this perception has been widely shared.
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whether there has been a change in the pattern of distribution over the period; and in particular 
in 1994 after the introduction of the formula-based allocation system.
The chapter follows the following outline. I begin with a brief overview of the theory 
behind intergovernmental transfers, outlining their purpose and ideal design. I go on to describe 
the Russian fiscal system as it has developed since 1992, and especially -- with the theoretical 
ideal in mind -- the existing mechanisms for intergovernmental transfers. I then present some 
Lorenz and concentration curve analysis of own-revenues and transfers to give a preliminary 
overview of how far the latter have helped to even out disparities in the former. This raises a 
series of questions for which multivariate analysis is required. In Section 1.5 I set up two 
hypotheses to be tested, describe the econometric framework and introduce the explanatory 
variables used. Finally I present and discuss the results.
1.2 Intergovernmental transfers in principle: purpose and d esign
Transfers of revenue from one level of government to another are made in states with even a 
small degree of regional autonomy, and serve a series of different purposes (see e.g. Oates, 
1972, Chapter 3). First, they are used by central governments as a way of encouraging regional 
expenditure on particular goods, either because they have positive externalities for other 
regions (e.g. health care, social assistance), or because they are seen by the centre as merit 
goods (e.g. education).
Second, they are used to iron out imbalances of two types in the fiscal system. The first 
type has been referred to as ‘fiscal gap’ or ‘vertical imbalance’: a mismatch between the 
expenditure and revenue responsibilities allocated to each level of government in aggregate. If 
regional governments are responsible for 40% of expenditure but only gather 30% of revenue 
on the taxes allocated to them, transfers from central to regional level will be in order. Vertical 
imbalance may occur as a result of deliberate policy because central government is seen as 
most efficient at tax-raising even if local government is best placed to make or implement 
decisions, or it may occur because of lack of foresight in the design of the fiscal system.
The second type of imbalance is sometimes called ‘horizontal imbalance’, or more 
frequently, ‘horizontal inequity’ (Buchanan, 1950). Where revenues raised per capita vary 
across regions, an individual living in a poorer region will have to pay a higher proportion of 
income for the same level of service as an identical individual earning exactly the same in a 
richer region. This contradicts what has been described as ‘perhaps the most widely accepted 
principle of equity in taxation’: that ‘people in equal positions should be treated equally’
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(Musgrave, 1959, p.I60). Transfers of revenues across regions are needed to iron this 
inequality out. Where regional income disparities are large, the implications of the inequity 
become more serious: not only will poorer regions have to tax individuals more heavily, they 
may find themselves unable to provide public services to an adequate level on the strength of 
their own tax base.
It is this last category of transfers that I am concerned with in this chapter, those intended 
to equalize revenues horizontally across regions. How should such transfers be designed? While 
grants intended to encourage expenditure on particular goods clearly need to be earmarked for 
those goods, the literature suggests that grants intended to iron out fiscal imbalance of either 
type (vertical or horizontal) should be unconditional and lump-sum so as not to compromise 
local autonomy (Oates, op.cit.).7 However, while unconditional grants to cover general 'fiscal 
gap* would probably be identical (per capita) to all regions, equalizing grants clearly need to be 
targeted to those regions most in need.
Regional ‘need’ in this context has two main components: poor fiscal capacity and high 
pressure on regional services, where the latter itself comprises two key elements — size of 
demand and the unit cost of provision. The challenge in designing a system of equalizing 
transfers is to account for each of these factors where it is beyond the control of the authorities 
but not otherwise. Thus regions with low revenue resulting from a small revenue base are needy 
while those with low revenue resulting from weak tax effort are not. Similarly, regions which 
face high unit costs due to scattered populations or high transport costs are needy while those 
spending inefficiently, or choosing to provide a higher standard of service than is seen as 
adequate, are not.
Every country with any degree of local fiscal autonomy has faced the problem of how to 
ensure that equalizing grants really go to those regions most in need. The simplest approach has 
been to avoid the problem of distinguishing factors under authority control from those beyond 
their control by giving the authority the benefit of the doubt. Thus in India, for example, the 
approach has essentially been a ‘gap-filling’ one: with some modifications, actual revenues and 
actual expenditures are taken as the measures of fiscal capacity and expenditure need; transfers 
are designed to make up part or all of the difference (see Rao and Sen, 1995, especially p.22). 
However, the Indian system has been attacked for obvious reasons: Rao and Aggarwal (1991), 
who compare the authorities in charge of allocation to ‘fiscal dentists filling budgetary
7This is true unless of course equity is sought not in a general package of public goods but only in 
certain specific ones, in which case conditional grants could be more effective (Hofman and Wang, 
1993, p.27).
cavities’, note that it faces ‘severe criticism’ on the grounds that it encourages laxity in fiscal 
management while discouraging tax effort (p.9).
The alternative way of estimating expenditure need is to measure local factors contributing 
to higher spending levels directly. In Denmark, a highly complex formulae has been developed 
which includes as variables numbers of children of different ages, numbers of elderly and 
kilometres of road (Lotz, 1981). The Danish system is more than usually sophisticated, but in 
general expenditure need is proxied using this sort of methodology rather that of the Indian 
model (see e.g. Norton, 1994; Council of Europe, 1997). Similarly, revenue capacity tends to 
be estimated using direct indicators of the strength of the local tax base (the value of property, 
where local revenues are raised through property tax, for instance), rather than on the basis of 
actual revenues raised in previous years.
1.3 Intergovernmental transfers in the R u ss ian  fiscal system
1.3.1 The need for transfers
In Russia the question of intergovernmental transfers is a new one, as in the Soviet era both 
expenditure and funding decisions were highly centralized. Although in principle many 
responsibilities were delegated to lower levels of government, including almost all health care 
and all pre-university education, in practice the degree of autonomy was limited. Minimum 
levels of service provision and maximum levels of expenditure were enforced from above, with 
the budget of each government level supervised by the next level up and any surpluses 
automatically extracted at the end of each Fiscal year (this is discussed in a little more detail in 
Chapter 2). While this deprived local authorities of any real control, it did ensure that any 
disparities in oblast expenditure were more likely to be the result of central decision-making 
than of regional economic inequality.8
Since 1992, oblast responsibilities have become much more substantive, while the relative 
size of the oblasts’ burden has increased considerably. More expenditure responsibilities have 
been delegated to the local level from the centre (income maintenance programmes and some 
capital expenditure), while many responsibilities previously handled by local enterprises 
(kindergartens and polyclinics) have been divested to local authorities. Table 1.1 gives an 
indication of the extent to which the role of the oblast increased between 1992 and 1995. As a 
point of comparison, 37% of total expenditure in the USA in 1982 came from state level or
8 However, given that central authorities were probably not fully informed about regional variation in 
provision costs, some unintended variation in real spending is likely to have existed.
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Table 1.1: Sub-national level budgetary expenditure as a percentage o f total budgetary- 
expenditure in various categories 1992-95
1992 1993 1994 1995
Total Expenditures 30 44 44 46
National Economy 27 71 71 73
Social Expenditures 70 83 82 85
Education 66 81 80 85
Health and physical culture 88 89 88 91
Social Protection 43 77 87 82
Culture 49 68 64 70
Source: Ministry of Finance data reported in Dmitriev (1996). Notes: ‘National Economy* includes capital 
investment, subsidies to industry and housing subsidies. All figures are exclusive of ‘extra-budgetary* 
expenditure, meaning that the Soda] Protection category does not include pensions, maternity benefit, health 
insurance or unemployment benefit and insurance. All of these are paid from centralized extra-budgetary funds 
financed from payroll taxes.
below, roughly equivalent to the situation in Russia in 1992 (Glendening and Mann Reeves, 
1984, p.228). Since 1993, though, almost half of all Russian budgetary expenditure has been 
the responsibility of the oblast or sub-oblast level. The oblast role is particularly important 
where social expenditures are concerned: over 80% of social expenditure now comes from sub­
national government.
The most significant impact on oblast autonomy, however, was made by the passage of the 
Law on the Basic Principles of Taxation in January 1992, which gave oblasts real control for 
the first time over the resources allocated to them. The revenues from each tax were to be 
assigned to a particular level of government: revenues from Personal Income Tax (PIT), 
Corporate Income Tax (CIT) and 21 additional minor taxes were to go to the oblast, and Value 
Added Tax (VAT), all taxes on foreign trade and international transactions and all energy 
excise duties to the centre. Once allocated, these revenues were to remain the property of the 
relevant government level. Budget surpluses would no longer be appropriated by higher level 
authorities.
Naturally, the reverse side of this was that budget deficits would no longer be automatically 
covered, and this highlights the major flaw in the system as initially designed. Oblasts were 
faced with growing expenditure responsibilities on the one hand and real control over the funds 
raised through assigned taxes on the other, but the decentralization of expenditure 
responsibilities was carried out quite separately from the design of the revenue-assignment
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system, and there was no reason to expect one to cover the other — either at the aggregate level 
(to ensure vertical balance) or at the level of the individual region (to ensure horizontal equity). 
The problem of vertical imbalance was exacerbated by the fact that rates for all the major taxes 
continued to be set at the centre, preventing oblasts from adjusting tax rates and bands to suit 
their own requirements.9 This ensured that individuals faced identical tax rates regardless of 
where they lived, but meant that they would face widely differing qualities of service: wealthier 
regions would automatically retain more revenue per capita than poorer regions. In 1993, for 
instance, the top 10 regions raised on average nine times as much per capita as the bottom 10.
1.3.2 The design of the transfer mechanism
Although no initial provision was made to deal with either of these problems, in practice 
mechanisms were developed to address both. To deal with vertical imbalance, adjustments were 
made to the original tax share rates, most notably with respect to VAT. In the original system, 
all revenues raised from VAT should have been transferred to the federal government; in 
practice this never happened and VAT revenues have been partially retained by the region since 
1992. For the last three quarters of 1992 the region’s share was fixed for all regions at 20%, in 
1993 retention rates were negotiated individually with each region, and in 1994 a uniform rate 
was fixed at 25%. In practice, however, even these rates were not adhered to: retention rates 
have varied across regions in all periods. The motivation for this could have been to address 
both vertical and horizontal imbalance simultaneously, or alternatively it could simply have 
been the result of preferential treatment enjoyed by politically important or powerful regions. I 
return to this below.
A second measure which has arguably been used as a means of addressing vertical 
imbalance is the making of transfers under the umbrella heading of ‘mutual settlements*. In 
principle these represent the net balance of a range of intergovernmental transactions and could 
flow either way (to or from the centre); in practice though every region has always been a net 
recipient. The settlements cover expenses which are federal responsibilities but given to regions 
to carry out, and also compensation for central decisions which lead either to a loss in income 
on the part of regional budgets (due to changes in tax rates) or to growth in regional 
expenditures (due for example to a rise in the minimum pension or the minimum wage) 
(Bogacheva, 1995, p.37). As such their role does seem to be to counter vertical imbalance, 
although it is not clear how effective they are: their lack of transparency and the fact that they
9 This rule was only amended for the first time in 1996, when oblasts gained the right to set their own 
rate of profit tax.
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have no foundation in budgetary law has left them open to charges of arbitrariness and 
subjectivity (see e.g. Lavrov* 1995, p.31).
My concern here, however, is with the mechanisms introduced to deal with questions o f 
horizontal imbalance, or interregional inequality. Despite the fact that no provision was made 
for them in the original budget laws, ‘subventions’, or transfers intended to support oblasts too 
weak to finance their expenditure responsibilities, have in practice been made in Russia since 
1992. Until 1994, their distribution was determined in closed door negotiations, and there was 
no obvious logic to the process. But in 1994 an attempt was made to rationalize their allocation 
and make it transparent, with the establishment of the Federal Fund for Financial Support 
(FFFS). Transfers from the Fund, which was initially assigned 22% of all VAT revenues, are 
allocated to regions needing ‘some support* and regions needing ‘considerable support*, on a 
formula basis. The formula is laid out in full in Appendix B, but in essence it works as follows. 
Regions which had below average per capita revenues in a base year (initially 1993 but later 
changed to 1991) are classified as in need of ‘some support’; those that would have had 
difficulty in meeting their expenditure requirements even after the first round of subventions are 
classified as in need of ‘considerable support’. The amount allocated to each region in the first 
category depends on the degree to which they fall below the average per capita revenue level, 
but is also positively related to average per capita expenditures in the wider area in which the 
region is located.10 The amount allocated to regions qualifying in the second category is simply 
a function of the size of their budget deficit (again in the base year), i.e. the degree to which 
their expenditures would have exceeded their revenues without this second round of transfers. 
The formula remained unchanged in 1995, although the Fund was increased to 27% of VAT 
revenues.
How does this system square with the demands of theory? As noted in Section 1.2, an 
equalizing transfer system needs to take account of two factors: the revenue-raising capability 
of the system, and the demand made on the region’s services, where this covers both the size o f 
the relevant population affected and the cost of providing these services where this is beyond 
the authorities* control.
In essence, the Russian system is similar to the Indian one in taking a ‘gap-filling’ 
approach to both factors. As the proxy for revenue-raising capability, the formula takes the 
actual sum of revenues raised per capita in a base year (1993). In the Russian context, this 
carries with it not only the problem of favouring those regions which have low revenues
,0The 88 oblasts are grouped into 11 ‘economic areas’: North, North-West, Central, Volgo-Vyatskiy, 
Black Earth, Volga, North Caucasus, Urals, Western Siberia, Eastern Siberia and the Far East. The 
classification is essentially descriptive and has little operational significance.
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because they are less rigorous about tax collection, but also that of favouring those which 
channel money into ‘extra-budgetary funds’ (EBFs); funds set up for specific purposes and not 
included in the budget.11 However, while the distinction between revenues raised and revenue- 
raising capacity is likely to be important, it is plausible that the former will serve as a rough 
proxy for the latter given the extent of regional variation in economic strengths. The nine-fold 
difference noted above between per capita revenues in the top ten and bottom ten regions is. 
after all, more likely to be driven by differences in capacity than by variation in effort. 
Furthermore, the obstacles to measuring fiscal capacity directly under current conditions are 
perhaps sufficient to justify this approach in the medium-term.
Potentially more problematic is the use of actual expenditures in the base year to proxy 
both aspects of pressure on regional budgets -- size of demand and cost of service provision. 
Again, the advantages of this approach are clear: it is simple and transparent, avoiding the 
complications of a formula based on a long series of indicators representing pressure on public 
services and cost of provision. These are particular strengths in a country where provision costs 
vary enormously across regions due to transportation costs, climate and compensating wage 
differentials for workers in colder and more remote parts of the country.12 But the problems of 
this method are equally obvious: it rewards cost inefficiency in expenditure, and it preserves the 
status quo, allowing regions with high expenditure levels to continue spending high, while 
penalizing regions with low expenditure levels in the base year, even where this has been due to 
financial constraint. In the first round of the formula allocation some attempt is made to control 
for these effects: grants to regions qualifying as in need of ‘some support’ are weighted not by 
own expenditure levels but by the average in the surrounding area. But this in itself has been 
criticized on the grounds that economic areas are far from homogenous with respect to the 
important variables, cost in particular (Lavrov, 1995, p.32). In any case, it is the region’s own 
per capita expenditures that are the relevant factor in the second round.
As discussed in Section 1.2, the gap-filling method is not a standard one, with most 
countries attempting to measure expenditure needs directly rather than through the cloak of past
n There are four main federal EBFs which are funded through a compulsory payroll tax (the Pension 
Fund, the Employment Fund, the Medical Insurance Fund and the Social Insurance Fund), but I refer 
here to the smaller EBFs set up at oblast level. These are typically funded through ‘voluntary 
contributions’, but it is not unlikely that local authorities and local enterprises might reach some 
agreement on contributions. The number of oblast level EBFs have multiplied since 1992, but their 
importance is hard to estimate precisely as data on them are not generally available.
12The coefficient of variation for the price of a basket of staples in December 1994 was about 0.3, 
compared with a similar coefficient of 0.07 for another large federation, Canada, in 1991 (De Masi 
and Koen, 1995). Appendix A discusses these price disparities in greater detail. Largely they result 
from transportation and delivery costs; variation in the cost of provision of public services ought to be 
yet higher, due to compensating wage differentials and heating bills.
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practice. Thus the new Russian formula mechanism seems to be rather out on a limb from the 
start. However, it is always possible that, in the Russian case, past levels of expenditure really 
do reflect cost and demand differentials for service provision, justifying the approach. 
Alternatively, past spending levels could simply reflect relative privilege in the Soviet era, in 
which case the formula would appear to bias transfer allocation towards relatively well-off 
oblasts. This forms part of the question I hope to get to the bottom of below.
1.3.3 The transfer mechanism In practice
Up to this point I have been concerned with the transfer system as it was designed. Several 
additional issues arise when we turn to look at how it has worked in practice. First, it seems 
that some two thirds of the FFFS in 1994 (and about one fourth in 1995) was allocated 
indirectly through additional variation in the VAT retention share. It will be recalled that the 
oblast’s share of VAT receipts was theoretically fixed at a uniform rate of 25% in 1994 but 
that in practice the proportion retained varied widely. This appears to have been the result o f 
oblast bargaining to retain an additional share of VAT to cover part or all of their allocated 
share of the Fund, rather than sending the VAT to the centre and then waiting for transfers to 
be made in return.13 As the Fund’s resources came from VAT revenues, there was a certain 
logic to this process. Certainly regions which succeeded in following it benefited: in a context 
of high inflation any time lost waiting for non-indexed sums is expensive. Transfers are in 
principle made quarterly, but in addition there are often delays.14 Quarterly inflation rates have 
been as high as 50% over the period; a three month waiting period might thus result in a region 
losing one third of the real value of its allocation.
The implications of this for the analysis below are two-fold. First and obvious, variations 
in VAT retention rates over and above the uniform 25% need to be included as part of the 
region’s receipt of transfers from the Fund. And second, given that a region may benefit 
substantially from retaining extra VAT rather than waiting for transfers, we might want to ask 
which were the regions which managed to do this. It seems plausible that the successful regions 
would have been those able to pull the most weight, but an alternative (if unlikely) hypothesis 
would be that VAT retentions were used to give immediate assistance to oblasts really in need. 
A further question is whether the formula was really fully adhered to in practice, whether
13That this is the explanation of much of the variation in VAT retentions and of the fact that direct 
transfers from the FFFS total far below 22% of VAT revenue is suggested by the data, and is 
supported by analysis in Lavrov (1995).
14Ptitsin (1996), Minister of Finance for the Sakha Republic, claims two to three month lags are 
standard.
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through direct transfers or VAT retentions. There is some evidence that in fact actual shares 
varied from the shares dictated by the formula (see Lavrov, 1994) but the formula is so 
designed that it is close to impossible to work out exactly what each region should have 
received (see Appendix B). For the purposes of this thesis I stick to analysis of transfers 
actually received, whether or not these were fully provided for in the formula.
A second issue is that some regions have simply refused to follow the rules as laid down 
and have imposed their own unilaterally determined tax retention rates. Four regions in 
particular withheld all or almost all their revenues from the centre in both 1993 and 1994 -  
Karelia, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Sakha (Yakutia); Sakha continued to hold onto 100% of 
taxes raised through 1995. Clearly in a data set on transfers and VAT retentions these regions 
will show up as what they are — extreme beneficiaries, with VAT retentions of close to 100%. 
But if we control for the special status accorded them they need not bias the analysis below.
More problematic are the numerous regions (19 in total) which followed the example of the 
above four in withholding revenues in 1993, but whose demands were met less favourably by 
the centre. While the four regions listed had special regimes legitimized in bilateral agreements 
by the end of the year, all others faced ‘strongly worded threats of sanctions’ which had led 
them to comply with fiscal regulations in full by the end of the year (Birkenes, 1997, p.2/3). 
The problem is that taxes should in principle be transferred quarterly, so by holding out until 
the end of the year regions in fact made a substantial gain, given the high rate of inflation and 
the fact that back payments were not indexed. Naturally however this gain does not show up in 
annual budget figures: these regions appear to have transferred roughly the same share of profit 
and income taxes as all other regions. Unfortunately, in the absence of quarterly retention data 
there is not much that can be done about this problem and 1 am forced to ignore the probable 
benefits enjoyed by these recalcitrant regions.
A final point worthy of note is the large sum received annually by Moscow. In 1993 in 
particular Moscow received a ‘subvention’ from the federal government roughly the same size 
as all direct grants made from the FFFS; in later years the amount was much smaller with 
respect to other transfers but still substantial. These subventions are made under a special 
article of the budget law which provides for additional support to Moscow to cover expenses 
arising from its role as capital. I exclude these transfers from the analysis below on the grounds 
that we know (up to a certain point) why Moscow receives these funds, and although there is no 
transparency to how much it receives, the process is presumably somewhat unique, not to be 
confused with the process determining other transfers.
To summarize this section, there are two key reasons to expect that allocation of 
‘equalizing’ transfers may not have been ideal even after the introduction of the formula
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mechanism. First, the terms of the transfer formula show a ‘gap-filling’ approach in which 
actual revenues represent revenue raising potential and actual expenditures expenditure needs: 
these may or may not be reliable proxies. Second, transfers appear to have been partly 
distributed through variations in the VAT retention rate, which may have been to the benefit of 
regions able to exercise influence over the centre. I now turn to look at the allocation of these 
transfers in practice. In the next section I present an overview of the data, before going on in 
Section 1.5 to outline the hypotheses I wish to test and to introduce the analytical framework.
1.4 A  preliminary look at the data
Turning to look at the actual allocation of transfers there are two immediate questions. First, 
how large are transfers as a share of total oblast revenues? Second, do they appear to have been 
equalizing? The proportion of oblast revenues comprised of all types of intergovernmental 
transfer taken together has varied considerably since 1992, rising steadily to reach almost 24% 
of oblast revenues by 1994, and then dropping by almost half between 1994 and 1995. (This 
drop is driven by the fall in size of ‘mutual settlements’ and is explained further below.) The 
1994 level is roughly equivalent to the share of federal grants in state and local government 
expenditure in the US in 1980 (Rich, 1989, p. 193), but the 1995 level is low by most 
international standards. The OECD average for intergovernmental grants as a share o f 
consolidated (central and local) budget expenditure is about 14% (Le Houerou, 1994, p. 15); 
the 1995 level for Russia corresponds to just 6-7% of the Russian consolidated budget.
Furthermore, transfers from ‘equalization funds* are themselves only a proportion of the 
total sum of transfers made, as illustrated in Table 1.2, which gives the trend in the size o f 
different types of transfers over time. The table demands some explanation. ‘Subvention’ was 
the term given to transfers apparently used for equalization in 1992 and 1993; they disappeared 
with the introduction of the FFFS. ‘Subventions to Moscow’ mean the special provision made 
for Moscow as capital. ‘Extra VAT retentions’ are counted as any VAT retained over and 
above 30%; the official retention rate was 25% but I choose a higher cut-off point to prevent 
regions moving from the category of ‘transfer receiving’ to the category of ‘non-transfer 
receiving’ simply as a result of calculation differences. As noted, there is evidence that extra 
VAT retentions were used as a means of distributing equalization transfers after 1994; I 
include them as ‘equalizing’ for 1993 as well for comparison purposes and also because it is 
plausible that their function would not have changed from one year to the next.
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Table 1.2: Intergovernmental transfers as a percentage o f total oblast revenues 1992-95
1992 1993 1994 1995
Total Federal Transfers 11.9 19.8 23.4 12.4
‘Equalization funds’ 5.4 8.3 8 .0 9.2
incl. Subventions 5.4 2.7
Subventions to Moscow 1 .0 2.3 0 . 8
Transfers from FFFS 2 .0 6 .1
Extra VAT retentions 4.5 3.7 2.3
‘Mutual settlements’ 5.9 11.4 14.8 2.9
Other (subsidies, short-term loans) 0.7 0.3 0 .6 0.4
Sources: Ministry of Finance data, author's calculations. Notes: 1992 and 1993 data (with the exception of VAT 
retention data) are published in World Bank (1995). ‘Extra VAT retentions* are calculated as any VAT retained 
by the oblast above 30% of VAT collected there.
As Table 1.2 illustrates, transfers from ‘equalization funds’ were dwarfed in 1993 and 
1994 by transfers made as ‘mutual settlements’, the payments made to compensate regional 
authorities for central decisions affecting regional revenues or expenditures. In 1994 equalizing 
transfers formed only one third of total transfers made.
The picture given for 1995, however, is more promising, despite the fall in the share of 
total transfers in oblast revenues. The fall is explained entirely by the near disappearance of 
mutual settlements, perhaps reflecting a clearer distribution of responsibilities between 
government levels as the fiscal system settles down. At the same time, the expansion of the size 
of the FFFS in 1995 meant that equalization funds grew substantially; by 1995 equalization 
transfers formed three quarters of total transfers made. Concentrating on the distribution of 
equalizing transfers at the expense of mutual settlements, as is done in this chapter, might seem 
odd in the 1992-94 context. But the fact that this type of transfer appears to be growing in 
importance, while mutual settlements may have been simply an transitional arrangement, 
justifies the decision. Even if they are still relatively small, if equalizing transfers are going to 
the regions most in need then the system is moving in the right direction.
But what can we say about the distribution of these transfers? To give a preliminary 
picture. Figures 1.1 to 1.3 show Lorenz curves for own revenue retentions and concentration 
curves for additional VAT retentions and direct transfers. (Only 76 regions are included: 
Ingushetia and the 11 Autonomous Oblasts are dropped as not enough data are available for 
them. Altogether the dropped regions contain only 3% of the national population.) This is a 
one-sided way of approaching the question: as already highlighted there are many other
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components of regional need than revenues. However the figures are still an illustrative way o f 
showing distribution with respect to one key variable. 15
The figures are drawn for the distribution of total population, where each individual is 
treated as a ‘recipient’ of the average per capita revenue or transfer level in the region in which 
they live. All individuals from the same region will hence be identical and rank next to each 
other, while the proportion of x-axi$ space representing each region will depend on the region’s 
population size. The distribution of own revenues per capita prior to any transfers is 
represented as a classic Lorenz curve: the x-axis shows the cumulative proportion of the 
population ranked from poorest to richest in terms of the per capita revenue level in their 
oblast, and the y-axis the cumulative proportion of total oblast revenues received by the 
corresponding proportion of people. If all oblasts had the same per capita revenue the Lorenz 
curve for revenues would run along the 45° line; in reality a Lorenz curve will always drop 
below this line.
Figure 1.1
Lorenz and concentration curves for revenue/transfer receipts 1993
Percentage of population (cumulative)
,5The figures are drawn for revenues and transfers deflated to Moscow 1991 prices using a regional 
Consumer Price Index weighted by the price of a basket of 19 food products in December 1992 (see 
Appendix A for details). All monetary variables used in this chapter are deflated in the same way. The 
idea is that, as price levels and inflation rates vary substantially across the Russian Federation an 
analysis of any monetary indicator considered in nominal terms could be quite misleading. The 
indices used are not ideal for deflating budgetary data — for example, they fail to take account of 


























































Lorenz and concentration curves for revenue/transfer receipts 1994
■ 45 degree line
-------- Revenues pre-eura VAT
— — -  E ura VAT
— — -  Direct transfers (FFFS)
— Estra VAT plus direct transfers
Figure 1.3
Lorenz and concentration curves for revenue/transfer receipts 1995
The concentration curves are then drawn with population again ranked along the x-axis in 
terms of their region’s per capita revenue but with the y-axis representing the proportion of 
total transfers (or additional VAT retentions) received by the corresponding proportion of 
people. Thus if transfers were equalizing we would expect the concentration curves to rise 
above the 45° line: the poorest 10% of the population ranked by oblast per capita revenue 
should receive more than 1 0 % of transfers.
The figures reveal several interesting patterns. First, in each year the curve representing 
direct transfer receipts rises clearly above the 45° line, showing a definite equalizing impact 
with respect to revenue receipts. In 1993 for example, the ‘poorest’ 50% of the population lived 
in regions which controlled between them less than 30% of total revenues, but which received 
over 80% of all direct transfers made. However, no trend towards greater equalization in direct 
transfer receipts is displayed over the period: the curves for direct transfers in 1994 and 1995 
(after the introduction of the formula) are in fact closer to the 45° line than in 1993.
Second, the distribution of transfers through the additional VAT share mechanism appears 
in all years to have been substantially less equalizing than the distribution of direct transfers. 
This is particularly true in 1993, when the curve for additional VAT retentions not only falls 
well below the 45° line but even (at higher revenue levels) below the Lorenz curve for revenue 
receipts: additional VAT retentions were still more unevenly distributed than initial own- 
revenue retentions. In 1994 and 1995 however, the pattern of allocation of additional VAT is 
much more similar to that of direct transfers. The result is that when both types of transfer are 
combined, the overall impact (shown in each graph by an unbroken line) is noticeably more 
equalizing in 1994 and (especially) 1995 than in 1993. In 1993 the bottom 50% of the 
distribution received between them about half of the total sum of transfers; by 1995 their share 
had increased to almost 70%.
If additional VAT retentions are treated as a regular part of the transfer process (and 
simply a means of distributing part of the allocation determined through the formula system) 
then it would appear that the introduction of the FFFS and the formula in 1994 did improve the 
allocation. At the same time, the difference in the distributions of the two forms of transfer 
suggest that regions are still able to use their influence, if not to affect the total nominal amount 
received, then to affect the time at which it is received. In a high inflation environment this in 
turn means affecting the real sum. The evidence given by the figures is that the regions 
benefiting from receipt in the form of VAT retention are not the regions most in need.
It needs to be noted however that the difference in the two patterns represents to some 
degree at least the impact of the handful of regions following their own individual fiscal rules. 
Sakha (Yakutia), Tatarstan and Bashkortostan all show up on the charts as steep slopes in the
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richest fifth of the VAT retention curve. Each of these regions effectively refused to participate 
in the system and negotiated their own arrangements with the federal government; as a result in 
1993 they submitted no VAT to the centre. This appears to be what is driving the sharp degree 
of inequality observed in the distribution of VAT retentions in Figure 1.1: these three regions 
together, representing some 6 % of the population, between them retain close to 40#  of all VAT 
retentions. By 1994 Tatarstan and Bashkortostan had both begun to hand over some of the 
revenue, retaining only 70% in total in 1994 and 60% in 1995. Only Sakha continued to retain 
all VAT through 1995. This probably explains the change in the shape of the VAT retention 
curves over the period. It could also be the explanation of why regions which receive transfers 
as VAT retentions and not through the centre appear to be those less in need.
That this is the explanation of the shape of the curves for VAT retentions is supported by 
the evidence in Table 1.3, which shows two measures of disparity, the decile ratio and the 
quartile ratio, for revenues inclusive and exclusive of additional VAT retentions and direct 
transfers. Measures for expenditures per capita are also included; these reflect the impact of all 
other subsidies and transfers, including those of the ‘mutual settlements* referred to above. 
These ratios, which are not affected by the four regions following their own fiscal rules, give a 
different impression to that given by the Lorenz curves: they suggest that in each of the three 
years both additional VAT allocations and direct transfers have had an equalizing impact on 
the allocation; and furthermore that this impact has been broadly similar in size in each year. 
The table also shows the trend in the disparities themselves, which the Figures were unable to 
do: we see rising disparities in own per capita revenues over the period, feeding through into 
rising disparities in per capita expenditure, particularly as measured by the decile ratio.
To try to test the patterns revealed here in a wider context I now move on to multivariate 
analysis. This will allow me to control formally for the influence of the ‘special case’ regions, 
and to introduce both a wider range of variables to represent regional need and some proxies
Table 1.3: Decile and quartile ratios for regional per capita revenues before and after 
transfers (76 regions)
Decile ratio Quartile ratio
1993 1994 1995 1993 1994 1995
Own revenues per capita 3.30 3.23 3.85 1.78 1.72 1.95
plus extra VAT 3.07 2.95 3.41 1.65 1.56 1.64
plus direct transfers 2.32 2.41 2.53 1.48 1.45 1.46
Expenditures per capita 2.18 2.19 2.63 1.46 1.40 1.52
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for regional power. Below I define my hypotheses» discuss the econometric framework chosen 
for each and introduce the possibilities for explanatory variables. In Section 1. 6  I present and 
discuss the results.
1.5 Hypotheses, econom etric framework and explanatory  
variables
1.5.1 Hypotheses
The primary aim of the multivariate analysis is to isolate the characteristics of the regions that 
received ‘equalizing transfers’ in 1993, 1994 and 1995. In a successful equalizing system, 
recipient regions should be characterized by a variety of ‘need’ indicators, representing both 
weak fiscal capacity and strong pressure on services. In contrast, in a corrupt system, or in one 
in which theoretically equalizing transfers are in practice used to alternative ends, recipients 
would be characterized by a series of quite different indicators, representing their political 
influence, their ability to negotiate or the potential threat they pose to the centre. The 
multivariate analysis aims to test the importance of one set of variables against the other.
This is a general framework which has been used in a series of studies of the allocation of 
transfers in other large federations. (See for example Holcombe and Zardkoohi, 1982; 
Grossman, 1994; and Peterson, 1995, on the distribution of federal grants in the USA, and 
Bungey et al., 1991, on Australia.) The hypothesis that needs are the main determinants o f 
transfers, referred to as the ‘efficiency/equity/ideology’ hypothesis, or ‘functional theory’ (since 
transfers fulfill their equalizing function), is tested against that of the ‘public choice’ hypothesis 
or ‘legislative theory’ (grants will be awarded according to the private agendas of legislators).
In the Russian case, where post-1994 allocation is governed by a simple formula 
mechanism, the room for public choice type explanations would appear to be limited. The 
formula does seem to be open to small measures of interpretation (see Appendix B) , 16 while the 
design of the formula itself may have been subject to influence: the choice of actual past 
expenditure as the proxy for expenditure needs clearly benefits certain regions more than 
others. However, short-term political factors will certainly have less capacity than before to
,6In the Australian case most grants are also formula-allocated, but in some cases the formulae are 
complicated enough to allow some subjective interpretation, allowing political factors a foothold 
(Bungey et al., 1991). In the Russian case the degree of ‘interpretation* possible will be limited, 
revolving around the means of adjusting past expenditure needs to current conditions.
influence outcomes. At the same time the replacement of a system of ad hoc bargaining with a 
formula mechanism ought in principle to have improved the direction of transfers to regions in 
need. I therefore formulate my main hypothesis as follows:
H 1.1 Despite the doubts surrounding the design of the 1994 formula mechanism, its
introduction led to an improvement in the allocation of equalization funds: transfers 
were higher after its introduction to regions with low fiscal capacity and high needs; 
and lower to regions with political influence or power.
This means comparing the parameters of three equations:
TRANSj93 = P i Nj93 + y j ^ 9 3  + ( U )
TRANSj9 4  = P2  ^ ¡ 9 4  + Y2p i94 + Ei2 ( 1 .2 )
TRANSi 9 5  = P3 N1 9 5  + y3  Pj9 5  + q 3 (1.3)
where TRANSjt is the level of ‘equalizing’ transfers per capita made to oblast i in year t 
(directly or via extra VAT retentions), N is a vector of needs indicators, P a vector of ‘power* 
indicators and the ps and ys corresponding vectors of coefficients. At its simplest, H l.l is 
essentially the hypothesis that the ps will be significantly larger in absolute size (with 
unchanged sign) in Equations 1.2 and 1.3 than in Equation 1.1, while the opposite will be true 
of the ys.
Given that (at least in 1994 and 1995) the variation in VAT retentions was apparently used 
as a means of distributing legitimate transfers from the FFFS, in all years I treat transfers as 
equivalent whether they came directly from the Fund or whether they were given as VAT 
retentions. In other words, in addressing Hypothesis 1.1 I take as my dependent variable 
TRANSjt, the sum of both these types of transfer. In practice however, as discussed in Section 
3.3, there is an important difference between the two. For all those regions which received 
transfers of some sort I therefore go on to ask the same question with respect to the proportion 
received as VAT transfer: was it regions in need that benefited, or regions with power? I thus 
formulate a second hypothesis:
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H 1.2 Oblast authorities continued to use their influence to affect the proportion of their 
allocation received in the form of VAT retention.
This involves examining the parameters of Equations 1.4-1.6 :
VATPERj9 3  -  74 p i93 + £¡4 (1.4)
VATPERi 9 4  = y5  P i 9 4  + ei5 (1.5)
VATPERj9 4  = Y6Pi94 + ei6 ( 1 .6 )
where VATPERft is the proportion of total transfers that oblast i receives in the form of 
additional VAT retentions in year t, and the ys the same vectors of power variables used in 
Equations 1-3. H1.2 is the hypothesis that the ys will be positive and significant in all three 
equations. In practice I also include a selection of the N variables used in Equations 1.1-1.3 as 
control variables.
1.5.2 Econometric framework
(a) Hypothesis 1.1: Tobit
Given the fact that not all oblasts received subventions at all in any of the three years 1993-95. 
I choose to use a Tobit framework to address Hypothesis 1.1. The dependent variables in 
Equations 1.1 -1.3 each have a concentration of values at zero and then a continuous 
distribution of values above zero (about one third of the observations are zeroes in 1993, falling 
to 1 0 % by 1995). Ordinary Least Squares estimation, which assumes all values to be part of a 
continuous distribution and ignores the qualitative difference between zeroes and non-zeroes, 
will therefore be an inappropriate estimation technique.
The Tobit itself imposes the assumption that a single underlying model determines both 
whether or not an oblast receives transfers and how much it receives (see for example Greene, 
1993, Chapter 22). This is perhaps unrealistic given that (post 1994 at least) we know the two 
processes to have been formally different. However, given that the purpose of the regressions is 
to identify and compare the characteristics of oblasts receiving transfers in different years, not 
to model the determination process itself, it is plausible that a Tobit would be sufficient. 
Furthermore, using a more general model, such as that developed by Cragg (1971), which
*****i«i ****tt tua
allows the two decisions to be modelled separately by combining a univariate probit model with 
a truncated regression model, would be costly: it would effectively double the number of 
parameters to be estimated. Given the small sample size I decide to stick with the Tobit. 17
For the Tobit model we define a new underlying variable y*, which is a linear function of 
the set of needs and power variables with which we hope to describe transfers, but each yj* is 
only observed if it is greater than zero. That is:
i
j
yj* = pN j + yPj + Ej E j ~ N ( 0 , a j2) (1.7) \
■ I
1i
where N and P are vectors of needs and power indicators respectively. But for each observation 'j
yj we observe: j
J
yi = yi* if y i*>o j
>. >
yj = 0  otherwise
Intuitively, y* stands for the level of transfer that would be received if a negative transfer ij
'1H
(or taxation) process operated according to the same mechanism as the actual transfer process. 1
' \
If we could observe y*. we would observe negative values for richer oblasts (if the mechanism j
was equalizing). In practice, as there is no negative transfer process, we observe yj = 0 ’ J
NN
wherever yj* would be negative: yj is essentially censored at zero, p and y are estimated by i:
maximum likelihood. j
(b) Hypothesis 1.2: Two Limit Tobit II
In testing Hypothesis 1.2 I drop for each year the observations which received no transfers at j
all. However, the censoring problem remains: as the dependent variable is measured as a ;
percentage it is naturally bounded both from below at zero and from above at 100. In practice j
in 1993 and 1994 there were no zero observations but a substantial proportion of 100s (20% in j
1993 and 13% in 1994). In 1995 only 5% of observations received all transfers in the form of ■}
>
VAT retention but 17% received none. ;
_  . -s
Again therefore an OLS framework would not appear to be appropriate. This time the
-i
choice of a Tobit as the alternative is more clear-cut, as censoring is not imposed by the .3
,7I did also estimate a Cragg model and established that for 1994 and 1995 there was some evidence 
that the parameters defining those oblasts which received subventions differed from those defining 
how much was received. However, the differences were small and did not seem to warrant abandoning 
the benefits of the Tobit model.
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operation of a separate mechanism but results simply from measurement of the dependent 
variable in percentage terms. Thus we define a new underlying variable z*, a linear function of 
the set of needs and power variables, but this time each Zj* is only observed if is greater than 
zero or less than 100. That is:
zj* = pNj + yPj + £j ej~N(0,<jj2) (1.8)
where N and P are vectors of needs and power indicators respectively. But now for each 
observation zj we observe:
Zj = Zj* if 1 0 0  > zj* > 0
Zj = 1 0 0  if zj* > 1 0 0
Zj = 0 if Zj* < 0
The idea here is simply that no region can retain more than 100% or less than none of its 
transfers as VAT, no matter how high or low its recorded level of the explanatory variables. If 
the percentage of transfers an oblast receives in the form of VAT is determined by the oblast’s 
power, we can see zj* as an underlying unobserved variable representing this power we 
observe only zj, a percentage bounded from above and below.
1.5.3 Dependent variables
As discussed, the dependent variable in Hypothesis 1.1  is the sum of direct transfers received 
by the oblast as equalization funds, and the amount received as additional VAT retentions over 
and above 30%. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.4. Figures are in per capita 
terms and in Moscow 1991 prices, as deflated by the price index detailed in Appendix A. In all, 
76 oblasts are included: that is, all oblasts except Ingushetia and the 11 autonomous oblasts, 
for which not all data is available. (These 11 represent between them only about 3% of the total 
population.)
There are three interesting elements in Table 1.4. First, the mean level of transfers 
(excluding zeroes) fell by about one-third between 1993 and 1994, and in 1995 at 204 roubles 
per capita it was still lower than it had been before the introduction of the formula system. 
Second, the number of regions receiving transfers increased dramatically: in 1993 2 1  regions
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out of 76 received nothing; by 1995 the figure was only 7 regions, less than 10%. That a 
greater number of regions are receiving transfers, and that they are receiving less each on 
average, does not suggest that there has been an improvement in targeting. The 1995 allocation 
would make sense only if there were 7 extremely wealthy regions able to support 69 oblasts in 
need, and this seems unlikely. The allocation could however still represent an improvement on 
the past if the oblasts ‘targeted’ in 1993 were not those most in need.
The third point worth noting is that the mean as measured over all 76 oblasts also fell 
substantially (some 30%) between 1993 and 1994, recovering almost but not entirely by 1995. 
Thus although the sum allocated to the FFFS increased between 1994 and 1995, this was still 
not enough to match the amount spent on transfers and extra VAT retentions in 1993.
The dependent variable in Hypothesis 1.2 is the percentage of total transfers which is 
received in the form of VAT retentions. Only regions which received some form of transfer are 
included as observations for each year. Furthermore, the four regions which received transfers 
simply because they did not participate in the system (and so received additional VAT by 
default) were also dropped, as the reason they received all transfers in the form of VAT 
retention is clear. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.5. I present statistics for all 
observations only.
Table 1.4: Descriptive statistics for dependent variables in Hl . l :  Transfers plus additional 










1993 269 195 44 749 168 2 1
1994 173 139 1 645 131 15
1995 204 185 5 909 165 7
Table 1.5. Descriptive statistics for dependent variables in H I.2: Percentage of total transfers 
received in form of VAT retentions








1993 51 52 32 0 8
1994 57 60 25 0 4
1995 65 2 1 2 0 11 1
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It is worth drawing attention in Table 1.5 to the large number of regions which benefited to 
some degree from additional VAT retentions. This was by no means a practice confined to the 
recalcitrant regions referred to in Section 3.3. In fact in 1993 and 1994 every single oblast to 
receive transfers received them at least in part in the form of additional VAT share. By 1995 
however VAT retention appears to have become far less important in the transfer process: one 
sixth received no extra VAT, only one received all transfers as VAT, and the mean share of 
VAT in total transfers had fallen to 20%.
1.5.4 Explanatory variables
The explanatory variables used to test H l.l fall into two broad categories -- those representing 
regional need and those intended to proxy regional power and influence in Moscow. Within the 
needs group two separate effects need to be covered, fiscal capacity and pressure on local 
services. The latter is itself the result of two separate factors, the size of demand and the unit 
cost of provision. The challenge is to include each of these factors but only insofar as they are 
beyond local authority control.
Needs variables
1. Fiscal capacity
The easy route in measuring fiscal capacity is to give local authorities the benefit of the doubt 
over tax collection and treat actual revenues collected per capita as a rough measure of revenue 
raising potential. This is essentially what the FFFS formula chooses to do, and there are fairly 
strong arguments for doing it here too. In a context in which direct measures of economic 
strength such as income levels, unemployment and oblast production levels all carry substantial 
measurement problems, actual revenues may be as accurate as any alternative, while their use 
makes the analysis decidedly more straightforward. I therefore follow the approach of the FFFS 
on this count, including as the first explanatory variable in each equation per capita oblast 
revenues prior to any transfers (lagged, i.e., for the year prior to that in which the transfers 
were made):
• Own revenues per capita in the year prior to transfers (measured in 1991 prices).
2. Pressure on services
The FFFS formula uses a combination of past levels of expenditures in the region in question 
and average past expenditures in the surrounding area as a proxy for both elements of
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Bexpenditure needs, demand for local services and unit cost of provision. Here I try to model the 
factors influencing expenditure needs directly.
(a) Demand for local services
1 initially tried including the following two variables as indicators of pressure on local 
education services on the one hand and on local health services on the other:
• Percentage o f the population under 16;
• Percentage o f the population over working age.
In practice however these two variables are quite strongly negatively correlated: regions 
with a high proportion of young people (often those in the North and Far East) tend to have 
fewer pensioners. Combining the two into a single variable (the proportion of the population 
not of working age) loses the effect of either, so I replace the population over working age with 
an alternative measure of demand on health care services:
• The infant mortality rate.
This variable ought also to reflect both weak inherited infrastructure in the health care 
sector and generally poor local conditions: infant mortality in developing countries tends to be 
highly correlated with poverty, and may therefore be a good proxy for poverty here. (Poverty 
headcount data is available by oblast for 1994 but there are question marks about its reliability, 
particularly as a comparative measure.) Life expectancy at birth was also tried as an alternative 
but infant mortality proved to be more effective.
(b) Cost of unit provision
Four variables were initially included to represent different costs of service provision facing 
regions:
• Dummy for Northern status: a dummy for regions partially located north of 67 degrees 
latitude, intended to pick up increased costs of transport and heating;
• Wage in the education sector, the average regional monthly wage in the education sector, 
deflated to Moscow 1991 prices. The point here is that, aside from nominal differences in 
wages resulting from price variation, 'compensating wage differentials* have traditionally
been paid to workers to encourage them to live in harsh parts of the country. These 
differentials represent an additional cost of employing each worker beyond the control of the 
authorities. (The education wage is intended as a proxy for all public sector wages.) I 
include the wage for 1992 on the grounds that since then regional authorities have had more 
control over public sector wages and differentials may partially represent preferences or 
wealth;
• Oblast population. Small regions may face higher unit costs of provision as they will be 
unable to exploit economies of scale. I try replacing this with the log of population, as the 
importance of changes in size is likely to diminish as the oblast gets bigger;
• Percentage o f the population urbanized. Again, economies of scale mean that the marginal 
cost of provision of goods and services is likely to fall as the concentration of the population 
in urban areas increases. Sparsely populated rural areas may require more funding per 
capita to provide the same level of services as more developed areas. (As cities increase in 
size diseconomies of scale may set in due to the costs of congestion and the higher price of 
factor goods, and it is possible that expenditure needs per capita start rising again. I tried 
including a Moscow City/St. Petersburg dummy but it was always insignificant.)
Power variables
There are a variety of different ways in which regions might exercise influence over the centre. 
I divide these into two broad categories — blackmail style tactics (threats) and ingratiating 
tactics (having friends in the right places).
To represent the first I include five variables. The first two are intended to represent 
respectively the likelihood and significance of a region withdrawing cooperation from the centre 
(that is, the importance of appeasing the region):
•  Republic status. Despite the fact that all regions are declared equal in the Constitution, the 
19 republics consider themselves to be more autonomous than other types of regions 
(oblasts, krai) and have been considerably more outspoken in their demands on the centre. 
They formed the bulk of the group of regions to call for sovereignty in 1992 and 1993, and 
were the first to sign bilateral fiscal agreements with the centre. 18 As a result they are 
widely held to have benefited from special treatment. This dummy for republican status is
18 These bilateral agreements have a legal foundation in the Constitution and provide a way for the 
federal government to try to appease uncooperative regions by bargaining over the exact delimitation 
of power between federal and regional governments (Birkenes, 1996, pp.22-25).
34
!intended to pick up the material effects of this status. (As republics are also in principle 
ethnically based, it should also pick up the effect of any transfers made to ease ethnic 
tension.)
•  The percentage o f national fuel production which is produced in the region. This is 
intended to represent the potential danger offered if a region does choose to secede.
The second pair of variables are included to represent different types of threat to the centre: 
on the one hand threat of civil unrest and on the other personal threat to Yeltsin’s power:
• Number o f workers on strike: the number of workers per 10,000 who went on strike in the 
year prior to that in which transfers were made.
• Support fo r Yeltsin 1993: the degree of support displayed for Yeltsin in the referendum of 
April 1993 (the percentage of voters to respond ‘yes’ to the question ‘Do you have 
confidence in the President of the Russian Federation, B.N.Yeltsin? ’ ) . 19 The idea here is 
that transfers may have been used to bribe regional leaders to come out in support of 
Yeltsin in areas where he was most likely to lose; hence we might expect a negative 
correlation between the ‘yes’ vote and receipt of transfers. (Alternatively, of course, 
transfers may have been used as a reward for well-behaved regions, in which case the 
coefficient would display the opposite sign.) Naturally this variable is more likely to be 
significant for 1993 transfers than for those in later years but no similar data is available 
afterwards until the Presidential election of 1996: data for elections to the Duma are much 
harder to interpret (see below) . 20
Finally I include a dummy variable for the four regions which enjoyed special status over 
the period:
; ?
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• Dummy fo r special status: a dummy included for Karelia, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and 
Sakha (Yakutia).
‘Threat’ variables are perhaps unique to a somewhat lawless situation such as that 
prevailing in the former Soviet Union, and are not usually included in analyses of transfer
19 Data from Mendras (1993).
20 It is worth noting however that there is fairly strong correlation — as might be expected — between 
the percentage of the electorate supporting Yeltsin in 1993 and in 1996. The coefficient of correlation 
for the two series is 0.70; with the final result changing in only 17 out of 76 regions (13 changing 
from ‘yes* to ‘no’; 4 from ‘no’ to ‘yes’).
35
«■oomuuuBeiiuueouuuuuuiJuaBBmm
allocation in more stable western democracies. In contrast, measures of the second type of 
influence, having friends in the right places, are included in these studies. The variables chosen 
however are generally along directly political lines, such as the proportion of regional 
representatives who come from the majority central party. In the Russian case the party system 
seems too ill-defined and too new to make party affiliation a good indicator of an oblast's 
influence.21 It seems more likely that past personal and political relationships will be of 
significance than the party a regional leader belongs to now. This is perhaps especially 
convincing when one considers that there is an 82% overlap between current regional elites and 
the old Soviet era regional nomenclature, and 75% overlap in central government and the 
presidential circle (Hanson, 1996, p.3).
If this is right, a variable representing the degree of privilege enjoyed by the oblast in the 
past may be a reasonable proxy for access to the ear of central authorities today. I therefore 
include one variable intended to pick up this privilege:
•  The percentage o f urban households with a private telephone at the end of the Soviet era
(1990).
For the analysis of Hypothesis 1.2 I use this same set of power variables and also include a 
selection of the needs variables to control for population size, regional wealth etc.: I include 
revenues per capita, population size and urbanization. In all cases, variables were taken for the 
year prior to that in which the transfer was made, except for urbanization (1992 for all 
regressions), the education wage (1992 for all regressions) and for variables clearly constant 
over time. These can be seen in Table 1.6 , where means and standard deviations are given for 
each explanatory variable.
2lSee Maximov (1995) on the difficulty of categorizing current parties even as far as pro- and anti­
reform. The large number of independent deputies complicates the issue further.
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Table 1.6 : Descriptive Statistics for explanatory variables (76 observations)
1993 1994 1995
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
NEEDS
Own revs per capita* 1,083 912 1,391 748 1.213 774
Population under 16 (%) 25 3.5 24 3.5 24 3.5
Infant mortality rate 17.8 3.0 19.7 3.4 18.6 2 .7
Northern (dummy) 7 positive values
Average wage education sector* 355 126 as 1993 as 1993
Population (thousands) 1,904 1,512 1,904 1,510 1,902 1,504
Population (log) 7.3 0.74 7.3 0.74 7.3 0.75
Urbanization (%) 69.2 13.0 as 1993 as 1993
POWER
Republic status (dummy) 19 positive values
National fuel production (%) 1.3 3.8 as 1993 as 1993
Workers on strike per 10,000 36.2 72.1 2.6 12.4 9.1 26.1
Support Yeltsin 1993 (% ‘yes’) 56.0 12.3 as 1993 as 1993
‘Special status' (dummy) 4 positive values
H-holds with phone 1990 (%) 30.4 1 1 .1 as 1993 as 1993
Notes: Figures given are those for the variable used in the regression for the year indicated. 'In 1991 roubles.
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1.6 Results
1.6.1 Hypothesis 1.1 : the allocation of transfers
Table 1.7 presents the results of the Tobit regressions run on transfers in each of the years 
1993 to 1995. Variables not significant in any of the three equations were dropped. The same 
formulation was kept for all three years to ease comparison.
Table 1.7: Tobit results fo r  per capita transfer allocations in 1993, 1994 and 1995
(76 observations per year)
Explanatory variables 1993 1994 1995 Exp.sign
o /3
NEEDS
Own revenues per capita ■0 .1 1 -0.06 -0.05 -
(-2.4) (-2 .6 ) • (-2 .0 )
Under 16s 6 . 6 3.1 10.9 +
(0.9) (0 .6 ) (2 . 1)
Infant mortality rate 1 2 . 2 7.5 11.9 +
(1.7) ( 1-8 ) (2 . 1)
Northern (dummy variable) -191 -88.3 1 2 . 2 +
(-2.4) (-1 .8 ) (0 .2 )
Education wage 0.64 0 . 2 1 0.15 +
( 1 .8 ) (1.9) (0.9)
Population (log) -91.4 -45.1 -79.3 -
(-3.1) (-2.3) (-3.4)
Urbanization -3.5 -4.5 -4.3 -
(-1.9) (-3.9) (-3.1)
POWER
Percentage of fuel production -7.1 -7.7 -3.6 +
(-1 .0 ) (-2.3) (-0.9)
Special status 617 316 148 +
(5.8) (5.0) (2 .2 )
Phone access 1990 3.6 1.3 1.4 +
(2 .0 ) (0 .8 ) (0 .8 )
Constant 474 506 532
0.4) (2.3) (2 .0 )
Standard error 139.9 89.5 105.3
Log likelihood -366.5 -370.3 -423.4
Pseudo R2 0.08 0 . 1 0 0.09
Notes: T-staiistics are given in brackets. Variables in bold were significant at the 10% level. For the needs
variables, the ‘expected signs of P' are those which we would expect to see if transfers were equalizing with 
respect to the variable in question; for the power variables, they are those we would expect if oblast threats or 
influence were positively affecting the level of transfers received.
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Two things are immediately striking about these results. First, there is no clear evidence 
that a change in regime took place between 1993 and 1994. Signs and significance of 
coefficients show remarkable continuity over the period despite the introduction of the formula 
system in 1994. In fact there appears to be more difference between results for 1994 and 1995 
than for those for 1993 and 1994.2- Second, across the period needs variables appear to be 
both significant and indicative of an equalizing effect; ‘power’ variables are less significant and 
also more equivocal in their impact.
With the exception of the dummy variable for northern location, all needs variables which 
are significant display an equalizing impact across the period. Other things equal, per capita 
transfers were significantly higher in 1993 and 1994 to regions with lower own-revenues per 
capita, a higher infant mortality rate, higher public sector wages (hence higher costs of 
provision), and smaller and more rural populations. In 1995 public sector wages no longer had 
an explanatory impact, but transfers were higher to regions where a greater proportion of the 
population was below working age. Hence across the period transfers do seem to go to regions 
with lower fiscal capacity, greater demand on services, and higher unit provision costs.
The flow of transfers thus seems to have been in the right direction. But how fa r  did 
transfers succeed in compensating for differing needs and revenue abilities? With respect to 
differences in revenue-raising ability, the impact of transfers appears small. Other things equal, 
in 1993 each per-capita rouble less raised in own-revenues was compensated by just one tenth 
of a rouble in additional transfers. After the introduction of the formula system in 1994, the 
degree of compensation halved: in 1994 and 1995 only one in twenty roubles less in own- 
revenues was replaced by a transfer. Thus while more transfers did go to poorer than to richer 
regions, their impact appears to have been negligible, post-1994 in particular. The difference 
between the coefficient for 1993 and those for the later two years is in part due to a fall in the 
total sum made available for transfers (notably with respect to 1994), and in part to the greater 
numbers of regions qualifying for assistance (notably with respect to 1995, when the total sum 
available was similar to that in 1993, but when all but seven regions were eligible for 
transfers).
What of the impact on transfer receipts of variation in the cost of service provision? Here 
transfers appeared to respond extremely well in 1993, and again much less well after the 
introduction of the formula. In 1993 an extra rouble on the average cost of employing a worker
22A likelihood ratio test does however allow us to reject at the 5% significance level the hypothesis 
that the coefficients are the same across either pair of years. The test statistic for the hypothesis that 
the coefficients for 1993 and 1994 were identical was 32.6; that for the same hypothesis for 1994 and 
1995 was 28.7. The critical value in both cases was 19.68 at the 1% significance level.
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in the education sector was met by a per capita increase in transfers of 0.64 roubles; in 1994 an 
extra rouble meant only 0.21-roubles extra per capita. However, as the total number of public 
sector employees ought to be substantially less than one per capita, this suggests significant 
over-compensation in 1993; high cost regions may have received far more than they needed to 
cover their costs, the situation in 1994 representing an improvement. The fact that the 
education wage is not significant at all in 1995 is mysterious.
In each year transfers were also higher to regions with smaller populations and to those 
with lower urbanization rates. The log of population proved to have greater explanatory power 
than a linear population term, implying a diminishing role for population size as population 
increases. A region with a log population size one standard deviation below average would 
have received an additional 60 or 70 roubles per capita in 1993 and 1995, and about half that 
in 1994 (some 20-30% of the average per capita transfer). A region with an urbanization rate 
one standard deviation above the average would have benefited by roughly the same amount, 
between 50 and 60 roubles extra per capita in each year.
The last variable included to proxy provision costs, the dummy for northern regions, is the 
only needs variable which clearly shows a counter-equalizing effect for transfers. In theory the 
dummy is intended to pick up the additional costs of heating etc. associated with service 
provision in the Far North; in practice, holding other factors constant, it seems that the seven 
regions located furthest north get substantially less in transfers than other areas. Their situation 
was particularly harsh in 1993, when being Northern meant 190 roubles per capita less against 
a mean transfer of 195 roubles per capita. In 1994 Northern regions got 90 roubles less on 
average against a mean of 140 roubles, so the negative impact was still substantial. As a point 
of comparison, in both years Northern regions would have had to have per capita revenues two 
standard deviations higher than the mean to compensate for their Northern status, or an 
education wage two or three times higher. Given that northern regions have higher 
compensating wage differentials than elsewhere a relationship might seem plausible between 
the two variables; the northern dummy might be acting to dampen the impact of the education 
wage at the upper end of the scale. However, the large size of the coefficients on the northern 
dummy makes this unlikely. Furthermore, a non-linear term for the wage (the education wage 
squared) turned out not to be significant, while the result for the northern dummy proved robust 
to the exclusion of the education wage altogether.
Finally, turning to the variables representing demand on regional services, we find a 
smallish impact, despite the general equalizing direction of transfers. In all three years an 
additional 3  points on infant mortality (roughly the standard deviation) brings in roughly 
between 25 and 35 roubles more in transfers per capita. The proportion of the population below
bah*
working age is significant only in 1995 when an additional 3 percentage points of children in 
the population (again the standard deviation) means about the same in transfers as an extra 3 
points on infant mortality.
These results are summed up in Table 1.8, which shows how many additional roubles per 
capita would have been received by a hypothetical region differing from a standard region with 
respect to each of the given needs characteristics. The size of the variation chosen for each 
variable is roughly equal to the standard deviation from the mean for that variable in 1993. The 
average actual transfer (including zero values) is given in the bottom row for reference.
The table makes it easier to address the first part of Hypothesis 1.1. Were transfers higher 
after 1994 to regions with low fiscal capacity and high needs? The table shows that in 1993 a 
region which had greater needs than the average in all of the given categories would have 
received a total of 334 roubles per capita more than a region with average characteristics. After 
the introduction of the formula system, the same high-needs region would only have received an 
additional 197 roubles per capita in 1994 and 229 roubles in 1995. The formula mechanism, 
while making the system transparent and apparently less arbitrary, does not seem to have 
improved its practical impact for regions in need. The difference appears largely due to the 
diminishing responsiveness of transfers to the regional level of per capita own-revenues and to
Table 1.8: Benefit gained from differing from a standard region with respect to each needs 
variable (roubles per capita)
Variable Difference from Additional roubles per capita
standard region 1993 1994 1995
Own revenues per capita 900 roubles less 99 54 45
Percentage under 16s 3 percentage points higher 33
Infant mortality rate 3 percentage points higher 37 23 36
Education wage 130 roubles higher 83 27
Log population 750 less 69 34 59
Urbanization 13 percentage points less 46 59 56
Total extra gained by a region 
ALL above characteristics
differing from standard on 334 197 229
AVERAGE PER CAPITA TRANSFER 195 139 185
(ALL OBSERVATIONS)
Note: This table presents predicted differences to a region’s value of y*; that is, the underlying 
variable put forward in Equation 1.7. Only if y* exceeded 0 would the region be predicted to receive 
the estimated extra amount.
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the education wage. It should also be noted that it is not simply a result of a change in total 
transfers made. If we compare the extra received by the hypothetical needy region to the 
average overall transfer made (i.e. if we compare the bottom two rows of Table 1 .8 ) we find a 
ratio of 1.7 in 1993, falling to 1.4 in 1994 and 1.2 in 1995.
The only needy regions which look to be doing better in 1995 than before are those in the 
north. A region with all the need characteristics given in Table 1.8 but located in the Far North 
would have received only an additional 143 roubles per capita in 1993 and 109 roubles in 
1994, but 229 roubles in 1995.
What of the second part of Hypothesis 1.1? Transfers may not be more equalizing post 
1994 than before, but the formula should at least have diminished the impact of regional power 
over the allocation process. That part of transfers not explained by needs factors should now be 
explained less well by power factors; if not more equalizing their allocation should at least be 
more arbitrary.
Turning back to Table 1.7 we find that in practice this does appear to be the case, although 
it is noteworthy that three of the factors included as ‘power’ proxies had no impact at all. The 
most surprising of these is the dummy included for regions with republic status. Despite the 
conventional wisdom, being a republic had no effect on a region’s receipts once population size 
and revenues had been controlled for. A fourth variable, the percentage of national fuel output 
produced in the region, was significant in one year only and had the opposite sign to that 
expected: other things equal in 1994 a greater share of fuel output was associated with lower 
transfer receipts, indicating that this was not used as a means of influencing central decisions.2 3
As expected, the influence of having ‘special status’, that is of being one of the four regions 
to have special regimes legitimized with the centre, was enormous in 1993, falling over time as 
these regions began to comply with general rules. In 1993 being one of the Big Four brought in 
on average 617 additional roubles per capita. In practice, the average receipt in these four 
regions was 520 roubles per capita, suggesting that none of the benefit received by these 
regions can be explained by other variables: in fact without the impact of their special status 
they would have received ‘negative’ transfers. By 1994 however this status only brought in 316 
roubles per capita (average receipt in practice — 300 roubles), and in 1995 150 roubles.
The special status variable however is somewhat different from the other indicators o f 
power. O f these only the extent of the phone network in 1990, theoretically representative o f
23 Of course, regions with large shares of national fuel production lend also to have been relatively 
successful in the 1990s in generating export revenues and hence have relatively high incomes per 
capita. This variable may therefore be acting as a proxy needs variable (higher fuel production, less 
need for transfers) rather than the power variable it is intended to be. I am grateful to Philip Hanson 
for pointing this out.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------  -
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past favour from central authorities, is positive and significant and this only in 1993. In 1993 
an extra 1 0 % of households with access to a private telephones was associated, other things 
equal, with an additional 35 roubles per capita in transfers against the mean of 195 roubles, but 
in 1994 and 1995 it no longer had any impact. This appears to suggest that connections at the 
centre were useful in gaining additional funds in the ad hoc system of 1993, but not after the 
introduction of the formula — which is intuitively appealing and evidence in favour of the 
second part of Hypothesis 1.1. We do need to be somewhat careful however: given the 
difficulty of isolating power proxies and the other factors that may influence them this is a very 
tentative conclusion.
1.6.2 Hypothesis 1.2: The percentage of transfers received as VAT retentions
Table 1.9 gives results for Tobit regressions run on the percentage of transfers received in the 
form of VAT. As discussed above, there are substantial advantages to receiving transfers in 
this form rather than remitting the bulk of VAT collection to the centre and then waiting for 
transfers to arrive through the official channels. Given high inflation, non*indexed transfers and 
often long payment delays, the method through which transfers are received can make a 
significant difference to the real value of a region's allocation. In the results for Hypothesis 1.1 
we saw that needy regions appeared to do less well from transfers in 1995 than they had done 
under the closed-door system of 1993. But the proportion of these transfers made as VAT 
retention was much higher in 1993 (50%) than in 1995 (20%), even when the four 'special 
status’ regions are excluded. If it is the less needy and the more powerful that are able to 
benefit from this means of allocation, it could be that the new system is an improvement on the 
old after all.
The regression results which are presented in Table 1.9 are however somewhat surprising. 
Expected to reveal a pattern of richer regions manipulating the system to their own ends, in 
practice they reveal no particular pattern at all. The clearest impression the results give is that, 
if any particular factors were important in determining which regions benefited from receipt 
through VAT retention, these factors were unique to a single year and did not persist over time. 
None of the variables included proved significant in more than one year. In 1993, larger and 
more urbanized regions were likely to receive more transfers as VAT retention, while there also 
seemed to be both a ‘reward’ effect for regions which supported Yeltsin in the 1993 referendum 
and a ‘punishment’ effect for regions with higher numbers of workers involved in strikes. In 
1994 however the only significant characteristic of regions which did well was that they tended 
to be richer: each extra hundred roubles in own revenues per capita was associated with an 
extra percentage of transfers as VAT. But by 1995 own revenues were again no longer
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Table 1.9: Tobit results fo r  percentage o f VAT retentions in transfers ¡993. ¡994 and ¡995
($¡,57 and 65 observations respectively)
Explanatory variables 1993 1994 ¡995 Exp. sign o f y
CONTROL CHARACTERISTICS
Own revenues per capita 0 .0 1 0 . 0 1 -0 . 0 0
( 1 .2 ) (2 .0 ) (-0.3)
Population 0.014 0.004 0 . 0 0 2
(3.9) ( 1 .2 ) (0.7)
Urbanization 1 .2 0.35 0 .0 1
(3.4) ( 1 . 1 ) (0 .0 )
POWER VARIABLES
Republic status 6,7 -2.7 3.9 +
(0.7) (-0-3) (0.5)
Fuel production -0.64 0.25 - 1 .6 +
(-0 .8 ) (0 .1) (-1 .2 )
Workers on strike -0.08 0.29 0.28 +
(-1.7) (0 .1 ) (2.5)
Support for Yeltsin 1993 0.59 -0.14 -0.19 * +
(1.7) (-0.4) (-0 .6 )
Phone access 1990 -0.60 -0.63 -0.15 +
(-1.5) (-1.3) (-0.4)
Constant -72.7 40.7 19.6
(-2.9) (1.5) (1.3)
Standard error 2 1 . 8 2 2 . 6 21.7
Log likelihood -199.8 -244.1 -249.8
Pseudo 0 .1 1 0.04 0 . 0 2
Notes: Results in bold are significant at the 10% level. Only regions receiving some form of transfer were
I;i
included. In addition, the four regions benefiting from special regimes (Karelia, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and
Sakha (Yakutia) were omitted as they by definition received all transfers in VAT retentions.
relevant« and the percentage of workers involved in strikes now had the opposite role to that in 
1993: more strikes meant a higher share of transfers through the VAT retention mechanism.
These miscellaneous results defy generalization: no pattern emerges over time« and the lack 
of continuity suggests that the significance of any given variable in a particular year is purely 
coincidental. Naturally it is quite possible that the power variables used are simply not picking 
up a key instrument of regional influence, but the inability of the variables included to pick up 
any consistent pattern is interesting. A system which allows transfers to be allocated by two 
different mechanisms« where this results in unintended changes in the final sum received, can be 
condemned for both its injustice and its inefficiency. However, it is encouraging to note that the 
distinction appears to be genuinely arbitrary, rather than benefiting regions with influence at the 
expense of those with greatest need.
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1.7 Conclusions
While in a country of Russia's size decentralization of the fiscal system is probably essential, 
the high degree of regional economic diversity makes a strong and effective transfer mechanism 
crucial if all regions are to continue to be able to provide adequate standards of public services 
during the transition and beyond. The Russian transfer system has developed in a fairly ad hoc 
fashion since 1992 and has come in for substantial criticism for insufficient targeting, for 
allowing wealthier regions to negotiate their own terms and for favouring politically threatening 
regions over those really in need. In this chapter I have attempted to address and quantify these 
claims by isolating the characteristics of regions receiving transfers over the period 1993-1995. 
I aimed to establish whether these transfers are really going to regions in need of them, and if 
not then whether their allocation is apparently arbitrary or affected by factors of regional power 
and influence. At the same time, I hoped to discover whether the replacement of closed door 
negotiations with a formula mechanism in 1994 made a favourable difference to allocations.
My results tend to support the system’s critics rather than the system itself, although some 
of the conclusions can be painted in a positive light. It is true for instance that the four regions 
which refused to play by the rules (and were tolerated in so doing) received what in practice 
amounted to substantial transfers when they ought not to have qualified for anything at all. But 
this situation has improved over time: by 1995 only one of these regions was remitting no tax 
receipts to the federal budget -- this could almost be seen as a victory for the federal 
authorities. In addition to these four, there are a number of regions which benefited in more 
subtle ways by exploiting a high inflation environment, either by remitting their taxes with 
several months delay, or by taking their transfer allocation immediately as VAT retention 
instead of waiting for transfers to be made through official channels. The former phenomenon 
was impossible to investigate in the absence of monthly budget data, but an analysis of the 
characteristics of regions receiving transfers as VAT showed, surprisingly, no evidence that 
those to benefit were richer or more powerful than other regions. The dual-channel allocation 
system remains inefficient and unjust, but at least it appears to have worked randomly. Another 
positive result is that the relative importance of VAT retention in transfer receipts is becoming 
less important over time, accounting for only 20% of receipts in 1995 in comparison to 50% in 
1993.
Finally, across the period the distribution of transfers has been basically equalizing, with 
per capita transfers higher to regions with greater needs. Regions with lower per capita own 
revenues, higher infant mortality, more children, higher compensating wage differentials, and 
smaller and more rural populations all received more per capita in transfers. Only northern
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regions appeared to suffer, with the seven regions located furthest north receiving substantially 
less in transfers than other areas with similar characteristics. Even in 1993, before the 
introduction of the formula, transfers followed this equalizing pattern, suggesting that 
allocation was needs-based even when the mechanism was non-transparent. Furthermore, 
though there does appear to be some indication of a link between power variables and transfers 
in 1993, the evidence is extremely weak. In particular, once special status and population size 
have been controlled for, there is no evidence that republics did better than other regions, 
despite widely held belief. In 1994 and 1995 none of the power variables other than that for 
special status had a role to play.
However, the success of the system ought not to be overplayed on the basis of these 
findings. It is crucial to note that, although in the right direction, transfers over the period have 
made little more than a dent in the pre-transfer revenue distribution. In 1994 and 1995, holding 
all other characteristics constant, transfers replaced revenues at a rate of only one in twenty 
roubles per capita. What is more, in this sense the allocation was substantially worse in 1994 
and 1995 than before the introduction of the formula: in 1993 one in ten roubles was matched 
by compensation. Thus not only do the transfers appear to be of little more than nominal 
assistance, but three years of tinkering with the system seem only to have made it worse.
There are two different reasons for the system’s weak equalizing impact. The first is an 
inadequate level of total funds made available for transfers. The size of equalization funds hit 
bottom in 1994, but in 1995 was still low by international standards: the share of total transfers 
in consolidated budget expenditure was less than half the OECD average. The second reason is 
that the literature appears to be right in claiming that targeting is inadequate and transfers too 
widely spread, particularly since the introduction of the formula mechanism. Classifying all 
regions with expenditures higher than revenues as in need of support simply allows too many 
regions to qualify. While it may be that they are all in need of support, an intergovernmental 
transfer system is of necessity about relative need: it is a zero sum game.
In 1997 some changes were made to the transfer system which may have improved it. In 
particular, the fund’s base was changed to 15% of all federal revenue in an attempt to make its 
revenue more stable; this ought also to have led to an increase in the fund's size. In addition, 
the adjustment coefficients for the first round of transfers were amended in a way that should 
have benefited northern regions. But the basic substance of the formula has not been affected, 
which means the vast majority of regions will continue to qualify as needy. This in turn makes 
it likely that regions which are worst off will continue to receive insubstantial assistance. Given 
the high degree of responsibility which regional governments now hold for financing essential 
public services, this is disturbing and calls for continuing close attention.
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Chapter 2
The impact of decentralization on regional equity 
of education financing
2.1 Introduction
In Chapter I we saw that, while a system of intergovernmental transfers does exist in Russia, 
transfers are neither sufficiently large nor sufficiently well-targeted to make up for wide disparities 
in oblast economic strengths. We also saw that oblasts have substantial expenditure 
responsibilities, including responsibility for the vast majority of social expenditure. As illustrated 
in Table 1.1, by 1995 some 85% of social spending originated at or below the oblast level, 
including 90% of spending on health care and 85% of spending on education.
In this chapter I turn to look at the effect the post-transfer revenue distribution has had on 
regional equality of social expenditure; or rather on one element of social expenditure -- education. 
Why education? In part, the idea is simply to focus on one sphere of social spending as a 
representative of others: if disparities in the provision of education are increasing across the 
country, then we can expect disparities in the provision of other goods to be growing too. 
Education expenditure is a convenient choice as it raises the fewest problems of measurement: an 
analysis of health care spending, for example, would be complicated by the recent introduction of 
medical insurance funds.24 But education is also chosen because of the importance of equality of 
access to education in particular, both from the perspective of the individual and from that of the
24 By 1994 about 18% of government health expenditure came from medical insurance funds (King and 
Proskuryakova, 1996). These funds are based on a 3.6% payroll tax, of which 3.4% goes to a regional 
fund and 0.2% to the federal fund (Chemichovsky et al., 1996). The regional implications are therefore 
substantial, but regional breakdowns of spending by insurance funds are impossible to obtain.
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region. If disadvantage spreads to the provision of education, regional economic inequalities are 
likely to become more engrained and harder to reverse, creating a vicious cycle of decline.
Using data on budget expenditure by region on general education in 1991 and 1995, I have 
three main aims in this chapter. First, I set out to establish how large regional disparities in 
education Finance are, and how far they have increased during the course of the transition. This 
task is complicated by the fact that nominal prices and wages, and hence provision costs, vary 
significantly across the federation, I discuss the problems involved in adjusting for these cost 
factors and try to separate the expenditure differences caused by higher costs and other needs 
factors from differences resulting from the budget constraint on the one hand and from different 
expenditure priorities on the other.
Second, I attempt to explore the precise nature of the relationship between oblast revenues (the 
budget constraint) and education expenditure. Naturally we expect that higher revenues will lead to 
higher expenditure. But is education treated as a necessity, receiving little priority from oblast 
budgets once a basic level has been covered, or as a luxury, so that an increasing share of any 
extra income goes to the education sector? This issue has potential implications for the transfer 
system. It is often claimed that the education system receives too low a priority in the Russian 
budget; the implication being that the federal government should do something about it.25 But this 
is to overlook the fact that oblast authorities are in charge of budgeting for pre-school and 
compulsory education: the federal level has little control over how much is spent; especially as 
federal transfers are essentially unconditional. If low education spending results entirely from 
insufficient funds in poorer regions, then to increase education spending the federal level needs to 
Find a way of ensuring stronger support to poorer regions. But if the problem is in part that the 
regions which do have more funds choose not to spend them on education beyond a basic level, 
then the government may (assuming it does want to increase the amount spent) want to consider 
ways of providing earmarked or ‘categorical’ grants.26
25 For example, the 1997 OECD Review of Education in Russia states that *[i]n comparison with OECD 
countries ... education in the Russian Federation has a lower financial priority. This pattern of priorities 
can endanger the present level of educational services, and imperil both the quality and the access to 
education.’ It recommends the deFinition of *a strategy for raising the expenditure level to average OECD 
levels by 2005’ (OECD, 1997, pp.l 17-18).
26 Of course, there is a question of local autonomy here: why should central government be able to 
override local government preferences about how to spend their budgets? But there are precedents for 
categorical grants to encourage education spending (see e.g. Oates, 1972, p.89 on the USA). The quality 
of education after all has externalities which affect both other regions and the position of the federation as 
a whole.
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The chapter’s third and final aim is to explore what can be said about the relationship between 
the high spending regions of today and those of the past. Are current spending disparities 
reinforcing inherited disparities in educational infrastructure, or are they in some sense providing a 
balance to the inequalities of the Soviet period? To address this question 1 examine the relationship 
between the change in education spending over the period and a series of different measures of the 
standard of educational provision in 1991. These include the level of expenditure on education at 
that time, a measure of general living standards, and qualitative indicators of the state of the 
education system, largely data on the state of school buildings.
With this last exception, the chapter, like the rest of the thesis, focuses very much on budget 
data. The key assumption made throughout is that the level of budget expenditure has a significant 
impact on the standard of provision of government services, allowing us to reach conclusions about 
disparities in service quality on the basis of disparities in expenditure levels. (Even the few 
qualitative indicators introduced at the end are used more out of a concern that variation in cost 
factors disguises the real expenditure level in each region than a fear that real expenditure levels 
may be irrelevant.) However, in the case of education at least, the relationship between finance and 
outcomes is in fact far from clear-cut — the debate currently raging on this issue is summarized 
very briefly in Section 2.2. Clearly this debate potentially casts a shadow on the rest of the 
analysis: if spending is only weakly correlated with quality of provision then this chapter tells us 
little about what is really going on in the education sector. I argue though that, in the current 
Russian context of severe shortage of resources, there is good reason to believe that finance is one 
important determinant of the quality of schooling a child receives.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.3 describes current provisions for 
education financing in Russia. Section 2.4 presents an overview of education expenditure by region 
in 1991 and 1995, and discusses disparities and some possible causes. Section 2.5 reformulates 
this discussion as two testable hypotheses and introduces the econometric framework used to 
address them. Section 2.6 presents and discusses the results. Finally, in Section 2.7 1 ask how 
much we are able to say about the relationship between current levels of regional expenditure and 
regional standards of provision in the past.
49
2.2 Does finance matter?
Whether or not the resources dedicated to education are relevant to educational outcomes is a 
debate which has been raging in the United States for at least three decades, without conclusive 
results (see Burtless, 1996, Chapter 1 for a survey of the literature). Most studies fall into one o f  
two broad categories. The first ask whether increased resources improve students’ performance in 
school, where performance is measured through standardized test results. These have tended to find 
little evidence that extra funding makes a significant difference: in one of the most well-known 
surveys of this type of study Eric Hanushek concludes that ‘[tjhere appears to be no strong o r  
systematic relationship between school expenditures and student performance’ (Hanushek, 1986, 
p.l 162). This view is based in part on aggregate trends observed in spending and performance over 
several decades — since the 1960s education spending per child has risen rapidly in the US while 
test results have stagnated or declined — and in part on micro-analysis of cross-sectional data on 
expenditure and test scores across different states.
The other type of study looks at the relationship between the resources spent on a child’s 
education and the earnings that child later commands in the labour market, on the grounds that 
earnings are a better measure of important skills gained than the artificial hoops represented by test 
scores. Several of these studies have concluded that increasing expenditure does make a difference. 
In the best known contribution to this literature, David Card and Alan Krueger work backwards 
from a group of male workers to show how education expenditure in the state in which a man w as 
educated helps to explain his current earnings (Card and Krueger, 1992).
These results are clearly contradictory: it is difficult to believe that schools have no impact on 
their immediate and proclaimed goal (improving test results) and yet at the same time manage to  
influence a distant measure, later earnings, about which they generally express little interest and 
have no feedback. Attempts to reconcile this conflict have come to no definitive solution: Card and 
Krueger themselves conclude in a recent paper that ‘[t]he available evidence is not unambiguous o r 
ubiquitous’ (Card and Krueger, 1996, p.47). One striking fact however is that the studies which 
find a positive role for additional spending are all long-term, looking at groups of people educated 
as far back as the 1920s, while those which find no link look at students from the 1970s onwards 
(Burtless, 1996, Ch.l). This is really a side-effect of the nature of the analysis: to look at work­
place earnings one can use a cohort which started school several decades ago, while reliable data 
on standardized test scores only became available from 1970. But it suggests two possible 
explanations of the different results. Relative school performance may have been affected by the
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very large expenditure disparities which existed between states in the period before the Second 
World War, yet not be affected by the comparatively small differences which have persisted in 
recent decades. Alternatively, at very low levels of expenditure an increase in resources may make 
a big difference, while at today’s much higher levels the payoff to additional investment is 
negligible (Burtless, 1996, pp.18-19). This possibility is accepted by both sides of the debate: 
Hanushek concedes that Card and Krueger’s results ’suggest that very low levels of resources ~ 
say those found in the poorest states before and during the Great Depression — may have an effect 
on student outcomes’ (Hanushek, 1996, pp.21-22).
What does this mean for a study of regional disparities in education finance in Russia? The 
current situation in Russia is arguably closer in several ways to that in the US of the Depression 
than to that in the US today. Certainly the ’aggressive spending programs’ which are the focus of 
Hanushek's attacks (Hanushek, 1996, p.9) have no equivalent in Russia. This is a situation in 
which teacher strikes have become a matter of course as staff demand, not salary increases, but the 
payment of accumulated wage arrears: by February 1997 the total owed to teachers was estimated 
to have reached 7 trillion roubles — the equivalent of about two monthly wages for every worker in 
the education sector (OMRI Daily Digest, February 18th, 1997). In the five worst hit regions 
teachers had not been paid for six to nine months (OMRI Daily Digest, January 13th, 1997). At the 
same time official data on the state of school buildings suggests that one third are in need of repair 
and six percent in ‘dangerous condition’ — and that in several regions over half of schools need 
repairs and some 15-20% are dangerous (Goskomstat, 1996b, p. 125). There is also evidence of a 
severe shortage of textbooks, with only one third of the 1 0 0  million books demanded printed in 
1997 (RFE/RL Newsline No.95, August 14th, 1997). Anecdotal evidence from Novgorod Oblast, 
presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis, suggests that in many cases parents are asked to provide 
textbooks, and that if they cannot afford to do so their children stay behind after class to copy from 
the teacher’s book.
Under such conditions it would be difficult to make a case that the injection of additional funds 
would make no difference to the quality of education available. Furthermore, if the average level of 
financing is very low, the implications of regional inequality in financing are particularly severe. 
Hence, while no attempt is made to argue in this chapter (or the next one) that more money is the 
only thing that the Russian education system needs, the focus of both on levels of expenditure 
seems justified. A further argument for the approach taken, of course, is simply that there are not 
many alternative options. Standard qualitative indicators of the state of education, such as drop-out
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rates, exam results and rates of university entrance, are either unavailable for Russia or are 
available but without regional breakdowns.27 (A separate problem is that these indicators may in 
any case adjust to change slowly). Not only then is there a strong argument that levels of 
expenditure do tell us something about what has been happening to education during the transition, 
expenditure may also for the moment be the only source of such information.
2.3 The role of the oblast in education financing
Table 1.1 in Chapter 1 showed oblast or sub-oblast level authorities to be spending 85% of 
consolidated education expenditure in 1995, up from 6 6 % in 1992. What exactly does this 85% 
include? Current federal law gives regional authorities responsibility for the ‘organization, 
maintenance and development' of local pre-school and school institutions as well as institutions o f 
professional (vocational) education, leaving federal government in charge only of institutions o f  
higher education.28 This basic allocation of expenditure responsibilities is summed up in Table 2.1. 
In practice, the decentralization process has not been completed everywhere and the federal 
government still has responsibility for technical and vocational schools in many areas. 
Kindergartens form another somewhat murky category: previously in large part under enterprise 
control, the majority have now been either closed down or divested to local authorities, but a small 
number of ‘departmental’ kindergartens remain, and these are financed directly from the centre. 29
Table 2 .1  : Education expenditure responsibilities by level o f government
Federal responsibility Oblast level and below
•  Higher education • Kindergartens (all costs, including
(Universities, polytechnics) maintenance and construction)
• Research institutes • Primary and secondary schools (as above)
• Technical and vocational schools (as above)
27 For example, the results of the Third International Maths and Science Study, released in 1997, are an 
interesting source of information on the standard of education in Russia as a whole compared to that in 
other countries, but the study does not allow for cross-regional comparisons.
28 Russian Federation Federal Law on General Principles of the Organization of Local Government in the 
Russian Federation, adopted by the State Duma on 12 August 1995, Article 6 .
29 According to UNICEF data, 75% of Russian kindergartens were enterprise-owned in 1989, but only 
18% were by 1996 (UNICEF MONEE Project Database).
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In one sense, only kindergartens and technical and vocational schools are really new 
responsibilities for the regional level: primary and secondary schools were always nominally in the 
regional domain, explaining why oblasts were responsible for 66% of education expenditure even 
in 1992. But it is important not to underestimate what recent changes have meant in practice. It 
may be useful to make a distinction here between déconcentration and decentralization.30 Where 
expenditure is deconcentrated it flows through regional or local offices and is recorded in their 
accounts, but the level and direction of spending is still dictated from above, either by law or 
because in practice local decision-makers are accountable to central ministries. This contrasts with 
decentralization of responsibility, in which decision-makers have real control over their resources 
and answer only to local electorates. The situation in Russia during the Soviet period was one of 
déconcentration, not decentralization: although oblasts have always had nominal responsibility for 
a substantial share of social expenditure, this translated into little if any practical autonomy. 
Budgets were heavily controlled from the centre and expenditure levels effectively enforced from 
above. As one commentator put it for the case of education in 1966: “Although the role of local 
budgets in providing funds for education seems large, the amounts local authorities may allot to 
any important function are limited by close controls exercised from above ... Throughout the length 
and breadth of the Soviet Union school administrators are required to adhere to a single 
standardised budgeting procedure that allows them virtually no freedom of action whatsoever... (it 
is) a picture of thoroughgoing external control exerted via minute concern for the pettiest detail and 
for every last kopeck of expenditure” (Noah, 1966, cited in Klugman, 1997).
It is only since 1992 that nominal responsibility has been accompanied by the ability to take 
independent decisions on the allocation of the budget. Bach oblast now has its own elected 
parliament (Duma), and, since 1996, a directly elected governor at the head of the regional 
administration. Decision-makers are therefore answerable now to the local population rather than 
to a ministry in Moscow. Furthermore, they have real control over their own budgets: 
appropriation of surpluses by higher levels of government is no longer allowed, while federal 
transfers for equalizing purposes are made as unconditional block grants.
This is not to say that there are no federal restrictions on how regions allocate their funds. 
First, there are general obligations about the provision of certain services: in the education sector 
the oblast must ensure that all children have access to education free of charge at primary and
30 See for example Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema (1984).
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secondary level, where this covers as a minimum the subjects included in the basic curriculum.71 
More specifically, the federal government has (and exercises) the right to establish ‘protected 
items’ which must be met before all other expenditures (currently wages, food and medicine are 
protected in the education budget), and the right to set a floor for teachers’ salaries and other 
public sector wages.
These are restrictions on minimum expenditure levels: they should ensure that a certain basic 
level is spent, but not affect regional decision-making beyond that point. But because resources are 
limited, in practice these restrictions can have a big impact: an increase in the minimum salary 
level will have a direct effect on salary levels in a great many regions which cannot afford to pay 
more.31 2 Furthermore, the federal government sometimes appears to overstep its boundaries: prior 
to the 1996 elections, for instance, a presidential decree declared that teachers should enjoy the 
same status as federal civil servants, implying a substantial salary increase for all teachers; hardly 
within the spirit of the setting of a wage minimum (OECD, 1997, p.120). By law, whenever the 
federal level makes any change which affects the required expenditure levels of regional authorities, 
it must make a transfer to the region to compensate for the increase: these are the ’mutual 
settlements’ referred to in Chapter 1. In practice, however, there is considerable evidence that this 
does not happen fully or consistently, creating the phenomenon of the 'unfunded mandate’: after the 
presidential decree referred to above, for example, no additional federal funds were made available. 
On frequent occasions then, federal decision-making does still impose restrictions on regional 
freedom of movement. However, there is a substantive difference between these constraints, which 
are of more consequence for poorer than for richer regions, and the fully centralized decision­
making of the Soviet era.
The budget constraint clearly presents the major obstacle to local authorities in all countries, 
but it is worth pointing out that in Russia this constraint is more restrictive than most, not just 
because of the general financial crisis, but also because the region has only limited ability to affect 
the level of revenue it raises. In other countries local authorities are often given control of one 
important tax, usually an income or local property tax, to enable them to make decisions not only 
about how to allocate revenues but also about how much revenue to raise. In Russia, as discussed 
in Chapter 1, tax rates for the major taxes are set at the centre, and oblasts simply retain a fixed
31 Russian Federation Federal Law on Education, accepted by the Federation Council 5 January 1996, 
Articles 5 and 31.
32 No information is available on the proportion of regions where actual wage levels are equal to the 
minimum as set.
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share of the revenues they raise from each tax.33 There are a number of smaller local taxes over 
which the oblast exercises control but these make up only a small percentage of total revenues 
(some 10% on average). The oblast's main sources of finance are receipts from the major taxes 
and transfers from the centre« presenting it with a budget the size of which is beyond its control. 
This system clearly weakens the ability of local populations to make their own decisions about how 
much they want to spend — that is, in richer areas, where there is room for choice. It does however 
have the advantage of simplifying the analysis below, as will become clear.
2.4 An overview of the data
To sum up, richer regions find themselves able to exercise much greater budget freedom than 
before; while the worst off are required to spend a certain minimum amount on education, but are 
not always provided with the means to do so. At the same time, regional differences in post-transfer 
revenues are growing. Even alone, each of these factors -  increased local control over budget 
allocation and growing revenue disparities with insufficient protection of poorer areas — would 
seem likely to lead to widening disparities in levels of regional education expenditure per capita. 
How far has this been the case?
Data on regional expenditure needs to be seen against the background of the general financial 
situation in the education sector. Estimates of national education expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP differ considerably (a result of conflicting estimates of GDP itself), but the general pattern is 
of an education share which is low by international standards but remains fairly stable during the 
course of the transition. Dmitriev (1997) presents Ministry of Finance figures which show 
education spending rising from 3.6% of GDP in 1992 to 4.4% in 1994, falling back to 3.4% in 
1995, and recovering to 4.0% in the first half of 1996.34 However, while this stability may be some 
indication of government commitment to protect education spending, it tells us little else: the 
collapse of GDP mean these figures disguise huge falls in absolute expenditure levels. This is 
reflected in Figure 2.1, which shows both education spending as a percentage of GDP and the fall 
in GDP over the period (unfortunately, data for consolidated spending on education in 1991 is not 
available). The significance for the real value of the education budget is reflected by the white bar.
33 There is now an exception to this rule: since 1996 oblasts have been able to adjust the rate of profit tax 
for their own tax share. All oblasts must levy 13% for the federal budget, but can levy anything up to 22% 
for their own budgets.
34 In comparison, in most OECD countries the average spent on education lies somewhere between 5% 
and 7% of GDP (OECD, 1997, p.l 17).
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Figure 2.1
Education Expenditure as a share of GDP, 1992-96
which shows education spending in each year as a percentage of GDP in 1992. By 1995 only 
2.9% of 1992 GDP was being spent on education, equivalent to 72% of the 1992 level. This is a 
decline of a similar scale to that observed across transition countries, although in Eastern Europe it 
happened a couple of years earlier: Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Croatia all 
experienced declines in real expenditure of 18-30% between 1990 and 1993 (Laporte et al, 1996). 
However, it does not represent the full scale of the decline in Russia, which began in 1991 : between 
1991 and 1992 education spending is also estimated to have fallen significantly.
How is this picture reflected in the data on spending by region? What I use here is Ministry o f 
Education data on regional education expenditure on primary and secondary education (together) in 
1991 and 1995. The main advantage of these data is that, by separating compulsory education 
from other categories (vocational education and kindergartens), they make it possible to compare 
expenditure levels across these two years. As explained above, although in 1991 oblast authorities 
had little real control over allocation, expenditure on compulsory schooling was recorded as 
coming from their budgets so the data for 1991 should cover the same items as that for 1995. Data 
for total education spending is in contrast not fully comparable either over time -- as vocational 
institutions and kindergartens have only recently become oblast responsibilities -- or across 
regions, as the decentralization process has taken place at different speeds in different places. Aside 
from this issue, there may of course be additional arguments in favour of a focus on compulsory 
education: for example, all regions must provide compulsory education for all children, whereas
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rural areas or areas with high unemployment are likely to face lower demand for pre-school 
education, and these considerations may make it difficult to interpret the pattern of spending on 
pre-schools.
Data on compulsory expenditure by region were initially deflated to 1991 prices by a regional 
Consumer Price Index* which adjusts for regional inflation rates over the period but not for 
differences in price levels across regions; the point being to make spending levels in 1991 and 1995 
roughly comparable for each region, while not wonying about comparisons of spending across 
regions at any point in time.35 This is to give us an idea of the different courses of development 
regions have experienced during the transition. Using the CPI* we find that ten of the 76 regions 
were spending more on compulsory education per pupil in 1995 than in 1991. The region which 
did best, Komi Republic in the Far North, appears to have increased expenditure by 43% in real 
terms* while in St. Petersburg spending was up by 22% (the fourth largest increase) and in 
Moscow by 10% (the eighth largest). At the other end of the scale* however, the Volga region of 
Kalmykia, described recently in The Economist as ‘one of Russia’s poorest regions*36, was 
spending just 27% per pupil of what it had spent in 1991. Kalmykia was one of ten regions in 
which expenditure had fallen by over half; three of these were in the Volga area, four in the North 
Caucasus, two in Eastern Siberia and one, Kurskaya, in the Central Black Earth region. But many 
more regions were suffering heavy cuts: thirty-seven regions, almost one half of the total, were 
spending less than 75% in 1995 what they had been spending in 1991. This is reflected in Map 2.1 
which maps the change in expenditure by quartile (Autonomous Areas, Chechnya and Ingushetia 
are left blank). A mixed geographical pattern emerges: the regions in the bottom quartile are 
concentrated in the southern half of the country (with the exception of Novgorod Oblast in the 
North-West), but are scattered across from the North Caucasus to the Far East. The regions in the 
top quartile are heavily represented in the Urals, Eastern Siberia, the North-West and the northern 
part of the Central area (which includes Moscow). The average fall in spending over the period 
was to 77% of the 1991 level by 1995, which is a smaller fall than we would expect on the basis of 
the aggregate trends shown above, but it is plausible that expenditure on compulsory education has 
been better protected than spending on other education sectors.
How did these changes affect regional disparities in spending? Table 2.2 presents four 
measures of expenditure disparity per pupil for 1991 and 1995. The figures are deflated using two
35 More detail on the CPI is provided in Appendix A.
36 ‘Earth to Kalmykia, come in please’. The Economist, December 10th 1997 - January 2nd 1998
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different indices. The first (Index I ) is the one used above, a regional price index which adjusts for 
the difference in inflation rates since 1991 but not for any original disparity in price levels across 
regions. The second (Index 2) deflates by the regional price index and also attempts to adjust both 
1991 and 1995 figures for differences in price levels using the cost of a basket of 19 foodstuffs in 
the region’s main town, the only price deflator available. More detail on these price deflators is 
provided in Appendix A. Each measure is calculated with regions weighted by their pupil 
populations so as to avoid small outliers distorting the results. (This does have the effect of 
dampening the degree of disparity slightly.) For purposes of comparison, the table also shows the 
same disparity measures for total oblast expenditures (on all budget items, not just education), also 
measured per-pupil; and some similar figures for disparities in per-pupil education expenditures 
across states in the USA. The total expenditure data is deflated by the first of the two indices only.
There are several things which are interesting about these figures. First, in both years 
disparities in education spending appear to be considerably lower than disparities in total spending, 
suggesting that education is treated as a necessity, protected at lower levels of revenue. This 
difference is not explained by the use of per-pupil measures -  the same result holds if all variables 
are measured per capita. It also fits with what we know about federal protection of a minimum
Table 2.2: Measures o f disparity in a) regional expenditure per-pupil on compulsory education 
and b) total regional expenditure per pupil, 1991 and J995
Education (index I) 
J991 1995






Max/min 3.41 8.29 3.99 6.95 6.09 9.51 2.94
Decile ratio 1.50 1.98 1.85 1.93 2.01 2.91 1.95
Quartile ratio 1.29 1.49 1.40 1.38 1.26 1.72 —
Coeff of Variation 0.24 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.50 -
Source: Figures for USA are calculations from data in Burtless (1996, p.2). Notes: (i) USA figures are for state 
education expenditures per pupil and are not weighted by pupil populations, unlike the figures for Russian regions: 
for Russia this has the effect of dampening the degree of disparity slightly, (ii) Index 1 is a regional CPI which 
adjusts for the difference in inflation rates since 1991 but not for any original disparity in price level across regions. 
Index 2 deflates by the regional CPI and also attempts to adjust both 1991 and 1995 figures for differences in price 
levels using the cost of a basket of 19 foodstuffs in the region's main town. Details of both indices are provided in 
Appendix A.
59
level of education expenditure. Second, there appears to have been an increase in inequality of 
education spending between 1991 and 1995, although the severity of this increase is very sensitive 
to the method of deflation used.
Using Index 1, we see a substantial increase in disparity reflected in all measures. Most 
notably, the highest spending region spent over eight times as much as the lowest spender in 1995, 
compared to 3.4 times as much in 1991, while the decile ratio also increased by some 30% and the 
quartile ratio by 15%. However, using the second index, which tries to adjust for differences in 
price levels across the country, it appears that disparities have only grown at the extremes. Table 
2.2 shows that the decile ratio has increased but by less than 5%, while the quartile ratio and the 
coefficient of variation have remained stable over the period. The surprising thing is that under 
Index 2 the 1991 distribution seems more unequal than under Index 1, while the 1995 distribution 
is slightly less unequal. In other words, part of the difference in spending in 1995 seems to be 
explained by differences in price levels; while in 1991 higher prices explain nothing -- ignoring 
them may even lead to an underestimation in the level of inequality.
Finally, using either measure, it is worth pointing out that the extremes in the Russian 
distribution seem to be further apart than those in the USA even in 1991: the maximum to 
minimum ratio is considerably higher. However, with the extremes left out (i.e. looking at the 
decile ratios), the degree of disparity in 1991 appears lower than that in the States, rising to 
roughly the same level by 1995. This last picture is closer to what we might expect. While 
disparities in levels of expenditure by region certainly existed in pre-transition Russia, it would be 
surprising to find that these were greater than between states in the USA.
However, neither of the price indices used are perfect deflators for budgetary items, and their 
failings may explain some of the tendencies noted. The first index, while probably a rough proxy 
for the regional inflation rate affecting the education sector, is likely to underestimate with respect 
to one important component -- utility prices. The CPI is based on prices facing the consumer, and 
household utility charges have remained heavily subsidized long after the liberalization of prices 
affecting institutions. If institutions are facing much greater increases in utilities, and particularly 
in heating bills, than allowed for by the CPI, the degree of the increase in real spending disparities 
since 1991 could be exaggerated. The regions which appear to have faced the biggest drop in real 
spending are, after all, mostly southern regions; while among those where real expenditure seems to 
have risen northern regions, such as the Komi Republic, are prominent. If the CPI is an inaccurate 
measure these conclusions about which regions have gained and which suffered will be unreliable.
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(The importance of the CPI in determining the ordering of regional fortunes is well illustrated by a 
comparison of Map 2.1 with Map A.2 in Appendix A. which shows the increase in the CPI 1992- 
95: one map is almost a negative image of the other.)
The second index, which attempts to adjust for variation in prices across regions as well as 
over time, also has drawbacks. Aside from the fact that it is measured only in the region's 
administrative centre, the cost of a basket of 19 food items is unlikely to reflect fully the cost of 
provision of public goods and services: it almost certainly underestimates, leaving a significant 
degree of cross-regional variation in provision costs unadjusted for.
One possible way of addressing at least the second of these problems is through the use of the 
regional wage coefficient. These wage coefficients were used in the Soviet era to adjust wage 
scales in different parts of the country, in part to make up for differences in the cost of living (only 
some of which the 19 good index picks up), but in part because of the need to pay higher wages to 
attract workers to remote and uncomfortable areas: they were known as ‘compensating* 
differentials. The essence of these differentials is likely to have persisted, both in sectors of the 
economy now governed by rules of the market — as the idea is one of basic supply and demand -  
and in the public sector. In the public sector the differentials may still exist explicitly: as noted 
above, the federal government retains and exercises the right to set minimum teacher salary levels 
for each region, and it is plausible that these minima would be governed by the same coefficients 
that governed the compensating differentials in the past. Explicit or not, the coefficients represent a 
cost factor which is beyond the control of the regional authority (it does not choose to pay a higher 
wage), and which has a considerable impact: the wage bill is likely to comprise a large share of 
current education expenditure in Russia as elsewhere.37
The problem, however, is that the coefficients themselves are not available, and using the 
observed wage as a proxy raises obvious problems. The wages themselves are certain to reflect the 
compensating differential to some extent, but they are also likely to reflect differences in teacher 
experience (as the wage figure is an average for all staff) and, since 1992, differences in regional 
decisions about what the wage should be (if the authorities decide to raise it above the minimum). 
Also since 1992, both of these factors may in turn be driven by differences in regional revenue: a 
richer region may spend more on education by raising wages or by hiring more highly qualified 
people rather than by buying more equipment.
37 Some 70% of current education spending in the UK in 1991 went on wages (MacKinnon and Statham, 
1995, p.139). Data for Novgorod Oblast (presented in Chapter 3) suggest a tower share, but still more 
than half of current spending (between 45% and 70% across raions in 1996).
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The observed wage in 1991 may, however, serve as a reasonable proxy for the regional wage 
coefficient in both years (if 1995 expenditure levels are adjusted back to 1991 prices using Index I 
above). Figure 2.2, which plots both the average education sector wage and total spending on 
education in 1991, reveals a wage distribution which is fairly flat, with a few peaks in colder and 
remote areas.38 This is consistent with the view that regional wage coefficients were at this point 
the main determinants of average wage levels, with some small additional disparities probably 
explained by differences in teacher experience. (Regions are ordered from North-West across the 
federation to the Far East, with the eleven broad geographical areas distinguished by the change in 
colour.39) In contrast, the much greater regional variation in the education wage in 1995, displayed 
in Figure 2.3 (where 1995 education spending per pupil and the education wage are plotted in 1991 
prices), suggests that by 1995 other influences on the wage had become important. That is, 1995 
variation is not explained by the 1991 variation and the CPI alone, or the deflated 1995 wage 
distribution would be similar to that in 1991.
Figure 2.2
Education spending per pupil and the education wage 1991
38 1991 wage data from Goskomstat (1995b); 1995 from Goskomstat (1996c).
39 From left to right the areas are: North, North-West, Central (including Moscow), Volgo-Vyatsky, 
Central Black Earth, Volga, North Caucasus, Urals, Western Siberia, Eastern Siberia, Far East and 
Kaliningrad (on its own).
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Figure 2.3
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As 1991 wage levels seem the best proxy for regional wage coefficients for both years. Table 
2.3 gives measures of disparity for a third expenditure index: nominal figures for spending in both 
1991 and 1995 are deflated by average nominal wages in 1991 in the education sector for each 
region. The degree of disparity in the centre of the distribution remains remarkably similar to that 
displayed by the first two expenditure indices, but the ratio between maximum and minimum is 
brought down considerably, as is the growth in this ratio over the period. Disparity in both years is 
shown to be much greater than disparity between States in the USA.
Table 2.3: Measures o f disparity fo r  education expenditure deflated by average monthly 
education wage in 1991 (1991 prices)
1991 1995 USA 1993/4
Maximum/minimum 2.17 3.79 1.91
Dec i te ratio 1.40 1.93 1.07
Quartile ratio 1,19 1.47
Coefficient of Variation 0.15 0.24
Note: Regions are weighted by their pupil populations. US figures are calculated from those given in Burtless (1996), 
p.3, and are unweighted.
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The apparently straightforward question, “How fa r  have disparities in education spending 
increased?'\ thus turns out to be very difficult to answer convincingly. Regional differences in 
cost factors make simple comparison of levels of expenditure problematic, even when expenditure 
is deflated by the best available price indices. The index presented in Table 2.3 adjusts for 
differences in regional wages beyond the control of regional authorities, but the problem of 
different utility bills remains. In the next two sections I introduce a multivariate model which aims 
to separate the impact of ali the most important cost factors from that of revenue once costs are 
controlled for. At the same time, I try to explore the true nature of the relationship between revenue 
and education spending, asking whether further analysis supports the initial impression that 
education is treated as a necessity.
The approach taken, however, does not track regions over time but looks at the overall 
distribution of expenditure in each year, and how it has changed. This gives us a preliminary but 
not a conclusive answer to the final question raised in the introduction: which are the regions to 
have benefited during the transition, those better off to begin with or those worse off? This question 
is addressed explicitly in Section 2.7.
2.5 Hypotheses and econometric framework
2.5.1 Hypotheses
I frame the first two of the questions put above as the following hypotheses:
H2.1 While variation in provision costs explains a part of total disparity in regional education 
expenditure, regional differences in real revenues are an equally important determinant.
H2.2 Education is treated as a necessity by regional authorities, protected at lower levels of 
revenue but given no priority at higher levels.
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2.5.2 A model of education demand
To test both of these hypotheses we need a model of the oblast’s demand for education. I begin by 
assuming that this demand can be divided into two elements: a committed part and a voluntary 
part.
Committed part:
Each Russian region is obliged to fulfil certain commitments to the education sector before it is free 
to start making decisions on the rest of the budget. Federal law states that the region must provide 
access to free compulsory level education to all children of the relevant age. More specifically, the 
region must cover ‘protected items’ before other items in the budget. In education this basically 
means teachers’ wages, at least at a minimum level set by the federal government. It also includes a 
fixed sum per child on food and medicine, but this sum is small enough to be ignored.
The amount spent on education under the committed part will depend on the number of 
children to be educated and the cost of educating each child. We can write it as:
COMED, = p,Ci (2.1)
where Ci is the number of educational units to be provided in oblast i and p, is the cost of providing 
each unit. If COMED* is understood as committed expenditure per pupil in oblast i, c* drops out of 
the equation. Factors affecting p, will include the potential for economies of scale (the degree of 
urbanization, total pupil numbers) and variations in the level of teachers’ wages and in the cost of 
running the buildings (such as the need for heating).
Hence we could represent committed education expenditure per pupil as:
COMED, = f (URBAN*, NUMPUP*, EDWAGE,, TEMP,) (2.2)
where URBANj is the degree of urbanization, NUMPUPj the number of children to be educated (to 
allow for economies of scale), EDWAGE* the minimum wage to be paid to teachers as set at the 
centre, and TEMP; the average temperature as a proxy for the cost of heating school buildings. A 
linear functional form is likely to be appropriate, so we might write:
COMEDi = cqURBANj + cc2NUMPUPj + a,EDWAGE, + OjTEMP, (2.3)
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Voluntary part:
Having met these requirements, and similar requirements to other sectors, a region is free to decide 
how to use the rest of its budget. It might choose to give particular emphasis to education, or it 
might have alternative priorities.
What will determine the level of this voluntary part of education expenditure? In most models 
of local government expenditure there are two complicating factors. First, the decision to spend a 
certain amount on a particular government service is not only a decision about the allocation of a 
fixed public budget, but also a decision about public versus private consumption: by changing tax 
rates a local authority can affect its own budget constraint. The second complication is that most 
countries have complicated matching or earmarked grant systems which mean that the local 
authority can also affect its total revenue level by the way in which it chooses to allocate its 
budget.40 Both factors mean that the budget constraint that the local authority faces is not fixed but 
can be affected by local authority decisions.
The oddities of the Russian fiscal system however mean that both these complications can by 
and large be ignored. First, the Russian region is considerably constrained in its ability to affect the 
local tax burden. The system is one of revenue sharing, in which tax rates are set at the federal 
level and regions retain a percentage of each tax as decided by the federal government. Although 
there are a handful of local taxes over which the region has control, these are too small to be taken 
seriously as a source of revenue. Hence there is in effect no possibility of switching funds from the 
private to the public domain or vice versa.
Second, the grants made from central to regional governments in Russia are exclusively 
unconditional block grants. The approach, as we saw in Chapter 1, is essentially a 'gap-filling’ 
one: grants aim at filling the gap between a region's revenue and the expenditure level it was used 
to in the past. Once received, the grants can be spent as the region sees fit. There are no restrictions 
and no incentives to spend them on any particular sphere.
The regional budget constraint is therefore similar to a household budget constraint: it is a 
fixed sum which the region is free to divide between a series of possible items, ignoring individual 
preferences about private consumption. The amount spent on the voluntary part of education will 
therefore depend simply on the level of uncommitted regional revenue (that which is left after 
committed expenditure has been covered), the cost of a unit of education relative to the cost of
40 Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), Brown and Saks (1983) and Kim (1988) are examples of studies 
which address the former issue. Feldstein (1975), Turnbull (1987), Addonizio (1991) and Weber (1991) 
are concerned with the problems raised by the latter.
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other government services, and the relative importance attached to education. Here for simplicity I 
assume the cost of education relative to other government services to be the same in each region, 
and to remain constant relative to the cost of other services over time. This allows me to ignore 
prices. (This is not an entirely implausible assumption as the main factors determining cost -  
wages and utility bills -- are common to all government services.)
To the extent that the relative importance attached to education is itself a function of revenue 
we can then write simply:
VOLEDj = f (REVENUE*) (2.4)
where VOLEDj is voluntary expenditure on education per pupil and REVENUE, is uncommitted 
revenue per pupil. This is just the relationship traditionally referred to as an Engel Curve (see e.g. 
Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980).
The immediate problem with Equation 2.4 is that the REVENUE variable included here is not 
actually available. What we have is total revenue per pupil, not the revenue that remains after 
committed expenditure has been covered. If the relationship we want to postulate between 
education spending and available revenue is a linear one, it is possible to get round this problem. 
Combining Equations 2.3 and 2.4 we can then write total education expenditure per pupil as:
EDEXP, = COMED, + p (TOTREV* - XCOMEXP,) (2.5)
where COMEDj is defined in Equation 2.3 above; TOTREVj is total oblast revenue and 
ECOMEXPj is the sum of committed item on all sectors, including on education. Multiplying out, 
we get:
EDEXPj = (l-p)COMEDj + pTOTREV* - 0 ICOMOTH, (2.6)
where ICOMOTH* is committed expenditure on all sectors other than the education sector. 
Substituting in from Equation 2.3 we get:
EDEXP* = (1 -p)ct] URBAN, + (1 -p)a2NUMPUPj + (1 -P)aEDWAGEj 
(l-p)atTEMPi + p TOTREVj - p ICOMOTH* (2.7)
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on
EDEXPi = Y,URBANi + y2NUMPUPi+Y3EDWAGEi + Y4TEMPj
+ p TOTREVj - p ICOMOTH, (2.8)
This can then be estimated as a linear regression, either including some proxy variables for 
committed expenditure in other sectors, or dropping this part of the equation on the grounds that 
the main factors influencing committed expenditure on other sectors will be the same as those 
affecting committed expenditure on education (regional wage coefficients, utility bills).41
Despite the simplicity of the linear functional form, it is not the form I would have chosen from 
the beginning to model education demand. Studies which use a linear functional form to estimate 
local authority equations (Inman 1971, Jackman and Papadachi, 1981) often do so within the 
framework of the linear expenditure system (LES) used in consumer theory (Stone 1954), but this 
seems an inappropriate framework in this context. Under the LES approach we begin with certain 
assumptions about the shape of local authority preferences and go on from there to derive the 
demand equations. This raises a series of questions about how local authorities make decisions: are 
they answerable to local electorates? if so how do they aggregate individual preferences? These 
seem unnecessary traps to be setting given that the aim is to describe the data, to ask what the data 
can tell us about the way revenue is spent.
On the other hand, if we simply choose a functional form which fits the relationship which 
economic theory and common sense would lead us to expect, it is not clear that the linear form is 
the one which we would come up with. If we think about the nature of the relationship between 
revenue and spending there are a series of possible shapes which the curve might take; a straight 
line is just one of several alternatives. For example, one functional form frequently used in studies 
of local authority spending which take an Explanatory* (rather than preference-based) approach is 
a log-linear form (see e.g Feldstein, 1975, Turnbull, 1987). However, this model is largely popular 
not because there are strong reasons for believing that it reflects the true relationship between 
revenues and spending, but rather because it imposes a constant elasticity on the data, and this 
simplifies the interpretation of results. It has therefore come in for criticism from researchers who 
argue that the elasticity is unlikely to be constant in reality (Brown and Saks, 1983, Addonizio,
41 In principle we could then use the estimated P to recover the a  terms in Equation 2.3, but as my main 
interest here is in the estimate of P itself I make no attempt to do this.
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1991). Many items analysed in household demand type systems have in fact been shown to have an 
income elasticity that falls as income rises, consumption increasing at a decreasing rate with 
respect to income (Prais and Houthakker, 1955); and some work has suggested that the same 
relationship may hold for local authority consumption of education (Brown and Saks, 1983). If so 
this would point to the use of a semi-log functional form, which would allow spending to tail off at 
higher levels of revenue.42 On the other hand, there is also evidence that the opposite may be true: 
Addonizio (1991) finds that richer districts in the State of Michigan have higher income elasticity 
of demand for education than poorer districts. This would call for a different form altogether, 
allowing the curve to climb steeply away from the x-axis as revenue increases.43
To test Hypothesis 2.2 above we really need to allow for all these various possibilities, ideally 
by choosing a general functional form which nests a number of testable special cases. However, 
given the constraints (and small size) of the data-set this might be putting the cart before the horse. 
The sensible route seems to be to start with the linear form, which is easy to estimate, and then test 
the specification for signs of non-linearity. If the assumption of linearity cannot be rejected, we can 
conclude that there is insufficient evidence to justify the additional complications introduced by 
trying to construct an alternative functional form. If we are able to reject the linear hypothesis, 
these issues will have to be addressed.
Hence I estimate the following equation for each of the two years, 1991 and 1995:
EDEXP, = Yo + P TOTEXPj + y, URBAN, + y2NUMPUPj (2.9)
+ YiEDWAGE, + y4TEMPi + £,
where TOTEXPj is total oblast expenditure per pupil, URBAN, is the degree of urbanization, 
NUMPUPj the total number of pupils in the region, ED WAGE, the average education wage in 
1991, and TEMPj the average temperature as a proxy for the cost of heating school buildings.
A few explanatory notes on the independent variables are called for. Most importantly, total 
oblast expenditure per child is used instead of total oblast revenue. This is simply because a more
42 Brown and Saks even question whether the Engel curve for education is monotonic. Their results 
suggest that desired local authority spending is a U-shaped function of family income, turning downwards 
at very high family income levels. This might be because these households opt to withdraw their children 
from public education; but Hashimoto and Heath (1995) find the same U-shape when looking at actual 
household education expenditure in Japan. These shapes could be represented using a quadratic form.
43 The linear model does not impose a constant elasticity either, of course, but nor does it allow for a 
simple and easily interpretable trend in the elasticity.
69
reliable and consistent measure is available for expenditure than for revenue (the 1991 data I have 
for revenues appears to exclude all transfers). While it raises the possibility of reverse causation 
(total expenditure per child being in part a function of education expenditure per child), the fact 
that spending on compulsory education composes an average of just \3%  of the total budget means 
this ought not to raise too serious a problem. Second, as noted above, the variable used for the 
minimum education wage is actually the observed average wage in the education sector in 1991, 
and is also the wage for the whole sector, not just for teaching staff. Third, and also for reasons of 
data availability, the average January temperature in 1995 is used in analysing both 1991 and 1995 
data. Finally, data for education expenditure and total expenditure are deflated to 1991 prices using 
Index 1 above (the CPI but not the 19 good index). This means Figures should be roughly 
comparable over the time period, but not across regions. The purpose of the average wage and 
temperature variables is to take out the bulk of nominal variation in expenditure across regions.
Summary statistics for all variables are given in Table 2.4. The Figures illustrate the 
substantial falls in average per pupil spending over the period, both overall and in the education 
sector, as well as the slight increase in pupil numbers.






Education expenditure per pupil (000s) 954 271 731 312
Total expenditure per pupil (000s) 8,402 3,174 5,763 3,120
Urbanization (%) 69.0 13.1 69.8 12.6
Number of pupils (000s) 260 186 271 196
1991 education sector wage (roubles) 386 94 386 94
Average January temperature (°C) -10.3 6.5 -10.3 6.5




Estimating Equation 2.9 above using OLS techniques yielded the results given in Table 2.5. Two 
sets of results are reported. In the second set a series of regional dummy variables were included to 
test results for robustness to outliers. Four such dummies were tested: (l) Moscow City, which as 
the capital has a number of additional responsibilities other regions do not have (resulting in a 
share of education in total spending of under 7% in both years, compared to an average of 13%); 
(2) St. Petersburg, as the second city, for similar reasons (less than 9% on education in both 
years); (3) the Sakha and Magadan Republics, two regions in the Far East with total expenditure 
(and education expenditure) several times above the average; and (3) the Altay Republic, which in 
both years (and for reasons unclear) had an education share in total expenditure of over 20%.
For 1991 none of these dummies proved significant, and their inclusion did not have a 
significant impact on any of the other coefficients, as may be apparent from Table 2.5. For 1995, 
however, the dummies for Moscow, St. Petersburg and the Altay Republic (but not for Sakha and 
Magadan) were all highly significant, and including them had important effects on several other 
coefficients. In particular, the significance of the urbanization and size variables seems to be 
entirely explained by these three observations. Moscow and St. Petersburg are both large urban 
regions, and spend less per child on education than would be expected given their total expenditure; 
while the Altay Republic is very small and very rural (200,000 inhabitants of which just 27% live 
in urban areas), and for unknown reasons spends a much higher share of its budget on education 
than any other region. Once these regions are controlled for both variables cease to have any 
explanatory power, while the revenue variable becomes larger and more significant. The dummy 
for Sakha and Magadan was insignificant in both years.44
The second set of tests run on the results was a test for linearity. This was done through the 
estimation of a spline function.45 For each equation, the total expenditure curve was allowed to 
bend at a given point, a ‘knot*. This knot was set first, at the 50th percentile of the expenditure 
distribution, and then at the point halfway between minimum and maximum.46 These unrestricted
44 A dummy for Magadan alone proved negative and significant in 1991 and positive and significant in 
1995; while a dummy for Sakha was positive and significant in 1991. But in neither year did the inclusion 
of either have a significant impact on the other coefficients.
45 See e.g Stewart and Wallis (1981), pp.201 -204.
46 The halfway point between minimum and maximum is a much higher value than the 50th percentile, 
because all outliers are at the upper end of the distribution. Trying both possibilities increases the chances 
of isolating any bend in the curve.
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Table 2.5: Results o f linear regression on expenditure per pupil on compulsory' education, 
1991 and 1995
1991a 1991b 1995a 1995b
Total expenditure per pupil* 0.040 0.041 0.088 0.094
(5.0) (4.3) (11.9) 05.2)
Average education sector wage 1991’ 1.26 1.22 0.28 0.17
(3-7) (3.5) (0.9) (0.6)
Urbanization (%) -8.11 -7 3 -3.08 -0.79
(-7.3) (-5.9) (-2.1) (-0.7)
Number of pupils (thousands) -0.10 -0.12 -0.18 -0.07
M .4) (-1.6) (-1.9) (-0.9)
Average temperature January 1995 -8.01 -7.7 -6.87 -4.6
(-2.6) (-2.3) (-2.9) (-2.7)
Moscow City 107.7 -536.1
(1-3) (-6.4)
St. Petersburg -120.6 -222.3
(-1.6) (-4.8)
Altay Republic 106.3 359.3
(1.5) (7.6)
Constant 6363 611.7 311.4 153.1
(6.7) (5.7) (2.6) (1.6)
Adjusted R2 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.91
Notes', *a* results exclude dummies; ‘b’ results include dummies. 'Measured in 1991 roubles. T-statistics given in 
brackets. Coefficients in bold are significant at the 10% level. N=75 for 1991, N=76 for 1995 (no data for total 
expenditure Ivanova Oblast 1991 ). Standard errors arc calculated using the HuberAVhite estimator of variance, robust 
to heteroskedasticity in the error term.
models were then tested against a restricted model in which the linear coefficients above were 
imposed on the full range of the data. That is, for each year, I created two new variables:
EXPSPLli = EXPi ifEXPi < EXP*
EXPSPLlj = 0 otherwise;
where EXP* is first the 50th percentile of EXP, and then the point halfway between minimum and 
maximum;
and EXPSPL2, = EXP, ifEXPi >EXP*
EXPSPL2i = 0 otherwise.
The unrestricted model is then estimated as:
EDEXPi = Oto +  Po EXPSPLlj + P, EXPSPL2i+ p.URBAN, + (2 .10)
pjNUMCHILDj + p4EDWAGEi + p5TEMP, + £,
This allows the expenditure variable to have a different slope at lower levels of expenditure to that 
at higher levels. The hypothesis that the slope is in fact the same at all levels (that the slope is 
linear) can then be tested as a simple restriction on this model:
Hr: po = pi
In all cases, I found that the hypothesis of linearity could not be rejected; that is, that the 
possibility of equivalent coefficients on the expenditure variables could not be rejected at the 59c 
significance level.47
There appears then to be no reason to reject the linear model and the rest of this section 
concentrates on the results given above, abandoning attempts to construct a more complex and 
flexible model.
47 With regional dummies excluded and EXP* set at the 50th percentile, the F-statistic for 1991 was 3.18 
and for 1995 0.03 (the critical value at the 5% level was 4.00). With EXP* set at the halfway point 
between minimum and maximum, the F-statistic for 1991 was 0.12 and for 1995 1.98. (Results were very 
similar with regional dummies included.)
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2.6.2 Interpretation
In support of Hypothesis 2.2, the coefficients on the total expenditure variable in Table 2.5 confirm 
that education is treated as a necessary good. The elasticity of education spending with respect to 
total spending is 0.36 at the mean in 1991, and 0.74 in 1995.48 In both years, then, the elasticity 
falls well below unity, implying that the education sector has been protected from the worst of the 
expenditure cuts (falling by a lower proportion than total expenditure has fallen), but has benefited 
less than proportionately in regions where total spending has risen. However, it is striking that the 
elasticity has more than doubled during the period. This could suggest that education is considered 
more of a priority now among richer regions in control of their own budgets. This is consistent with 
the story told by the maximum-minimum ratios presented in Table 2.2: while even in 1995 there is 
less difference between the extremes in education spending than in spending overall, the gap is 
much smaller than in 1991. On the other hand, the other measures of disparity presented in Table
2.2 tell a less clear story. Furthermore, as explained below, there may be reason to believe that the 
coefficient on total expenditure in 1991 is an underestimate.
Hypothesis 2.1 is more difficult to address. A first glance at the significance of variables in 
Table 2.6 suggests that in 1995 revenue factors were much more important than cost factors in 
determining education spending, but that in 1991 the impact of each type of variable was more 
balanced. Table 2.6 facilitates this type of comparison, showing for each explanatory variable how 
much more or less would have been spent by a region located at the 25th and 75th percentile in 
comparison to a region at the median for that variable (but with otherwise identical characteristics). 
In 1991, the impact of total expenditure is similar in size to that of the several of the cost variables. 
Primorskiy Krai in the Far East, which falls at the 25th percentile with respect to temperature (i.e. 
at the colder end) is predicted to spend some 45 roubles more per child than an identical region 
with the median temperature. Mariy El Republic, at the 25th percentile for urbanization, is 
meanwhile predicted to spend an additional 50 roubles. This is in comparison to Ulyanovsk Oblast, 
which was at the 75th percentile for total expenditure (the richer end), which spent an additional 60 
roubles per child compared to a region at the median.
In contrast, in 1995 the impact of total expenditure overshadows that of all other variables. 
Three of the cost factor variables, as noted, do not appear to have had any significant impact on 
spending once three regional dummy variables are included. The remaining variable, temperature,
48 Elasticity calculated as pX/Y at mean values of X and Y.
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Table 2.6: Difference in spending with respect to the median region for each explanatory 
variable (an interpretation o f the results in Table 2.5)
1991
25th pctile 75th petite
1995
25th pctile 75th pctile
Expenditure per pupil -38 58 -112 131
Education wage 1991 -26 53 H ) (7)
Urbanization 52 -68 (5) (-8)
No. of pupils 7 -20 (4) (-13)
Temperature 1995 45 -23 27 -14
Average expenditure per pupil 954 731
Note: Numbers in brackets are insignificant results.
has a fairly small impact. The model suggests that Primorskiy Krai spent only 27 roubles more 
than the median region in 1991, about half of the extra it spent in 1991: while Kostroma Oblast, at 
the 75th percentile for total expenditure, spent 130 roubles per child more than the median.
The table also allows easier comparison of the impact of any given variable across the two 
different years. For example, we can see that Stavropol, at the 25th percentile with respect to total 
expenditure per pupil in 1991, is predicted to have spent 38 roubles less than the median on 
education per pupil. In comparison, Rostov Oblast, which was at the 25th percentile in 1995, 
appears to have spent 112 roubles less on education than the median region. Total expenditure 
seems to have had a much greater impact on education spending in 1995 than in 1991 once the four 
cost factors included are controlled for. The difference is underlined when we consider that the 
mean expenditure level was much lower in 1995, as the last row of the table shows.
This all seems to be strong evidence in favour of Hypothesis 2.1: variation in provision costs 
does seem to explain a part of total disparity in regional education expenditure, but regional 
differences in real revenues (or in total expenditures once cost factors are controlled for) are also 
important determinants. To be more specific, in 1991 variations in provision costs seem to explain 
most of the disparity in expenditure, although there is still a significant role for revenue. In 1995 on 
the other hand, the vast majority of explained disparity seems attributable to total spending 
disparities. Provision costs (namely temperature) explain only a small part.
This interpretation is supported by an analysis of the decomposition of the variation in 
predicted education expenditure. I owe this technique to Jackman and Papadachi (1981), who use it
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to address a similar problem in the case of the UK. If a variable Y is regressed against N variables 
Xi (i = 1,...,N), the ‘explained’ variance in Y (Yhat) is given by: *
V N N N
var(Yhat) = \ z r ( £ b iX i ) = ^ b *  v a i iX ^  + ^ ^ b i b j C o v a r i X ^ X j )  ( j * i )  (2.11)
1*1 1*1 »*i j - i
where bj are the estimated regression coefficients on Xj.
Hence if we construct a matrix in which the diagonal elements are b,’ var(Xi)/var(Yhat). and 
the off-diagonal elements b,bj covar(Xi, Xj)/var(Yhat), we will be able to see the share of the 
variation in Yhat attributable to any variable alone or to any group of variables simply by 
summing the relevant terms. In Tables 2.7a and 2.7b the matrices are presented with all terms 
multiplied by 100 to convert them into percentages, and with symmetrical off-diagonal terms 
summed for clarity.
Using these figures we can decompose the explained variation in education spending into a part 
attributable to variation in total spending, a part attributable to variation in cost factors, and a part 
due to the interaction between the two sets of factors. Looking first at 1991, it seems that about a 
quarter of the variation in education expenditure can be explained by variation in total spending 
alone, while almost 40% of the variation is explained by the cost factors (including the variation 
attributable to each cost factor alone with that attributable to the interaction of each with the other 
three.) The most important of the cost factors are the education wage, which alone explains 20% of 
variation in education spending, and the degree of urbanization, which explains 15%, The average 
temperature is able to explain just 4%,
In contrast, in 1995, total expenditure is effectively the only variable which has any 
importance. Total expenditure explains a remarkable 98% of explained variation in education 
spending, while all four cost factors combined explain only 2%. In a sense this is a bit misleading 
as the existence of negative values means that more than 1007c of the variation can be ‘explained’: 
‘-9%’ is explained by the regional dummy variables, while the compensating 9% can be put down 
to the interaction between total spending and cost factors. But the key point, the near irrelevance of 
the cost factors, remains the same. Even the temperature variable explains just 1% of total 
explained variation.
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Table 2.7a: Components o f variation in education spending 1991
Total exp Ed wage Urban Pupils Temp Reg.dum TOTAL
Total exp 26.3 26.3
Ed wage 37.5 20.4 57.9
Urban *14.4 -14.9 15.2 •14.1
Pupils 1.2 0.6 2.8 0.8 5.4
Temp 10.3 10.2 -1.4 0.2 3.9 233
Reg.dum -0.9 -0.3 1.7 - 0.1 0.3 0.7 1.4
TOTAL 60.0 16.0 183 0.9 4.2 0.7 100
Note: All variation attributable to the regional dummies is summed into one term (‘Reg.dum’).
Table 2.7b: Components of variation in education spending 1995
Total exp Ed wage Urban Pupils Temp Reg.dum TOTAL
Total exp 98.2 98.2
Ed wage 7.0 0.2 7.2
Urban -3.1 -0.1 0.1 -3.1
Pupils -2.5 0.0 0.1 0.2 •2.2
Temp 7.4 0.4 -0.1 0.1 1.0 8.8
Reg.dum -18.8 -0.2 0.9 1.3 0.8 6.9 -9.1
TOTAL 88.2 0 3 1.0 1.6 1.8 6.9 100
Note: All variation attributable to the regional dummies is summed into one term ( ‘Reg.dum’).
How do these results measure up to those obtained for Britain? There Jackman and Papadachi 
concluded that over 50% of variation in local authority spending on both primary and secondary 
education could be put down to cost factors alone (sparsity, density, labour costs and pupil 
numbers), while 20% of variation was explained by revenue factors. (The remainder results in part 
from a political variable included to proxy preferences and in part from the interaction between the 
three types of variable.) These are very similar numbers to those obtained for Russia for 1991. 
Those obtained for 1995 however are clearly in a different league entirely.
There are one or two objections which may be brought against the analysis above. The first is 
the use of the actual wage in 1991 to proxy minimum wage levels in both 1991 and 1995. It may 
be argued that the reason for the high significance of this variable in 1991 and its irrelevance in
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1995 is obvious: in 1991 it is highly correlated with education spending simply because it is a 
major driving force behind that spending; in 1995 it is insignificant because it no longer represents 
the real wage bill. This seems to me a legitimate concern with the 1991 results: it is no surprise that 
Table 2.7a shows that a large share of predicted education spending (almost 40%) cannot be 
separated between total spending and the education wage, and it may be that the wage is picking up 
some of the variation which should really be attributed to revenue levels. However, the observed 
wage is the only proxy for labour costs available. Furthermore, there are good reasons for 
believing that the 1991 wage largely if not entirely reflects fixed labour costs beyond authority 
control. In 1991 regional authorities had no ability to affect the local wage themselves, and so 
variations which cannot be explained by the regional wage coefficients should be explainable only 
by differences in teacher experience. An examination of the average education wage by region in 
1991, as given in Figure 2.2, supports the theory that wage coefficients are the main cause of wage 
variation at this point in time: the wage distribution is largely flat, broken by steep peaks in 
northern and remote areas. The frenetic ups and downs of the 1995 distribution, in contrast, make 
it clear why using the 1995 wage as the proxy for labour costs in 1995 would be unjustifiable. If 
we do use the 1995 wage, the wage variable immediately becomes significant, taking over some of 
the disparity otherwise explained by total spending. But in 1995 wage levels could officially be 
adjusted upwards by the regional authorities, and there is almost certain to be a high degree of 
reverse causation. At the same time, given that all monetary variables used are deflated to 1991 
prices using the CPI, there is no reason why the 1991 wage levels should not reflect the true labour 
costs faced by regions even in 1995.
Thus there is a case that the use of the 1991 observed wage is more problematic for the 1991 
equation than for the 1995 equation. A further argument for the veracity of the fall in significance 
of the wage variable over the period is that this is not an isolated event but is symptomatic of what 
has happened to other cost factors: neither the degree of urbanization nor the number of pupils is 
significant in 1995 and the temperature variable is also much less important than previously.
A second objection may be raised at this point: is it possible that total expenditure levels in 
1995 are themselves explained by cost factors? If correlation was explained by observed cost 
factors, this would mean multicollinearity between the explanatory variables. In fact, the 
correlation between total spending and cost variables is no higher in 1995 than in 199149; and there
49 Correlation between total expenditure per pupil in 1991 with urbanization is 0.47 (0.36 in 1995); with 
number of pupils 0.26 (-0.12 in 1995) and with temperature -0.36 (-0.50 in 1991). Correlation between
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should be sufficient independent variation to allow the effects of each variable to be separable. An 
alternative possibility, of course, is that total expenditure is correlated with unobserved cost 
factors; factors unrelated to heating, wage costs or scale economies. Costs of textbooks and 
equipment might be an example. But regional variation in the costs of these items will be driven by 
transport costs, and these ought to be proxied by variation in wages (which do in part reflect 
transport costs) and in heating requirements (colder regions being in general further from 
Moscow). In addition, there is evidence that expenditure on textbook and equipment items has 
become almost negligible in many areas (see for example Chapter 3, Section 3.4.3). In this case, 
even if expenditure were in part driven by spending on textbooks in certain areas, this would be 
better explained as ‘voluntary’ than ‘committed’ expenditure.
To summarize then, we do seem to see a huge rise in the importance of revenue factors, as 
represented by total expenditure, in explaining education spending over the period 1991 to 1995. 
By 1995 provision costs appear to be basically irrelevant in explaining spending disparities. It 
seems that growing disparities in education spending during the transition must be interpreted as 
real disparities; they cannot be explained away by increasing variation in costs. Indeed, real 
disparities may have grown by more than first appears to be the case: in 1991 part of the difference 
can be put down to provision costs while in 1995 this no longer seems to be true.
The results for 1995 are perhaps especially interesting and important with respect to the fall in 
the importance of the temperature as an explanatory variable. It looked as though the preliminary 
analysis, which isolated southern regions as being among those to have suffered the greatest fall in 
real spending over the period, may have been due to the underestimation of heating costs for 
institutions in the CPI, But further investigation provides no support for this possibility: there is no 
relationship between average temperatures and spending levels in 1995. On the contrary, colder 
regions appear to be less well protected in 1995 than in 1991. In Section 2.7 I therefore treat 
changes in spending as measured by the CPI as meaningful.
total expenditure and the 1991 education wage is naturally much higher in 1991 (0.81) than in 1995
( 0 .66) .
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2.7 Winners and losers
The purpose of this Final section of the paper is to ask what can be said, if anything, about the 
relationship between the high spending regions of today and those of the past. Have changes in 
education spending over the last few years been more to the benefit of those regions traditionally 
better protected, thus reinforcing disparities in educational provision; or the opposite, allowing 
previously deprived regions to catch up? In the long-run widening disparities are worrying 
whatever the answer to this question, but in the short-run it might be encouraging to discover that 
regions where spending has fallen most dramatically are also those where conditions were 
previously relatively good. Large falls in spending in areas already very badly off clearly provide 
particular cause for concern.
This might seem a very easy question to answer quickly. A glance back at Figures 2.2 and 2.3 
suggests no obvious relationship between the expenditure series for 1991 and that for 1995; an 
impression confirmed by Figure 2.4, which plots both series together with each one ordered by per 
pupil expenditure in 1991. However, as discussed, while these data are deflated for changes in 
prices between 1991 and 1995, they are not really comparable across regions. Furthermore, there 
are serious problems with both of the cross-regional deflators available. In this section I do look at 
the relationship between change in spending and 1991 spending levels as measured by each of these 
deflators, but I also explore some alternative, non-monetary measures of initial situation.
Figure 2.4




First, though, why might we expect a reshuffling of high and low-spenders? Among the regions 
which have benefited most from price liberalization and the lifting of trade barriers are those rich in 
natural resources, now Russia’s main exports. These are also regions held to have done relatively 
badly in terms of social infrastructure during the Soviet era, although arguably more through 
circumstance than design. Jonathan Schiffer maintains, for example, that because social facilities 
were provided through industrial ministries, no comprehensive policy of social development existed 
under Soviet rule. In practice less development took place in Siberia and the Far East because of 
the much higher construction costs in those areas combined with the same pressure to fulfil 
production targets as elsewhere (Schiffer, 1989, Ch.6). Oksana Dmitrieva agrees that, despite 
receiving ‘excessive* investment, high construction costs resulted in a lower level of social facilities 
in the north and in Siberia than elsewhere (Dmitrieva, 1996, p.74). It is possible then that in some 
of the regions which are now doing well, public services were provided at relatively poor levels in 
the past.
At the same time, however, traditionally highly privileged regions such as Moscow and St. 
Petersburg also feature among the winners, indicating that generalization is unlikely to be easy. To 
illustrate this further, a categorization used by Hanson (1996) is useful. Hanson groups regions by 
economic features likely to prove important in adaptation to the market, creating five categories 
(not mutually exclusive): seven ‘natural-resource* regions (fuel-energy, non-ferrous metals and 
timber and woodworking sub-sectors account together for more than half of industrial output in 
1993)50; thirteen * commercial hubs/gate way s' (possessing in 1994 a foreign exchange bourse 
and/or major maritime port facilities; ten ‘high-tec* regions (in the top ten regions in 1993 when all 
regions are ranked by numbers of identified work-places in the following military branches: 
aerospace, radio, communications equipment, electronics); ten *rural* regions (more than 45% 
rural population in January 1995); and the residual, which he terms ‘ordinary Russian regions’.
While these categories naturally provide an extremely rough guide to potential success, they do 
go some way to explaining who has best survived the transition, measured here by what has 
happened to education spending. Regions seem to have done well if they fall into one of two 
groups: either they are commercial hubs and hi-tec regions (satisfying one alone tends not to be 
enough) or they are rich in resources. Of the ten regions where education spending actually 
increased in real terms between 1991 and 1995, three are natural resource regions, four are both
50 Hanson includes an eighth region, Tyumen, which I exclude as the majority of resources are located not 
in Tyumen itself but in its two Autonomous Republics. I have left these out of the rest of the analysis for 
data reasons.
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commercial hubs and high-tec and one is high-tec. Spreading to look at the top quartile (1995 
spending at least 93% of its 1991 level, as illustrated in Map 2.1, five of the nineteen are natural 
resource regions, five commercial-hub and hi-tec, and one hi-tec. Rural regions, on the other hand, 
have done badly in general: five of the ten rural regions are in the bottom quartile, while there are 
none in the top quartile. While the mean level of change across all regions is to 11% of the 1991 
level in 1995, the mean for the thirteen regions which are either commercial-hubs and hi-tec or 
resource rich is 107% and that for the ten rural regions 58%.
As a further simple indication of the characteristics of success, Table 2.8 gives results of a 
regression of change in education spending on a dummy variable termed STRONG, which takes 
the value 1 if the region is either a) resource-rich or b) both a commercial hub and hi-tec under 
Hanson's classifications; and the value 0 otherwise. This dummy variable alone is able to explain 
over 30% of the variation in expenditure change. Including another dummy variable for the regions 
which classify as rural means 36% of the variation can be explained, with the coefficient on the 
rural variable negative and significant. (This dummy could be placed by a continuous variable for 
degree of urbanization, with little changing.) If population size is also included, the equation 
explains 43% of the variation, with a positive coefficient on population size. Regions likely to have 
done well can be very crudely characterized as being large, having a relatively small rural 
population, and/or being either rich in resources or commercial hubs with hi-tech industries.
The question that interests us here however is what conditions were like to start with in these 
different types of regions, both those that would prove successful and those which have suffered 
most during the transition. A plausible scenario might be that hi-tec/commercial hub regions were
Table 2.8: Results o f regression o f change in education spending 1991-95 on possible 
characteristics o f success
STRONG RURAL URBAN POP’N R2
1 35.2 (5.9) 0.31
2 32.6 (5.6) -16.5 (-2.5) 0.36
3 26.7 (4.6) -15.4 (-2.5) 0.004 (3.1) 0.43
4 25.2 (4.1) 0.38(2.1) 0.004 (2,3) 0.41
Note'. ‘Strong’ is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if region is either a) resource-rich or b) a commercial hub and 
hi-tec according to Hanson’s (1996) classifications; value zero otherwise. ‘Rural’ is a dummy variable which takes 
value 1 if more than 45% of the population was rural in 1993. Urbanization and population are continuous variables.
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well provided for in the Soviet era, and resource rich regions and rural regions less so. subsequent 
developments thus resulting in a mixing of fortunes, as suggested in Figure 2.4. But are such 
generalizations possible? Below I try to answer this question using three different measures of 
initial conditions. I look at 1991 expenditure levels but also explore two non-monetary measures: 1 
begin with another categorization, this one done by Dmitrieva (1996) to group regions by 1991 
living standards; and then turn to available non-monetaiy indicators of the quality of education in 
particular, which largely means data on the state of school buildings.
2.7.1 Living standard groupings
Dmitrieva (1996) groups regions and Soviet Republics into six groups depending on the level of 
living standards in 1991. Her classification includes measures of both social welfare and household 
consumption and thus gives a very broad idea of how conditions compared across regions.51 As 
boundaries have changed somewhat Dmitrieva’s classifications do not fit exactly with Hanson’s 
(and mine), but 72 of the 76 regions overlap. Data for these show the commercial-hub/hi-tec group 
of regions to have started with much higher average living standards than the resource-rich group, 
while most rural regions also have a poor record. Of the six commercial-hub/hi-tec regions, one 
(Moscow) classifies as having the ‘highest level* living standards — Moscow is in fact the only 
Russian region to be included in the top group, which also contains the Baltic States and Belarus — 
and three more fall into the second category from top (‘high living standards’). In contrast, all 
seven resource-rich regions are classified into the bottom three groups, with living standards 
‘below average* or worse. Three fall into the very bottom group. Five of the seven rural regions for 
which data are available fall into the bottom two groups, with ‘low’ or ‘lowest’ living standards. 
(Aside from Group 1, the groups are roughly the same size, containing between 12 and 16 Russian 
regions.)
This is in keeping with the scenario suggested above: some of the regions to have done well 
from the transition are regions which were already privileged in the Soviet period, while others 
were relatively deprived. It is not surprising therefore that, if we link the Dmitrieva classifications 
directly to what happened to education spending over the period 1991-95, no very clear pattern
51 Living standards are measured by three input indicators of social welfare (doctors per capita, hospital 
beds per capita and state investments in social facilities and housing), three output indicators of social 
welfare (infant mortality, secondary school students studying in second or third shifts and pre-school 
places per child under 6) and five indicators of household consumption (average monthly wage excluding 
collective farmers, average monthly wage of collective farmers, retail turnover per capita, car ownership 
and living space per capita).
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emerges. In Figure 2.5 below I plot the mean level of change within each group. The second group 
(‘High’) is plotted with a sub-division as Dmitrieva makes a distinction between regions where 
higher living standards were due predominantly to better social welfare facilities (Group A) and 
those where higher household consumption was the more important factor (Group B).52 With the 
exception of the fifth group, (‘Low’), there is a general trend downwards in the averages across the 
chart, suggesting that regions with worse living standards to begin with have suffered bigger falls 
in spending since 1991. But this is not a strong trend, particularly given that ‘Highest’ contains just 
one region, Moscow. It is notable though that, within the second group, education spending has 
suffered less in the regions which had the stronger social welfare facilities to start with (Group A).
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show the distribution by living standard group of the top ten and bottom 
ten regions when regions are ranked by the change in education spending 1991-95. In both figures 
we see a spread of regions across the groups, with three or four regions classified as average or 
above average and six or seven as below. These figures provide further evidence that there is no 
simple link between recent developments and past conditions. No clear pattern emerges in either of 
the charts taken individually, nor in the comparison of the two of them against each other. Some 
regions which were doing well before seem to have improved their position yet further, while 
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52 Three of the other groups are also subdivided in Dmitrieva’s classifications, but not in ways which are 
of interest to this analysis.
84
Figure 2.6
Top  10 regions ranked by expenditure change 1991*95: distribution by 
1991 living standard group
Living standard groups
Figure 2.7
Bottom 10 regions ranked by education change 1991*95: distribution 
by living standard group
Living standard groups
Figure 2.7 suggests that in several regions the fall in spending in recent years has exacerbated an 
already severe situation. Three regions which classified as having among the worst living standards 
in the country in 1991 saw spending fall by over half between 1991 to 1995. One of these is the 
Kalmykia Republic, where spending fell the furthest of all, to just 27% of its 1991 level.
In the next two sub-sections I look at data on initial conditions in the education sector in 
particular. Does this data support the pattern (or lack of a pattern) suggested above? I Find that 
conclusions are very sensitive to the way in which the starting point of the education sector is 
measured. Data on education expenditure in 1991 suggests that there may have been some 
reshuffling of winners and losers. But using non-monetary indicators of the state of education in
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1991 we find a positive link between past conditions and recent developments: change seems to 
have reinforced initial position both for those to have done best and those to have done worst in 
recent years.
2.7.2 Expenditure data
One apparently obvious way to look at the link between initial conditions and recent developments 
is just to take expenditure levels in 1991 and compare them to the change in expenditure that has 
taken place since then. As already discussed, however, in the Russian case this raises a series of 
difficulties because of the absence of a satisfactory method of making nominal figures comparable 
across regions. There are three possible ways of attempting this: no deflation (that is, deflation 
across time using the CPI but no deflation across regions), deflation across regions using the 19 
good index, and deflation by the average education wage. Descriptive statistics for all three of these 
measures were presented above in Section 2.4, Tables 2.2 and 2.3.
Table 2.9 gives the means for each of these three measures for the top and bottom quartiles 
when regions are ranked by the change in education spending 1991-95. According to all three 
measures, regions in the top quartile of expenditure change started off with expenditure slightly 
lower than those in the bottom quartile. The difference is significant, as shown by the confidence 
intervals given in the last column: all means fall outside the confidence intervals except those for 
the top quartile measured using Index 1.
This conflicts with the evidence in Section 2.7.1, which suggested that any weak link which did 
exist would be a positive one. Evidence specifically on the education sector may be felt to be of 
greater interest than the generalized living standard categories used above. However, the difficulties
Table 2.9: Average level o f education spending per pupil in 1991 for the top and bottom 
quartiles with regions ranked by change in education spending 1991-95
Measure o f expenditure used Top Q Bottom Q 95% confidence intervals 
fo r  mean o f all observations
Index 1 (no deflation) 918 1050 890, 1013
Index 2(19 good) 1055 1409 1111,1288
Index 3 (average wage) 2.27 2.75 2.38,2.59
Note: There are 76 regions in total, so each quartile contains 19 regions.
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involved in deflation mean that any conclusions reached on the basis of cross-regional comparison 
of monetary indicators must remain tentative. Even if a deflator took full account of differences in 
wages and other cost factors, additional elements such as the degree of urbanization and the 
number of pupils to be catered for would have an effect on per pupil costs, and hence on the real 
value of a given level of per pupil expenditure.
The counter-intuitive evidence given by an analysis of average 1991 expenditure for three of 
the Hanson categories helps confirm this. The six regions which classified as commercial hubs with 
hi-tech industries did well under the Dmitrieva classifications but their average per pupil spending 
in 1991 falls significantly below the overall mean on all three expenditure measures. Conversely, 
the mean expenditure level for both rural regions and resource-rich regions is significantly higher 
than the overall mean using two out of the three measures, although both sets of regions appeared 
to have a poor record on living standards using the Dmitrieva groupings. (For the resource-rich set 
the exception is Index 3: the mean is lower than average once the wage level is adjusted for. For the 
rural set the exception is Index 1, under which the mean does not differ significantly from the 
overall mean.)53
2.7.3 School quality: non-monetary indicators
To get around the problems which expenditure measures raise, here I try measuring initial quality 
of educational provision using non-monetary indicators. A limited number of these indicators are 
available, and they relate mostly to the state of school buildings: no data are available on exam 
results, drop-out rates or percentage of children going on to further or higher education. Naturally 
questions of reliability arise with this type of data, as there may be incentives for regional 
authorities to misreport local conditions in the hope of receiving higher budget allocations. This is 
particularly true of the percentage of school buildings in need of repair, as this is something which 
is difficult to verify and in any case can be interpreted subjectively. The two other measures of 
building conditions, the share of students studying in shifts and the degree to which buildings are 
equipped with modem conveniences (heating, running water and sewerage), may be more reliable 
because they are more concrete.
In any case, only two indicators of alternative aspects of provision to physical infrastructure 
are available -  the kindergarten enrollment rate and the percentage of the population enrolled in
53 For the commercial hub/hi-tec set the means are: 785 (Index 1); 904 (Index 2); 2.07 (Index 3). For the 
resource-rich regions: 1291 (I); 1396 (2); 2.32 (3). For the rural regions: 963 (1); 1299 (2); 2.81 (3).
higher education. The latter of course really reflects the presence in the region of a university or 
polytechnic, rather than the quality of local high school education. However, this is of some interest 
in itself. Altogether, the following variables were examined (the best available year — i.e. the 
closest to 1990/91 — is given in brackets):
• Children attending kindergarten as percentage of relevant age-group in urban areas (1990)54
• Percentage of population in higher education (1990)
• Percentage of school students studying in a second shift ( 1990)
• Percentage of school students studying in a second shift in urban areas (1990)
• Percentage of schools in need of repair (1993)
• Percentage of rural schools in need of repair (1993)
• Percentage of school buildings judged to be in ‘dangerous condition’ (1993)
• Percentage of schools with all conveniences: running water, heating, sewerage (1993)
Kindergarten enrollment was only considered in urban areas because of the high degree of 
correlation between enrollment and urbanization. For the same reason, several other indicators 
were included both for the region as a whole and for just urban or rural areas.
There is substantial variation across regions in these indicators, as shown in the summary 
statistics given in Table 2.10. Most striking are the figures for the share of schools in need of
Table 2.10: Descriptive statistics for non-monetary measures o f quality o f education provision
Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Kindergarten (urban), 9c 71.3 8.1 53.9 88.8
Higher education, per 10,000 159.0 87.5 42 587
Second shifts, 9c 22.5 5.9 10.5 35.9
Second shifts (urban), 9c 28.8 7.0 10.9 43.3
Repairs needed, 9c 36.3 9.5 15.1 62.3
Repairs needed (rural), 9c 34.0 10.6 12.8 68.7
Dangerous condition, 9c 7.2 4.2 0.1 18.4
All conveniences, 9c 44.8 19.9 2.5 100
54 Though not fully explicit, this appears to be the percentage of children attending any kindergarten, 
whether run by the municipality or by an enterprise.
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repairs, which ranges from a minimum of 15% to a maximum of 62%, and the share of schools 
which do not have running water, heating and sewerage. In one region, the Altay Republic, just 
2.5% of schools had all three, while in Moscow City all schools were fully equipped. Table 2.11 
gives the means for each of the figures above for the top ten and bottom ten regions when ranked 
by the change in education spending 1991-95. The top ten is calculated excluding Moscow and St. 
Petersburg (i.e., it is really the top twelve with these two observations dropped). This is to ensure 
that results for the top half are not distorted by outliers: both cities have a far higher percentage of 
the population in higher education, and Moscow also does extremely well on several other 
indicators, with 100% of schools equipped with all conveniences and 0.1% in ‘dangerous 
condition’.
It is striking that regions which experienced more positive change in education expenditure 
have better records for almost all of these measures than regions with very big falls in expenditure. 
The one clear exception is the share of students studying in second and third shifts. Here the 
bottom regions seem to have had a better history, although the differences in mean are barely 
significant, particularly when we look only at urban areas (urban areas are likely to have greater 
pressure on facilities; and urban areas also tend to have done better, as we have seen). In terms of
Table 2.11: Non-monetary variables: means fo r top ten and bottom ten, where *top* and 'bottom* 
are judged with respect to change in education spending 1991-95
Bottom 10 Top 10 95% Confidence intervals fo r  
mean o f all observations)
Kindergarten (urban), % 66.1 76.9 69.7,73.4
Higher education, per 10,000 136.9 146.4 134.5, 162.8
Second shifts, % 20.9 24.3 21.3,24.0
Second shifts (urban), % 27.8 29.1 27.7, 30.7
Repairs needed, % 44.0 31.5 38.4,34.0
Repairs needed (rural), % 44.2 29.8 36.5,31.6
Dangerous condition, % 11.5 5.9 8.3, 6.3
All conveniences, % 36.7 54.7 38.5,47.4
Note: Top ten regions are calculated with the exclusion of Moscow and St. Petersburg; i.e. they are the top twelve 
regions with these two observations dropped.
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the density of students in higher education, the top ten regions do better, but not significantly so: 
both means fall within the 95% confidence intervals given in the final column (this, it should be 
remembered, is with the exclusion of Moscow and St. Petersburg).
In all other cases, however, the averages for the top ten are significantly better than those for 
the bottom ten. For example, in the top ten regions, 31% of schools were in need of repair and 6% 
in dangerous condition -- not a good record, but much better than that of the bottom ten, where 
44% of schools needed repair and 12% were in dangerous condition. In the top ten regions an 
average of 66% of urban pre-school children attended kindergarten in the bottom ten regions, 
compared to 77% in the top ten.55
It is true that in some cases changes in expenditure could be partly responsible for the relative 
levels of these indicators. Data on the state of school buildings (both those in need of repairs and 
those with all conveniences) are only available for 1993, and by this time cuts in spending may 
have begun to have an impact, leading to cutbacks in urgent repairs in the worst hit regions. 
However, the ‘all conveniences’ variable ought not to have been affected, as this represents the 
result of long term capital investment. The share of urban pre-school children attending 
kindergarten is for 1990 and will also therefore have been unaffected.
2.7.4 Some conclusions
The three measures used above to examine whether recent change has reshuffled or reinforced 
inherited inequality in the education sector have given us three different answers. Using 
Dmitrieva’s living standard classifications, we find no clear relationship between initial position 
and later developments. Using a series of measures of education spending per pupil in 1991 we find 
a negative relationship: spending has increased or fallen by less in regions which had lower 
expenditure levels to begin with. But using non-monetary indicators to measure the initial state of 
the education sector we find the opposite: the regions where education spending has risen over the 
past few years started off in 1991 with a stronger educational infrastructure than average; while 
those regions which have seen the most severe cuts in spending tend to have had a worse than 
average starting point.
55 Averages for the top quartile were significantly better than the mean for all the same indicators except 
the percentage o f schools in dangerous condition, which fell within the 95% confidence interval. Averages 
for the bottom quartile were significantly worse than the mean for all except the percentage of schools 
with all conveniences.
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Indicators which measure the education sector in particular seem the most relevant here, while 
within these, the inadequacy of available price indices means there are good reasons for adopting 
non-monetary indicators over expenditure data. However, this does raise the possibility that regions 
where education spending has fallen hardest are to some degree self-selected. Is it possible that in 
some regions education was never highly valued, and hence education was one of the first services 
to be cut when times got tough? This seems improbable given the tight central controls on 
budgeting which existed until 1992. Neither is it supported by a closer look at the 1991 living 
standard rankings (i.e. not just education) of the regions with poor educational indicators and big 
falls in spending. Six of the ten regions where expenditure fell by more than half started with a 
worse than average record on both the ‘all conveniences’ and the ‘dangerous conditions’ measures, 
as illustrated in Figures 2.8 and 2.9. Of these, four were classified by Dmitrieva as having ‘below 
average’ living conditions (including in two in the bottom group), one as average and one 
(Adygeya) was not included in the classification. The Chita Republic, which has a very poor record 
on the equipment of buildings although it does well on repairs, is also classified into the bottom 
living standards group by Dmitrieva.
Hence we have six or seven regions which raise particular concern: education spending in these 
regions fell by over half between 1991 and 1995, from an initial starting point which available 
evidence suggests was significantly below average. Most of these regions have the common link of 
being among the most southern regions of the country, although scattered west to east from the 
North Caucasus to Eastern Siberia. They are also more rural than average: while only two of the 
seven qualify as rural under Hanson’s definition (at least 45% rural population in 1991), all but 
two are more than 40% rural and all seven have a larger rural share than the Russian average of 
27%. Finally, they tend to be small: all are smaller than the 1.9 million people which is the average 
for the 76 regions examined, and four (Northern Osetia, Adygeya, Kalmykia and Tiva) have fewer 
than 650,000 inhabitants. The Kalmykia and Tiva Republics, which stand out as having the worst 
combined record of the bottom ten on the two indicators illustrated above, also stand out as 
particularly small and particularly rural.56 Kalmykia had a population of 328,000 in 1991, 62% of 
which was rural, and Tiva a population of 307,000,52% of which was rural.
56 Only one other region out of the 76 began with a combined record as bad: in Dagestan only 10% of 
schools had all three conveniences in 1993, while 16% were in dangerous condition. Expenditure also fell 
sharply in Dagestan, though not by half: it was 64% of its 1991 level in 1995. A fourth region, the Allay 
Republic, was as deprived in terms of long term investment: less than 3% of schools had all conveniences 
in 1993, while 8% were judged to be dangerous. Here spending fell to 83% of its 1991 level. The Altay 
Republic is also a very small, rural region: its 1991 population was 196,000, 76% of which is rural.
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Figure 2.8
Percentage of schools equipped with central heating, running water and 
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Percentage of schools in 'dangerous condition' 1993, among regions 
where education spending has fallen by over half 1991-95
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Dagestan is roughly average size at 1.8 million, but it too has a high rural share (58%). Both are located 
on R ussia 's southern border, although one is in the North Caucasus and one in Western Siberia.
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2.8 Conclusions
Attempts to analyse disparities in regional budgetary expenditure across the Russian Federation are 
complicated by the high degree of variation in regional provision costs. Nominal wage rates, 
climate, population size and the degree of urbanization can all be expected to affect the cost of 
providing any public service to a given number of people. However, in this chapter I find that 
taking cost factors into account only exacerbates the degree to which regional disparities in 
education spending have increased between 1991 and 1995. In 1991 I find that about 40% of 
variation in regional education spending can be explained by variation in the four cost factors 
listed, compared to about one quarter which can be explained by variation in total spending once 
costs are controlled for. In 1995, however, virtually all the variation in education spending which 
can be explained seems driven by variation in total spending, with cost factors virtually irrelevant. 
Of the provision cost variables examined, only the temperature seems to have been significant in 
1995, with spending per pupil remaining higher in colder regions. Even so, colder regions still 
spent less relative to other regions in 1995 than in 1991.
One reason for concern with the robustness of these results is the use of the observed 1991 
education sector wage to proxy the minimum necessary regional wage in 1991 and in 1995. It is 
possible that part of the variation attributable to differences in the wage in 1991 should really be 
put down to differences in total spending, which in turn drives differences in the wage. However, 
the fall in importance over the period of all of the other three cost factors — urbanization, pupil 
numbers and temperature -- supports the hypothesis that nominal spending disparities increasingly 
represent real differences and are not just driven by growing disparities in needs. The fall in the 
importance of the temperature variable is particularly interesting in this respect, as the lifting of 
energy subsidies has led to big increases in the cost of heating school buildings, and this will have 
had a much bigger impact on provision costs in the northern parts of the country than on those in 
the south.
Separating the impact of provision costs from that of revenues was the chapter’s first task. The 
second was to define the nature of the relationship between revenue and education expenditure. 
Regression analysis suggested that a linear relationship could not be rejected, and that the revenue 
elasticity of education spending was some 0.36 at the mean in 1991, rising to 0.74 in 1995. This 
implies that education is treated by regional authorities as a necessity, protected as total revenue 
falls but rising less than proportionately as revenue rises. However, the steep rise in the elasticity 
between 1991 and 1995 is striking. One explanation could be that minimum expenditure levels
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were more effectively enforced while budget allocation was centralized; while in 1995 richer 
regions have more freedom to give education higher priority. In fact though, the observed rise in the 
elasticity is probably exaggerated by the problems of effectively proxying the minimum wage: the 
wage effect is probably overestimated in 1991 at the expense of the revenue effect and perhaps 
similarly underestimated in 1995.
The last section of the chapter looked for a link between developments during the transition and 
a region’s relative position in 1991, asking whether the biggest cuts have come in areas previously 
privileged or in areas which were already deprived. Answers proved sensitive to the measures 
chosen to judge initial situation, but the measure which is arguably the most reliable, on the state of 
development of school buildings, pointed to a disturbing positive link. Regions which have 
improved their position since 1991 on balance began with buildings in a much better condition than 
the average; while many of the regions which have seen the largest spending cuts started in a 
position considerably below average. The group of regions which have seen an already difficult 
situation get dramatically worse can be broadly characterized as small, with a large rural 
population share, and located in the southern-most parts of Russia, although spread from east to 
west across the country. The positions of two regions in particular were highlighted: in the 
Kalmykia and Tiva Republics fewer than 10% of schools began the transition equipped with 
central heating, running water and sewerage. By 1995 education spending had fallen to 45% of its 
1991 level in Tiva and to just 27% in Kalmykia. Growing spending disparities therefore appear to 
mean deteriorating conditions for regions already at the very bottom of the pile.
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Chapter 3
Financing education at the local level: 
A study of Novgorod Oblast
3.1 Introduction
The first two chapters of this thesis have focused exclusively on spending disparities and revenue 
support mechanisms at the inter-oblast level, ignoring any questions about what takes place inside 
the oblast. In doing so, they have kept company with the small existing literature on 
decentralization and the equitable provision of public services in Russia, which also limits itself to 
inter-oblast issues (e.g. Bahl et al., 1993; Klugman, 1995; McAuley, 1996). The reasons for this 
focus are understandable: substantial inter-regional differences make the fiscal relationships 
between regions interesting and important, while data constraints present an obstacle to a study of 
the sub-regional level. For obvious reasons indicators available with regional breakdowns are given 
by region rather than by local authority (raion), of which there are some 1800 units, averaging a 
population of some 80,000 each.57
At the same time, however, there are strong reasons for wanting to take the analysis beyond the 
inter-regional level. First and foremost, many of the expenditure responsibilities which I have so far 
classified as the responsibility of ‘regional authorities or below’ are in reality the responsibility of 
‘below’. In the sphere of education, for example, kindergartens and general schools are now raion 
responsibility, meaning the vast majority of pre-compulsory and compulsory educational 
institutions fall under raion control. There are certain federal constraints on provision, but in 
principle it is up to the raion to decide how much to budget for these institutions and how the 
budget should be allocated.
37 ‘Raion’ in general refers to a rural authority and 'municipality’ to an urban authority. For simplicity in 
what follows I use the term ‘raion’ to cover both.
Second, while regions are likely to be more homogenous as units than the federation as a 
whole, with less severe internal differences in economic circumstances, there is still room for 
considerable intra-regional disparity, both between urban and rural areas and between different 
towns. These differences may be small in comparison with the inter-regional disparities, but this is 
by no means certain; at least not certain enough for sub-regional issues to be ignored. It is possible 
that local authorities even within a single region face very different economic constraints. While 
there are federal regulations on what the region is required to do to ensure all raions can cover a 
minimum budget, these are not specific and it is not clear how they are enforced.
In this chapter I set out to fill in a small part of the hole of information about what takes place 
below the level of the oblast, by presenting an analysis of the system of financing of education in 
Novgorod Oblast. All the material used in the chapter was gathered during five weeks of field 
research in the oblast in June-July 1997, where I interviewed officials in the oblast administration 
and in the administrations of three of Novgorod’s twenty-two raions (Appendix D contains a list of 
the main officials I met). The idea was to explore the themes of the first two chapters of the thesis, 
but at the sub-oblast level. The chapter is therefore divided into two parts: the first part examines 
disparities between raions in pre-transfer revenues and the oblast mechanisms that exist to create a 
more equitable allocation; while the second part goes on to look at differences across raions in per 
pupil education spending. The exact questions I try to answer, however, differ somewhat from 
those in the first two chapters, in part because different questions seemed interesting at the raion 
level, and in part because of the different nature of the analysis: my presence in the oblast made it 
possible to explore issues which were closed to me at the national level.
The immediate question is, of course, why Novgorod? In a sense any region might have done, 
given that the purpose of the exercise is to see how education is financed in a region, any region. 
But Novgorod seemed to be typical in a number of ways. It is an industrial region in European 
Russia, and along with most of European Russia has suffered considerably during the transition. 
Its industry traditionally centred around the development of radio technologies used predominantly 
by the military; over the past five years demand has virtually disappeared. It is now poorer than 
average but not among the very poorest of Russian regions, ranking one third of the way down the 
list of recipients of federal transfers.
At the same time, however, it has a progressive administration which has received wide 
recognition for its innovation: last year for instance the World Bank declared it to have one of the 
six most favourable climates in Russia for foreign investment. This last feature is clearly not so
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typical of other regions. The choice of Novgorod might be justifiable all the same as a deliberate 
decision to examine a case likely to present the better face of sub-regional organization; thus 
avoiding drawing overly pessimistic conclusions on the basis of a single wayward region. In fact a 
more decisive consideration was that it proved hard to gain access, for reasons which are perhaps 
obvious, to regions which seemed promising as disastrous cases. This is also likely to be a 
difficulty in any attempt to follow this study up with a study of a contrasting region. In any case, 
throughout the chapter I try to give an idea of how much of what I discovered during my slay in the 
oblast seems to me to be generalizable and how much likely to be unique to Novgorod.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces Novgorod and the circumstances in 
which it finds itself. Section 3.3 is concerned with general financing issues. In this section I try to 
answer three questions in particular. First, what are the raions* expenditure responsibilities in 
practice: do they exercise real control over the items nominally under their control, or are these 
items (as discussed in Chapter 2) deconcentrated rather than decentralized? Second, what 
mechanisms exist to ensure that all raions can meet their responsibilities, and how effective are 
these? And third, how far is what happens dictated by federal law, and how much is left to oblast 
initiative? This last question is important to our understanding of how typical the Novgorod 
situation might be.
Section 3.4 turns to look at education. The focus is on the extent of disparities in education 
finance across the oblast’s raions, but the analysis is broader in two senses. First, in this section I 
try to give some idea of the incentives and constraints raion education departments face. This is 
partly motivated by the fact that there is much greater uniformity in raion budget allocation 
decisions than the system formally requires, which in tum suggests that a high degree of uniformity 
might persist right across the country. Second, I present some evidence on other aspects of 
inequality: I ask whether there is an urban-rural split in education provision, and discuss the role of 
non-budgetary sources of funding and how these may be affecting both regional and individual 
equity of educational opportunity. Section 3.5 presents some conclusions.
Unlike the rest of the thesis, which explores how inter-oblast disparities have developed over 
the course of the transition, this chapter concentrates on the picture in 1996, aiming to provide just 
a snapshot portrait. This is partly for practical reasons: it proved difficult to collect budget data for 
more than one year, while tracing changes over time would present considerable difficulties 
because of the speed of changes that have taken place (and are still taking place annually) in the
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responsibilities of different levels of government. But a snapshot also seems a reasonable starting 
point given the little that is known so far about equity and public finance at the sub-oblast level.
3.2 Administration, history and economics: a brief tour of 
Novgorod58
Novgorod Oblast is in North-West Russia, 500 kilometres north-west of Moscow and 180 
kilometres south of St. Petersburg. Smaller than average for a Russian region, it has a population 
of 740,000, some one third of whom live in the administrative centre, Novgorod City. A further 
120,000 live in the three other main urban centres, Borovich, Staraya Russa and Chudova. In total, 
just over 70% of the population are urbanized, close to the Russian average. The oblast is divided 
into 22 sub-regional divisions, called towns (if solely urban) or raions. For simplicity, below I use 
the term ‘raion’ to include all 22 divisions. Novgorod City is in fact the only such town; most 
raions have mixed urban-rural populations but there are five which are fully rural. These are also 
the smallest, with six to ten thousand inhabitants each.
Like all Russian regions, the Oblast has its own elected parliament (Duma), as well as a 
directly elected Governor who heads the Duma and the Oblast Administration (a non-elected civil 
service). All oblast policy and oblast budgets must be approved by both the Duma and the 
Governor. Each raion also has its own small elected Duma and its own Administration, headed by 
a directly elected mayor. Neither the Oblast Duma nor Administration therefore has direct control 
over the actions of raion politicians, who are accountable only to their electorates. In essence the 
system is similar to that in most of Europe, where local government functions independently of 
regional or national government. However, personalities seem to play a more important role than 
party politics in local elections: in the elections to the Oblast Duma in October 1997, only one out 
of twenty-six successful candidates had a party affiliation (a member of the Communist Party). 
The majority of the others were directors of large enterprises or heads of local administrations 
(RFE/RL Newsline, October 21st 1997).
Novgorod is now often confused with its more famous namesake, Nizhniy Novgorod (800 
kilometres away on the Upper Volga), but it occupies by far the more prominent place in Russian 
history. Founded in 859, it is Russia’s oldest town and was also briefly capital of Rus, the
58 This section draws on Dmytryshyn (1977) and the Russian Academy of Science (1995).
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predecessor of modem Russia. At its peak Novgorod controlled a territory which stretched from the 
Arctic Ocean to the Volga and from the Gulf of Finland to the Urals, allowing it to establish itself 
as one of the key East-West trading points and to rename itself ‘Lord Novgorod the Great* (a name 
still used on tourist brochures, and to mark the distinction from the upstart Nizhniy)/”  But the 
wealth that came from trade was not able to protect the town from Ivan the Terrible and his 
minions in pursuit of hegemony for Muscovy: in 1570 Ivan arrived in person to initiate a five week 
massacre from which Novgorod never recovered.
Its more recent history has not been so illustrious. During the Soviet era there was little to 
distinguish it from the other industrial regions of Central and North-West Russia. Its primary 
industries were radio-electronics, with a strong leaning towards military production and a sideline 
in radios and televisions for the consumer market, timber processing and chemicals. By the end of 
the 1980s about 13% of the working population were employed in agriculture, roughly the Russian 
average. If Novgorod stood out it was for poor levels of social indicators relative both to the rest of 
the North-West and to Russia as a whole: in 1990 infant mortality was 18.3 per thousand 
compared to 16.9 in the North-West and 17.4 in Russia; male life expectancy at birth was 61.6 
years against 64.2 in the North-West and 64.0 in Russia.
The transition has hit the oblast hard. The radio-electronics industry has suffered most: 
military demand has collapsed and lines of production aimed at the consumer market have found it 
difficult to survive on their own, particularly in the face of cheap imports from the Far East. In 
Novgorod City only two of the fifteen largest firms remain in operation; one is the (heavily 
polluting) chemical plant AKRON, which makes fertilizers, and which is the only firm in the oblast 
to have managed to keep production stable, largely due to exports to countries which presumably 
do not want to suffer the consequences of production themselves. In total there are three chemical 
plants in the oblast, and in 1995 these three between them accounted for 34% of the volume of 
production.59 60 An unofficial estimate is that AKRON alone currently provides one half of oblast 
budget revenues raised in the region.
These developments are illustrated in Table 3.1, which shows production of a series of goods 
over the period 1991-1995. This is likely to be a better indication of the state of the economy than
59 According to local folklore, Peter the Great made Novgorod drop its titles when he founded nearby St. 
Petersburg. But in January 1998 the Novgorod City and Oblast legislatures voted to restore the name 
Velikii Novgorod (Novgorod the Great). The change is waiting approval from the federal government 
(IEWS Russian Regional Report, Internet edition, Vol. 3, No. 5, February 5th 1998).




MTable 3.1: Production o f a series o f goods in Novgorod Oblast 1991-1995
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Fertilizers, thousand tonnes 680.0 629.9 585.2 570.0 664.0
Industrial wood, thousand m3 2417.1 2011.9 1355.3 1113.1 1229.3
Paper, thousand tonnes 65.5 44.0 23.8 6.9 7.2
Televisions, thousands 236.5 210.2 240.8 95.9 16.6
Videos, thousands 57.7 68.9 . 47.7 13.8 0.8
Meat, thousand tonnes 32.5 26.9 19.0 13.6 9.1
Dairy products (converted
into whole milk), th. tonnes 86.5 38.2 34.9 28.7 22.8
Source: Novgorod Oblast in Figures, Novgorod Oblast Committee of State Statistics, 1996
the unemployment rate, which rose from 5% in 1992 to 10% in 1995 but which almost certainly 
hides substantial underemployment: it is common for workers to remain on the official employment 
roll despite not having worked in practice (or been paid) for several years.61 Table 3.1 also shows 
the collapse in production in the agricultural sector. Most kholkozi have ceased functioning. 
Former workers farm small plots of land privately for their own consumption and for small scale 
trade.
Overall though, and perhaps due to the success of the chemical industry, the collapse of 
production does not look so bad in comparison to the Russian average. In 1994 industrial 
production in Novgorod was 63% of its 1990 level, while in Russia as a whole it was just 51%. 
But the gap in social indicators has continued to widen. By 1994 infant mortality in Novgorod had 
risen to 20.8, compared to 18.6 for Russia, while the average for the North-West had actually 
fallen to 16.1. Male life expectancy in Novgorod was just 55 years, compared to 56.6 in the North- 
West and 57.6 in Russia as a whole.
Prospects for the region look relatively bright. Last year the World Bank declared Novgorod 
one of the most favourable six regions in Russia for foreign investment, and in June The Economist 
sang its praises as one of Russia’s boom towns.62 While this may be a bit premature, it is true that
61 This is the estimate of total unemployment given by the Novgorod Oblast Committee of State Statistics 
(1996). Registered unemployment is much lower at 1.0 in 1992 rising to 3.7 in 1995. Both rates are 
slightly higher than corresponding rates for Russia as a whole: 8.2 for 1995 using the ILO definition of 
unemployment (EBRD, 1997) and 3.5 for 1996 using official registrations (OECD data).
62 ‘Russia: An old-fashioned, modem look ', The Economist, June 14th 1997.
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foreign investment has begun to arrive» most notably from Cadbury’s, which last year opened a big 
chocolate factory just outside the town of Chudova. The reason for this success seems to be a 
progressive and active administration headed by a young and dynamic governor, Mikhail Prusak: 
Alexei Lavrov, an advisor in Yeltsin’s office on regional affairs, recently described Novgorod as 
one of only six reformist regions in Russia (‘going more by feeling than by statistics’).6’ One 
example of the administration’s activity is the new experimental scheme of tax holidays for small 
businesses investing in any of the four most depressed areas of the country. These businesses will 
be exempt from all profit tax, with even their share of federal profit tax paid for them by the oblast 
government.
For the moment, however, the brighter future has yet to materialize. Novgorod may look 
promising as one of the successful regions of the next century, but today it ranks firmly in the 
bottom half. In 1995 20% of Novgorod’s revenues came from the Federal Fund for Financial 
Support, compared with an average across Russia of 8%. Furthermore, although the new tax 
scheme shows that the problem of uneven regional development is being addressed, considerable 
disparities between areas persist as yet. Only two towns, Chudova and Novgorod, have so far seen 
any foreign investment, while rural areas have almost no local sources of budgetary income. The 
extent of raion disparities in own revenues — and the mechanisms used to even them out — are 
discussed further in Section 3.3.
3.3 The fiscal system and its implications for the raion
1111*5 part of the paper explores the general structure of the fiscal system as it affects the raion. It 
sets out to answer three questions in particular. First, what are the raion*s expenditure 
responsibilities? Second, what mechanisms exist to ensure that raions have the revenues they need 
to meet these responsibilities? And third, is the system dictated by federal law or does oblast 
initiative play an important role? This last question is clearly important in affecting our ability to 
reach generalizations on the basis of the Novgorod story.
The section contains of necessity a large amount of descriptive material. To try to make this 
easier on the reader the information is sub-divided. In Section 3.3.1 I detail the raion’s expenditure 
responsibilities, putting these into context with some examples of the local authority burden in 
other countries. In Section 3.3.2 I turn to look at revenue sources. First, I look briefly at some 63
63 ‘Russia: Regions are to blame for wage arrears’, Robert Lyle, RFE/RL Newsline, March 7th 1997.
101
international examples of local authority revenue structure; second, I describe the rules as laid 
down by Russian federal law; and finally, I tum to look at the way the system works in practice in 
Novgorod, analysing how far the Novgorod system succeeds in providing adequate revenues for 
less well-off raions. Section 3.3.3 sums up by clarifying the answers to the three questions posed 
above.
3.3.1 Expenditure responsibilities
The decentralization process of the last few years has not stopped at the level of the oblast: federal 
law has delegated many responsibilities directly to the raion level. The Federal Law on Local 
Government64 includes among the responsibilities of raion governments the ‘organization, 
maintenance and development* of local pre-school and school institutions, institutions of 
professional education, and local health care institutions. Local public transport, local roads, the 
police force, the housing fund and the provision of social support and employment assistance all 
also fall into the raion’s sphere of control.65
In practice the process of decentralization is an ongoing one. It is up to the oblast to implement 
federal law in the area, and the speed and extent to which it does so also seems up to the oblast to 
decide: presumably the federal government has more serious things to worry about than who is in 
charge of a particular school, and will interfere only in cases of serious violation of the law. In 
some cases, the federal level itself still holds responsibility for items that should fall under oblast 
control. The result is that the location of responsibility for a series of items will vary across oblasts 
for some time to come. As an example within the education sector, professional-technical 
institutions (PTUs) were taken over from the federal level by Novgorod as an oblast responsibility 
only last year and at the oblast’s initiative, whereas in principle as institutions of professional 
education they ought to be raion responsibilities. Responsibility for special schools and boarding 
schools (mostly ‘correctional’ schools) was handed over by the Novgorod Oblast Administration to 
the raions as of January 1st 1996, but this may not have happened in all oblasts.
These imprécisions notwithstanding, the bulk of institutions delegated by law to the local 
budget ought in practice to be found there by now, and Table 3.2 below should be fairly
64 Russian Federation Federal Law on General Principles of the Organization of Local Government in the 
Russian Federation, adopted by the State Dum a on 12 August 1995; further referred to as ‘Federal Law on 
Local Government'.
65 Federal Law on Local Government, Article 6.
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representative of the situation across the federation. The table shows the percentage of oblast 
expenditure in Novgorod in 1996 which was spent at the raion (rather than the oblast) level, along 
with an estimate of what this is likely to represent as a percentage of total, or consolidated, 
expenditure in each sphere (i.e. all budget spending at raion, oblast and federal level). The table 
shows that about 60% of all Novgorod Oblast expenditures was spent at the raion level, 
representing nearly 30% of consolidated budget expenditure. The raion’s role is most important in 
the social sphere, where it spent over 90% of the oblast total in 1996, corresponding to some 80% 
of consolidated expenditure. About 80% of the total budget for education was spent at the raion 
level.
Table 3.2: The importance o f raion expenditure in the oblast and consolidated budgets ¡996
Raion share in 
oblast exp (%)a
Estimated 
raion share in 
total exp (%)h
Total expenditure, of which: 61 28
Administration 78 49
Law enforcement 16 4
National economy, of which:c 73 53
Housing 81 81
Social expenditure, of which: 92 78
Education 95 81
Health and physical culture 91 83
Culture, art and mass media 65 46
Social policy 96 79
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Finance Committee of Novgorod Oblast Administration, and on 
Ministry of Finance territorial and federal expenditure data for 1995, printed in Dmitriev (1996). Notes: * The total 
spent by all 22 raions in Novgorod as a percentage of total expenditure in Novgorod Oblast in 1996. h A rough 
approximation of the raion share of consolidated expenditure (raion, oblast and federal budget spending), equal to the 
first column multiplied by the fraction of consolidated expenditure spent at the territorial level in 1995 (1996 not 
available). c National Economy’ also includes subsidies to industry and agriculture and expenditure on developing 
market infrastructure, transport and the environment.
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Table 3.3. Local budget expenditure as share o f total government expenditure in selected 
European countries in the early ¡990s
Local share o f total Local share o f total
Czech Republic 21 Germany 29
Slovakia 12 France 27
Poland 22 UK 27
Romania 17 Denmark 31
Lithuania 59 Sweden 38
Source: Council of Europe 1997, p.19. All figures refer co 1994 except France (1992) and Romania. Lithuania and 
Germany (1993). Lithuania has since experienced a substantial recentralization process (Klugman 1997).
It is worth commenting briefly on how this situation compares to that in other states in Eastern 
Europe and beyond. Are Russian raions being given unusual levels of responsibility, or are their 
duties much the same as those of other local authorities? Table 3.3 gives the share of total 
government expenditure spent at local level in a number of other European countries in the early 
1990s. There is considerable variation, reflecting a range of government systems from highly 
centralized to very decentralized. The Russian level fits somewhere in the middle, with a local 
government share very similar to that in the UK, France and Germany, and considerably lower than 
that in Lithuania and Sweden. Of the countries given, local authorities have main responsibility for 
the provision of pre-primary, primary and secondary education in all except Slovakia, Romania, 
Poland and Austria (pre-primary and primary only), and the Czech Republic, where responsibility 
is shared with district offices of the Ministry of Education (Van Haecht, 1996 and Barrow, 1997).
3.3.2 Revenue sources
Where does the raion get the revenue to cover these responsibilities? This is an important question 
for two reasons. First, the structure of the revenue system is a key determinant of what local 
responsibility means in practice. The numbers in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 could reflect several very 
different scenarios: while it may be that local authorities are indeed the ones deciding what to spend 
and where to spend it, it could also be the case that the local budget is really just a stopover for 
already earmarked central government resources.
Second, and more important for this paper, is the equity question. If raions do have real 
responsibility for such an important range of expenditures, there is clearly a concern about what
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will happen in poorer areas. Particularly if inter-raion economic disparities are large, we want to 
know what kind of transfer mechanisms exist to protect these areas and how effective these 
mechanisms are.
In this section I first look briefly at some examples of local authority revenue structure from 
other countries. I then describe the rules of the system in Russia as laid down by federal law and 
discuss how far they leave room for differences across oblasts in interpretation. Finally, I turn to 
look at the system as it works in practice in Novgorod, and ask how successful this system is in 
equalizing revenues across raions.
International examples
A standard textbook revenue system would give local authorities control over a key local tax to 
give it autonomy, usually an income or property tax, and would then use a system of general and 
unconditional transfers to support the revenues of poorer regions.66 The latter would be based on a 
formula which takes into account indicators of local expenditure need as well as an estimate of the 
region's tax base (independent of how far the local authority chooses to tax it), the idea being to 
give local populations a choice about tax-rates and service levels without penalizing tax-payers in 
poorer areas. In addition, there may be conditional or earmarked transfers, these to fund goods 
which central government wants to encourage local governments to provide or which they provide 
in an agency role for the centre.
It is difficult to summarize international experience because it is so varied, but on the surface 
this is essentially how the system works in many European countries. In most cases local 
authorities have some control over either income tax (e.g. Scandinavia and Switzerland) or 
property tax (e.g. Germany and the Netherlands), although in many cases they are constrained in 
how far they can adjust tax rates, either for economic or political reasons: in France and Austria 
property tax rates are set locally but only within limits imposed by the centre, and the UK also 
moved in this direction with the introduction of ‘rate-capping' in 1984 (see Council of Europe, 
1997; Batley and Stoker, 1991). In Central and Eastern Europe as a rule central governments still 
hold on tightly to their fiscal tools: local authorities have limited control over either income or 
property tax in the Baltics, Hungary, Poland and Romania, but no control at all in Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic or Slovakia (Council of Europe, 1997).
66 This is o f course a gross oversimplification. See Oates (1994) for an overview of the public finance 
literature on these issues.
Most countries also have a transfer system along the lines of the one above. Allocation of 
transfers is based on estimates of local tax base adjusted by needs criteria, which can include 
population mix and density (numbers of pre-school and school children, young people and elderly), 
children in one-parent families, length of roads, age of housing and level of labour costs. Variations 
on this theme can be found in the UK, Germany, France, Denmark, Sweden, Portugal and 
Australia (Council of Europe, 1997; Norton, 1994; Searle 1995).
The importance of transfers relative to local tax revenues will clearly depend on both the 
emphasis given to equalization relative to autonomy and on the level of initial disparity to be 
equalized. Table 3.4 shows a range of possibilities by giving an overview of sources of municipal 
funding in a number of European countries. In the Scandinavian countries local taxes make up the 
majority of local revenues; elsewhere there is more of a balance between local taxes and general 
grants. In Romania, France and the UK, over 25% of local authority revenue comes from general 
grants, although Romania and the UK are the only countries listed where grants are more important 
revenue sources than local taxes and fees and charges taken together. Comparisons are confused 
however by the role played in some countries of ‘shared taxes’, which are taxes with rates set by 
the centre but receipts shared between different government levels. In some cases














Sweden 61 8 0 11 8 1 11
Denmark 51 22 2 12 0 2 12
France 36 2 0 24 0 10 28
Poland 21 7 23 15 22 0 12
Germany 19 16 17 15 13 9 11
Czech Republic 16 12 23 8 10 11 20
UK 11 6 17 32 27 0 6
Romania 5 16 33 25 21 0 0
NB. 'Local tax* means local authority decides rate (in some cases within limits). ‘Shared taxes’ are those with rates 
set at the centre. Source: Council of Europe, 1997. All figures refer to 1994 except those for France (1992) and 
Romania and Germany (1993).
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(e.g. Germany) receipts from these taxes are shared out across local authorities with the intention 
of equalizing revenues, making them really a form of general grant. A second reason for caution is 
that countries which appear to have only a small role for grants may of course have very effective 
equalization schemes which concentrate on the very poorest areas; in other countries all regions 
may contribute to the central budget, and then all may receive general transfers of varying sizes. 
The most important information the table gives us is really that a wide variety of combinations of 
revenue sources are possible.
Finally, does international experience give us any examples of the role played in local financing 
by regional level authorities? In countries which have three tiers of government, does the middle 
level tend to have any control in determining equalization mechanisms and the extent of local 
autonomy within the region? The answer again is varied, as the cases of Germany and Austria 
illustrate. In Germany, a degree of control is given to the Länder (regional) governments over the 
operation of the transfer mechanism, degrees of local equalization differing fairly significantly 
across Länder as a result (Gunlicks 1986, p.128). But in Austria, although federal structure is very 
similar, the federal constitution is much more explicit on the relations between regional and 
municipal authorities, and the situation across regions is basically uniform (Council of Europe 
1988, p.6). In laying out below the basic rules that govern local authority financing in Russia, I 
assess how much room is left for regional difference in practice.
Russia: the basic rules
The raion revenue system in Russia is in essence an extension of the oblast revenue system 
discussed in brief in Chapter 1. Its main features can be summarized as follows. •
•  The basic system is established by federal law to be one o f ‘revenue-sharing' (like the
*shared taxes ’ in Table 3.4).
Rates for the main taxes are set at the federal level, and raions keep a share of the tax revenues 
raised from these taxes on their own territories. The remainder is handed up to the oblast, which in 
turn keeps a share determined by the federal government and passes the rest to the centre. The four 
most important of these shared taxes -- profit tax, income tax, value added tax (VAT) and
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enterprise property tax — together make up some 70% of tax revenues in both Novgorod Oblast 
and the Russian Federation as a whole.67
• Oblasts have a limited degree o f control over how much raions receive, but raions 
themselves have almost no control.
The oblast has the ability to determine the proportion of the non-federal share of each tax that each 
raion can retain, with shares allowed to vary across raions (although there are certain federal 
constraints on the oblast's decision, discussed below).68 The raion itself, however, has no say in 
this decision, and as a result little control over the size of its budget: it gets whatever it happens to 
raise and be allowed to retain. Raions do have the right to the proceeds from a series of minor taxes 
and charges that they can set themselves,69 but these in general form a small percentage of the total: 
some 10% (see Table 3.6 below). On the other hand, this is not a dissimilar amount to that in a 
large number of other countries, as shown in Table 3.4.
• Federal law requires oblasts to ensure that each raion can cover a ’minimum necessary 
budget\
The system as described so far raises obvious equity concerns. If raions begin with very different 
tax bases, a revenue sharing system clearly offers the potential for large disparities in raion budget 
revenues.70 Federal legislation does, however, impose on the oblast the requirement to address 
inter-raion disparities. Oblasts must calculate a ‘minimum necessary budget' for all of their raions, 
and then ensure that each raion can cover it. The budget is to be calculated on the basis of the 
raion’s current (non-capital) expenditures in the previous year, adjusted to take account of the rate 
of inflation, the cost of providing any additional services devolved to the raion (or removed from
67 Profit tax made up 27% of tax revenues in the consolidated Novgorod budget in 1996 (33% of the 1995 
RF consolidated budget); income tax 23% (10%); VAT 14% (24%); enterprise property tax 5% (4%).
68 Since 1996 the oblast has also been able to set its own rate for profit tax (up to a maximum of 22%), and 
has also been able to vary this rate across raions, allowing the new ‘tax-holiday’ scheme introduced in 
Novgorod’s most depressed areas.
69 Russian Federation Federal Law on Basic Budgetary Rights and Rights of Formation and Use of Extra- 
Budgetary Funds, adopted by the Supreme Soviet 15 April 1993; further referred to as ‘Federal Law on 
Budgetary Rights'; Articles 1 and 14.
70 Germany also has a revenue-sharing system for several taxes, but there the shares kept by the local 
authority are not necessarily the shares raised there: the Lander can redistribute the share and hand out 
greater shares to poorer areas (Council of Europe 1997). In Russia this cannot happen: while, as noted, the 
oblast can choose to vary tax shares across raions, it cannot take revenues away from one raion and 
reallocate them to another. Each raion keeps only taxes raised locally.
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the raion) during the year, and any changes made by the oblast or federal authorities in ‘social and 
financial norms and standards1 (the latter presumably meaning changes in the levels of benefits, 
minimum wages etc).71 72
The oblast is to use two mechanisms to make sure that each raion can meet the minimum 
budget. First, it must set revenue sharing rates for each raion so as to allow them to cover 7 0 ^  of 
the minimum budget with their own tax receipts (if possible). Second (and if necessary) it is to 
make transfers to the raion level.73
•  In principle, the raion has fu ll control over the revenues it does receive.
Transfers are unconditional. The minimum budget is calculated as a single figure, and there are no 
requirements on the raion to spend grant receipts in particular ways. Nor are there federal 
provisions for specific transfers for particular sectors.
To sum up then, federal law allows the raion little autonomy over the size of its budget, but 
appears to guarantee less well-off raions a fairly strong degree of protection. How much role is 
there for the oblast in all this? Federal government regulations seem tight, but in practice there is 
limited room for oblast initiative, or at least variation in arrangements across oblasts. This arises, 
first, from the fact that the method to be used to calculate the minimum budget is specified only 
vaguely at the federal level, and there seems to be no mechanism for checking up on how oblasts 
implement the requirements. In Novgorod, for instance, the criteria suggested are used as 
guidelines, but additional factors are taken into account as well, including changes in the number of 
school-age children.73 There are also no formulae dictating what the weight of each factor should 
be. The second area which is underdetermined is the transfer system: in particular, the source of 
revenues for transfers is not mentioned; nor is any provision made to ensure that funds are 
sufficient. This opens questions about where the resources are to come from and what happens if 
there simply are no funds to cover raion minimum budgets. The solutions found in Novgorod are 
not necessarily universal solutions.
71 Federal Law on Budgetary Rights, Article 7. This system is basically a mini-version of the principle 
behind the formula for the allocation of FFFS funds, as examined in Chapter 1.
72 Federal Law on Budgetary Rights, Articles 1 and 9,
73 Novgorod Oblast Law on the Budgetary Process in the Oblast, approved by the Oblast Duma 6 February 
1995; Article 4
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Novgorod Oblast: the revenue system in practice
This section examines how the system works in practice, looking first at the allocation of 
revenue shares across revenues and then at the transfer mechanisms. The following section assesses 
the success of these mechanisms in achieving equalization of revenues.
•  Revenue sharing
Table 3.5 shows the share of the four major taxes kept by the raion rather than handed up to the 
oblast budget. Effectively what happens is that most raions keep all revenues which are to remain 
in the oblast (that is, all revenue not to be handed up to the federal level). Given that many of the 
raions have little or no tax base, this is the only way to get close to meeting the 70% requirement; I 
was told in the oblast budget department that in practice for some raions even this is not enough. 
The oblast budget depends heavily on income from just two raions, Novgorod City and Chudova. 
The oblast is entitled to all receipts from some smaller taxes and charges, but receipts of profit tax 
from Novgorod and Chudova and VAT from Novgorod composed some 65% of oblast tax 
revenues in 1996.
Table 3.5: Percentages o f revenues from the major taxes to be retained in the raion, Novgorod 
Budget 1996
Tax Percentage to be retained 
in the raion
Total share to remain 
in raion or oblast*




Income tax 90% all 90%
Value added tax 7% Novgorod City 
25% all others
25%
Enterprise property tax 60% all 100%
Notes: 22 raions in total. * Total share to be retained by either raion or oblast, as opposed to being passed up to the 
federal level. "  Federal profit tax is set at a rate of 13%; subjects can set their own rates up to a maximum of 22%. 
Sources: Novgorod Oblast Law ‘On the Oblast Budget in 1996’, accepted by the Oblast Duma 30 Jan 1996;
Russian Federation Federal Law on the Federal Budget in 1995. Article 14.
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Novgorod C 54.4 9.0 16.1 79.2 8.1 11.8 20.0
Valdaisky 34.3 4.5 11.7 50.5 22.4 25.2 47.6
Shimsky 20.2 7.1 3.9 31.2 17.4 48.7 66.1
Poddorsky ■ 12.1 5.2 1.3 18.6 12.4 61.3 73.7
Total (all 22 44.5 7.0 10.1 61.6 14.5 20.6 35.1
raions)
Notes: ‘Big 4 taxes' are profit tax. income tax, VAT and enterprise property tax. ‘Own taxes and fines* are those for 
which raion exercises control over rate. ‘MS & Dot’ns* (Mutual Settlements and Dotations) are transfers made to 
compensate raions for extra responsibilities or mandates handed down by higher levels of government. ‘Eq. transfers’ 
are those made according to formula and intended to equalize revenues, as explained below. Where total own revenue 
and total transfers do not sum to 100, the difference is made up by subsidies and credits.
Source: Author’s calculations using data provided by Finance Committee of Novgorod Oblast Administration
Despite the fact that most raions retain the maximum share of their taxes, in many cases these 
taxes comprise a small part of the overall budget, as reflected in Table 3.6. While 80% of budget 
revenue in Novgorod City is raised in the raion itself, and 50% in Valdai Raion (an industrial raion 
in the south-east of the oblast); in the smaller, predominantly rural raions of Shimsk and Poddorsky 
the percentage raised in the raion is only 30% and 20% respectively. These raions are both 
dependent on transfers from the oblast budget for the vast majority of their revenues. •
• Transfers
As Table 3.6 illustrates, since 1995 raions have received two types of transfer from higher level 
government. The idea of the First type, which I have classified to include ‘mutual settlements’ and 
‘dotations’, is to satisfy the obligations of higher levels of government to lower. Mutual settlements 
are intended to make up for any change in expenditure at one level of government caused by a 
decision taken at another level (such as a centrally determined increase in public sector salaries, 
when salaries are paid by the local level). Dotations are meant to cover additional expenditures 
arising as the result of the handover of responsibilities from oblast to municipal budget. The size of 
the transfer in each of these cases is decided by the oblast after negotiation with the raions. In both
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cases transfers are always made by the oblast rather than the federal level. Even if the federal 
government mandates some increase in expenditure, it reaches a decision on compensation with the 
oblast government, which then goes on to conduct negotiations with the raion authorities in its 
territory.
The second type of transfer are used directly for equalizing puiposes. These are the transfers 
the federal law requires oblasts to make in order to bring all raions up to a minimum budget. For 
the last two years they have been allocated in Novgorod according to an oblast formula very 
closely resembling the one used to distribute transfers from the federal level to the oblasts and 
examined in Chapter 1. Details of the Novgorod formula are given in Appendix C, but essentially 
the mechanism works in two stages. First, raions are classified as ‘in need of support’ if their 
predicted per capita revenue in the year in question is less than predicted per capita revenue in the 
oblast as a whole; they are then awarded transfers in proportion to the difference. In the second 
stage, raions are labelled ‘in need of considerable support* if their revenues after first stage 
transfers are still going to be insufficient to meet their estimated ‘minimum necessary budget’. In 
that case they are allocated the difference. The minimum budget is calculated as dictated by federal 
law, except that 1991 expenditures are used as the base, rather than last year’s expenditures.74 
These are then adjusted for inflation and for changes in federal standards (such as wage changes). 
Novgorod has also introduced some additional criteria not laid down in federal law, such as 
changes in demographic structure (number of children).
• Financing the transfer system
The basic idea then is that raions get topped up to a minimum budget, but with a little extra for 
those raions with below average revenues, regardless of their necessary expenditures. But this 
leaves the question of where the funds come from to cover these transfers. As minimum budgets are 
calculated quite independently of oblast revenues, there is no guarantee that there will be sufficient 
funds to cover them. In practice then, the allocated sum really determines, not a fixed rouble 
amount, but the share the raion will receive of the funds that are available in practice. In other 
words — and this is a key point — raions will only be sure of covering their minimum budgets if 
transfer funds allow.
74 The Federal Fund for Financial Support has also calculated necessary expenditures on the basis of 1991 
expenditures since 1996 (before then it used expenditures in 1993). So this is accepted federal practice 
even if not in accordance with federal law.
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So where do the transfer funds come from? In Novgorod what happens is simple: the oblast 
takes the transfers which it receives from the federal transfer fund (the Federal Fund for Financial 
Support to the Subjects of the Federation), and simply passes them on to the raions using the 
formula above. Naturally what this means is that raions are very dependent on federal transfers 
being made in full and on time, neither of which happen in practice. In 1996, about two thirds of 
the initial allocation arrived, and this came in trickles through the year. What the oblast does then is 
allocate piecemeal to raions depending on the urgency of need; naturally some raions end up 
receiving more of their initial allocation than others. By the end of 1996 raions had received 
between 59% and 68% of their planned transfer allocation.
I asked whether the oblast could implement its own transfer system on the basis of its own 
funds, and the answer was perhaps obvious: in principle of course it could, but in practice it 
doesn’t have the money. Given lack of local funds, it sees the best way to distribute federal 
transfers as to pass them on to the raions, especially given that the stated purpose of these transfers 
is equalization (although there is no federal obligation or even assumption that they will be passed 
on). However, in 1997 the Oblast Administration did implement an additional system of 
‘subventions’ for the first time. These are to come out of the oblast budget and to be given to raions 
to cover the ‘protected items’ in their budget: wages, meals and medicine. (‘Protected items’ are 
items given top priority by federal authorities. They must be covered before other expenditures, and 
planned spending on them cannot in principle be reduced even in the event of a budget shortfall.) 
The introduction of the subventions is seen as a way for the oblast to ensure that all raions are able 
to cover essential items as quickly as possible even if federal transfers are delayed. This should 
reduce, for example, the incidence of wage arrears, a huge problem in many regions and one which 
regional authorities often blame on delays in federal transfers. Under this new system, transfers will 
be worked out in the usual way, but with receipts from subventions included in a raion’s ‘pre- 
transfer’ revenues.
The impact o f the transfer system
Several criticisms of this transfer system are possible, even putting aside the instability of the 
financing source and the insufficiency of funds. The most obvious is the use of the ‘minimum 
budget’ as a proxy for expenditure needs, where the minimum budget is based on the level of 
spending in a previous year. As discussed above, in most countries formula mechanisms to 
determine equalizing grants are based on direct indicators of need (population, area, number of
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school-children etc). Though far from being an exact science, this seems a more reasonable starting 
point: why after all would past expenditure levels be a good proxy of current needs? The 
mechanism implies great trust in the equality of the old system; but the key motivation behind its 
use in Russia appears to be more inertia than belief in the allocative justice of the Soviet era. 
Several people I spoke to in the Novgorod Oblast Adminstration felt that the system was unfair and 
should be replaced, but argued that it was imposed on them by federal law. This is true -  although 
it is not clear how far it is really an obstacle given the imprecision of the law and the fact that other 
federal laws are happily bent. For the moment though it seems likely that it is a system used as 
standard right across the country.
But whatever the rights and wrongs of the minimum budget, a look at the Novgorod budget for 
1996 shows that in practice the system’s impact is considerable. Table 3.7 gives summary statistics 
for average pre- and post-transfer revenues per capita and actual per capita expenditures. The first 
column gives revenues per capita as raised and retained in the raion. Disparities are considerable, 
with an almost six-fold difference between the lowest and highest revenue raions. Many of the 
lower revenue raions -  Moshenskoi, Volotovsky, Marevsky, Poddorsky — are small rural raions 
with no industry. In the past the local economy was based around the collective farm, but the
Table 3.7: Summary statistics fo r  pre- and post-transfer revenues and total expenditures per 











Minimum 238 397 916 993 947
Maximum 1,367 1,451 1,583 1587 1,736
Mean 619 844 1,265 1,294 1,322
Max/Min ratio 5.7 3.7 1.7 1.6 1.8
90/10 decile ratio 3.2 2.1 1.6 1.5 1.7
Coefficient of
Variation 0.40 0.28 0.16 0,14 0.17
Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Finance Committee of Novgorod Oblast Admin.
Note: Each raion is weighted by its population for the calculation of decile ratios and coefficients of variation. 22 
raions in total.
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majority of these have now collapsed into private plots run for subsistence or very small scale 
private sale. At the other extreme, Novgorod City and Chudova have been the only direct 
beneficiaries of all recent foreign investment.
Transfers, however, have a dramatic impact on the distribution. The second column of the 
table shows per capita revenues including mutual settlements and dotations (i.e. transfers made not 
for equalizing purposes but to fulfil commitments made from higher levels of government or to 
cover newly devolved responsibilities). The third column shows the latter plus the equalizing 
transfers made according to the formula outlined above. Disparities are sharply reduced at both the 
dotation stage and the ‘transfer’ stage, as reflected in each of the measures of inequality given at 
the bottom of the table.
Finally, the fourth column of the table gives total per capita expenditures by raion, which 
includes any subsidies and credits made to the raion. Expenditures appear to be slightly more 
evenly distributed than total revenues. The upshot is that while the highest revenue raion raised 5.7 
times more than the lowest in own revenues, the highest spending raion spent just 1.6 times more 
overall than the lowest. As a comparison, in 1995 the highest revenue oblast in European Russia 
raised 9.6 times more than the lowest, while the highest spending oblast spent 5.2 times more.75 
The coefficient of variation for this group of oblasts came down from 0.47 for own-revenues to 
0.42 for expenditures; while that for the Novgorod raions started at 0.40, decreasing to 0.14 for 
expenditures. The scale of initial disparity is therefore smaller inside Novgorod than that between 
the European oblasts (as might be expected), but the Novgorod equalization mechanism also 
appears to be considerably more effective than the inter-oblast mechanism.
In addition, final raion expenditure levels in Novgorod appear to be dictated slightly more if 
anything by the level of the minimum budget than by initial own revenues: correlation between total 
expenditures and own revenues is 0.68; between total expenditures and the minimum budget 0.75. 
While these correlations are not very different, the relative importance of the two factors varies 
depending on the level of own revenues, as the scatterplot in Figure 3.1 illustrates. It seems that 
having high pre-transfer revenues per capita will ensure high per capita expenditures, but that low 
revenue raions are not necessarily condemned to the lowest levels of spending, thanks to the 
transfer mechanism. Among the bottom half of the expenditure distribution, the minimum budget is 
a more important determinant of spending than own revenues.
75 These figures are calculated for the 35 oblasts o f the North-West, Central, Central Black Earth, Volga 
and Volga Vyatskiy Regions. The North Caucasus, Urals Siberia and the Far North and Far East are 
excluded to minimize the importance o f the disparities in provision costs discussed in Chapter 2.
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Figure 3.1
Scatterplot showing raion expenditure per capita against pre­
transfer revenues and minimum expenditure per capita (Novgorod
Oblast 1996)
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3.3.3 A summary
This part of the chapter had three main aims: first, to establish the extent of raion expenditure 
responsibilities; second to explore the mechanisms that exist to ensure that raions have the revenues 
they need to meet these responsibilities; and third, to determine how far the revenue system is 
dictated by federal law and how far arrangements might differ across oblasts.
The first question is straightforward. The raions of Novgorod Oblast are now responsible for 
some 60% of oblast expenditure, or nearly 30% of consolidated expenditure in the oblast. In the 
education sector, they are in charge of all pre-school and school institutions, which means 95% of 
oblast education spending or 80% of all spending on education. Furthermore, analysis of the 
revenue system shows that raions have real responsibility for these services: their role is not just to 
pass on earmarked funding from above. While they have only limited ability to affect the size of 
their budgets, they do have full control over allocation: even grants received from higher levels of 
government are general and can be spent freely. There are of course a number of federal 
regulations on minimum expenditure levels: those that affect education will be described in 
Section 3.4.
In answer to the second question, it turns out that fairly powerful mechanisms exist to ensure 
that even less well-off raions can meet their responsibilities. Equalization transfers bring the ratio
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of per capita budget revenue in the highest and lowest revenue regions down from 3.7 to 1.7 and 
the coefficient of variation down from 0.28 to 0.16. The level of post-transfer revenue disparity 
within Novgorod Oblast is hence much lower than that between the oblasts of European Russia, 
where the coefficient of variation was 0.42. The degree of disparity in expenditures per capita in 
Novgorod is actually lower than that in the minimum budgets calculated as essential for each raion.
One very interesting aspect of the Novgorod transfer system, however, is the fact that the 
degree of support to poorer raions depends entirely on the level of oblast receipts from the federal 
transfer fund. This brings us on to the third question: how far can this, among other aspects of the 
Novgorod system, be assumed to apply to other oblasts too? Many of the basic characteristics of 
the system are laid down in federal law and as such are likely to hold for all oblasts: most 
importantly, federal law requires that oblasts have a system of transfers which ensures that all 
raions can cover a ‘minimum budget', and also states that this budget should be calculated on the 
basis of last year's spending levels, adjusted for various relevant changes since then. However, 
there are no requirements (or guidelines) on where the funds to cover these transfers are to come 
from.
If the Novgorod system is universal, it raises an interesting question. The system implies that, 
despite federal law, the degree of equalization achieved depends on the sum of federal funds — 
indeed, actual transfers made were considerably less than intended in Novgorod in 1996 because 
transfers from the centre fell below plan. If other regions do things in the same way, poorer regions 
(those receiving more) will have stronger redistribution systems. The fact that Novgorod is poor 
and receives a relatively large sum in transfers from the federal support fund is what allows it to 
achieve such a high degree of equalization. In 1995 19% of Novgorod Oblast’s total budget 
revenues came from the federal support fund, compared to a regional average (for all Russian 
regions) of 8%: does this mean that Novgorod redistributed 19% of its revenue while the average 
region redistributed only 8%? The extreme cases are the donor regions, those receiving no federal 
transfers: could it be that they have no internal redistribution system at all?
The last possibility seems unlikely, and the fact that Novgorod itself has introduced a second 
transfer mechanism to cover protected items is evidence that regions can and do have the initiative 
to set up their own systems from scratch. But this leads to a second question for the donor regions. 
Novgorod does its best to follow federal law in bringing each raion as close as possible to a 
minimum revenue level. In practice every raion ends up qualifying for transfers: even Novgorod 
City and Chudovsky, once they have submitted their allotted tax shares to the oblast budget, fall
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below their minimum budgets on the basis of their own revenues. The point is that while Novgorod 
is doing a good job, what it is doing is (of necessity) a minimum. Would more distribution take 
place if the oblast had resources sufficient to do more than the minimum? With a basic revenue 
level assured for all raions (and the requirements of federal law satisfied) it would be interesting to 
know whether equalization would continue or whether some areas would pull ahead. In the 
Novgorod case today this is impossible to answer.
3.4 Financing education in Novgorod Oblast
This part of the chapter concentrates on the financing of the education sector in Novgorod. The 
focus is on disparities in education finance across the oblast's raions, but the analysis is broader in 
two senses. First, 1 begin by trying to give some idea of the way in which decisions are made, and 
the incentives and constraints involved at different levels. And second, I also look briefly at 
evidence on other aspects of inequality, in particular the urban-rural split, and the differences in 
opportunities facing individual children living in the same area.
In the first sub-section below, I clarify the division of education expenditure responsibilities by 
government level, and discuss the degree to which the local level is really free to make its own 
decisions. I look at the formal constraints faced by raion authorities, and also at the informal 
framework of precedents and incentives within which decision-making takes place. In practice, 
budget allocation decisions are much more uniform than the system formally requires, and it is the 
reason for this that interests me here. The next sub-section explores the evidence on disparities in 
total raion education spending. It asks how far these seem to be explained by financial constraint 
and necessity, and how far by raion choice about priorities. Section 3.4.3 looks at how funding is 
allocated within the education budget, both by item and between different institutions, and asks in 
particular whether raions differ in the priority that they give to kindergartens, given that there is 
somewhat less obligation to provide these than to provide compulsory schools. Section 3.4.4 asks 
whether there seems to be an urban-rural split in education provision, looking at what evidence 
there is on non-monetary measures of education provision. Finally, Section 3.4.5 looks at the role 
of non-budgetary sources of finance, including the importance of private schools and of private 
financing of public schools.
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3.4.1 Background: responsibilities, constraints and incentives
In principle the raions in Novgorod have full control over current expenditure on all pre-schools 
and general schools, including (since 1996) correctional boarding schools and schools for children 
with special needs. There are one or two exceptions in practice, of which textbooks are the main 
one. The oblast authorities continue to provide textbooks (to the extent that they are provided at all) 
to all raions except Novgorod City, which chooses to provide its own. This is a responsibility 
which the oblast could by law delegate, but feels that the raions are not in a position to take on 
themselves. For the same reason, the oblast authorities told me that they fund teachers* holiday 
pay. Capital repairs are the raion responsibility, but capital construction comes from the oblast 
budget. In practice construction is virtually non-existent for the moment, and what little there is 
shows up as an expenditure in the raion budget: the funds appear to be transferred from oblast to 
raion as part of mutual settlements or dotations. Aside from the items already mentioned, the oblast 
education budget covers only general educational development programmes, teacher training, 
(voluntary) assistance to Novgorod State University, and as of January 1997 the 25 technical- 
vocational institutions in the area. Previously these were federal responsibility but the oblast has 
opted to take over control. The federal budget is responsible for the university.
How far does raion autonomy over education spending reach in reality? There are basically 
five constraints on raion authorities. One has already been discussed above -  the raion’s limited 
ability to adjust tax rates to raise extra revenues if it wishes to. However, the fact that all transfers 
from the oblast are lump sum and unconditional means that at least within the limits of its budget 
the raion is free to spend money as it chooses. This is with four provisos which apply specifically 
to education. First, under federal law the raion must ensure that all children have access to free 
(non-paying) education at primary and secondary level, where this covers as a minimum the 
subjects included in the basic curriculum.76 Second, there are maximum limits on class sizes for 
each age group, implying minima on teacher numbers. Third, these teachers must be paid at least 
the salary level set as a minimum in Moscow. (This minimum can then be raised by the oblast 
authorities, but this does not happen in practice in Novgorod.) Finally, the raion must cover 
‘protected items’ before any others. In education, the only significant item here is the wage bill. 
The other protected items are food (a minimum per pupil expenditure, which is negligible — 1,200 
roubles per child per month, enough for half a loaf of bread), and medicines (an even tinier sum).
76 Russian Federation Federal Law On Education, Accepted by the State Duma 12 July 1995 and approved 
by the Federation Council 5 January 1996; further referred to as ‘Federal Law on Education*, Articles 5 
and 31.
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Aside from these limits the raion's hand is free to allocate the education budget as it chooses, and 
indeed to determine the education budget’s size. It can take funds away from other activities to 
spend on education, or it can take funds away from education and spend them on other things.
The combination of minimum teacher numbers and minimum salaries might seem quite a 
severe restriction on what the raion can do, but it is worth noting that in practice the limits on 
teacher numbers at least are unlikely to change anything in how the education budget is run by the 
raion. I did not hear any complaints at oblast or raion level about being forced to hire too many 
teachers: at all levels the recent rise in teacher numbers was defended on grounds of need (higher 
pupil numbers in general and particularly at secondary level). What I was told about this in tiny 
Shimsk Raion matched exactly what 1 was told in the federal Ministry of Education three months 
earlier.77 Clearly traditions of small classes and light teaching loads are deeply engrained at all 
levels. On the other hand, there were complaints from the oblast about salary limits, but these 
seemed more rooted in principle than a belief that wages were actually too high. The Oblast 
Administration pointed to the irrationality of having one government level decide on the wage level 
while another pays the wages, but nobody suggested that teachers’ wages had been pushed too high 
by federal decree, nor that they were being forced by federal law to spend too large a proportion of 
the budget on wages. As context it is worth noting that in 1995 the average wage in education was 
72% of the overall average wage in Novgorod, compared to 85% in 1991; while at the beginning of 
1997 the average teacher’s wage was under 400,000 roubles a month ($70), with textbooks 
retailing for up to 100,000 roubles each. It is also worth noting that in principle the federal level 
should in any case foot the bill for any mandated salary increases through ‘mutual settlements* (see 
above), although there are continual complaints from the regions that these are non-transparent and 
insufficient.78
Yet however constrained raions may be by these regulations, I was interested to discover that 
the uniformity of the budgeting process far exceeds their limits. There seem to be two different 
reasons for this. The first is inertia and lack of innovation in the budget allocation system. Despite 
the fact that each raion is free to determine the education budget in the way it chooses,79 all three
77 Meeting with V.V.Grachev, Head of Department of Statistics, Ministry of General and Professional 
Education (MGPE), Moscow, April 15th 1997.
78 V. Bolotov, Vice Deputy Minister, MGPE, acknowledged lack of transparency to be a problem with 
these payments at the OECD Review of Education Policy in the Russian Federation (Moscow, June 16-17 
1997). He said it was completely unclear why one region got one sum to cover wage arrears and another a 
different sum.
79 Article 31 of the Federal Law on Education explicitly notes the right of the raion to ‘develop and adopt 
local norms of financing for the education system'.
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raions I visited did it in the same way — on the basis of last year's budgets, with adjustments made 
for changes in pupil numbers after negotiations between raion finance department and raion 
education department. The same was also apparently true of the way in which funding was 
allocated by raion education departments to schools and kindergartens. This is essentially a 
reproduction of the principle behind the calculation of the raion ‘minimum budget’ discussed in 
Section 3.3.
Naturally there are both efficiency and equity implications of such a system. It is inefficient as 
those making spending decisions have no real incentive to economize as this will just result in a 
smaller budget for next year. The rational course of action for both the raion education department 
and the individual school is to keep requesting more binding and then spending it whether it is 
needed or not. In the current context of severe shortage of resources this may not be a very 
important consideration: there are always many more ways in which money can usefully be spent, 
and so institutions and local budget departments have clear incentives to prioritize expenditure. For 
the moment the equity implications may be more worrying. In each of the three raions I visited, and 
at the oblast level, it was openly acknowledged that the system was outdated and inaccurate, with 
past expenditure levels bearing little obvious relation to current need. At the same time the lack of 
transparency of the system and the room it allows for negotiation may add to inequality as it may 
mean that schools which are better at bargaining or which have friendlier relations with the raion 
authorities receive more than others.
Why do local authorities stick with this allocation system, if they recognize its faults? At each 
level of government there seemed to be a desire to change the system, but also a feeling that no 
change could realistically be made unless it came down from the centre. At raion level, redesigning 
financing norms appears simply to be too big a job, one which it would not make sense for them to 
take on. They are waiting for the initiative to come from the oblast, which has a policy role even if 
it has no coercive power over any raion. At the oblast level, work has in fact begun on a new 
system which would use a per-pupil type formula to allocate funds, and several people I spoke to 
were enthusiastic about it.80 The obstacle here seems to come from Oblast Duma deputies who 
have been persuaded of the convenience of the non-transparent system, which allows criteria to 
remain cloudy and prevents any school from being able to stake an absolute claim to a certain sum.
80 This is currently one of two main policy concerns of the Oblast Education Committee. The other is 
school budget autonomy (see below).
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The Oblast Duma has apparently said it would refuse to adopt any new system unless it was first 
adopted at the federal level.
A second factor driving uniformity, however, is the fact that actual budgetary resources are 
limited, unstable and always below plan. Funds reach both raion education budgets and schools in 
trickles throughout the year, which means that in practice by the time they arrive they are already 
earmarked: they go to pay the most urgent arrears, be it salaries or heating bills. This means raions 
have no chance of making any policy decisions about how to spend funds, and may be one of the 
reasons behind the failure to develop new financing norms: what would be the point? This is 
explored further in Section 4.4.3 below.
One further aspect of the financing system is worth highlighting. Under the traditional 
allocation mechanism, not only was a school’s funding for this year based on its expenditure last 
year, but in addition the school never got to see what this allocation was. All local school funds 
were handled by a single accountancy office for each raion. While in principle these accountants 
knew how much funding a school was entitled to and were supposed to ensure that by the end of 
the year they hadn’t received more (or less?), the school director was not aware of how much 
his/her school was allocated. Each time there was a need for a new expenditure (a light bulb, some 
teacher overtime, new chairs) the school director went to the central accountant and made a request 
for funds. The accountant could accept, or reject on the grounds that the school had used up its 
share of resources. Such a murky financing arrangement clearly gave the school director very little 
incentive to keep costs down or to prioritize spending. It also confused the issue of accountability. 
If a teacher was not paid it was not theoretically the school director's responsibility but that of the 
central accountant. But as the accountant paid wages via the director, the money could get lost 
along the route.
In Novgorod this is an aspect of the financing system which the Oblast Education Committee 
has been keen to address, giving it top priority alongside the goal of per-pupil financing. In this 
case they have been much more successful in implementation, apparently because they have federal 
law on their side: the Federal Law on Education gave the school the right to its own independent 
budget and the school director full control over how it is spent.81 As of July 1997 budget autonomy 
had been delegated to almost 40% of schools in Novgorod Oblast, and the aim was to reach 50% 
by the end of the year. Funds to these schools are still negotiated on the basis of past expenditure 
levels, but once agreed on the sum is transferred into an independent bank account upon which only
81 Federal Law on Education, Articles 42 and 43.
122
the school director can draw. The authorities argue that budget autonomy will give school directors 
more incentive to control costs and to prioritize, as the buck now stops with them. According to 
raion officials, school directors did not universally jump at the chance to control their own budgets; 
many of them seem to have been quite content with having no responsibility. But as they are 
appointed and dismissed by the raion authorities they do not have much choice. The determinant of 
whether a school will have an independent budget is what the raion thinks of the policy: in those 
raions in favour, most or all schools have now moved over, while in other raions the policy has not 
yet taken off at all. The oblast has no power to force raions to comply.
Despite the fact that school budget autonomy is now federal law, Novgorod appears to be 
unusual in putting it into practice. As recently as April 1997 a Ministry of Education official 
claimed that schools had no budget autonomy,82 while a note on the direction of Russian education 
reform prepared by several Deputy Ministers in Summer 1997 estimated that less than 10% of 
Russian secondary schools had their own accounts.83 Some of the reasons for this delay were made 
clear to me at a conference held in Novgorod to discuss oblast education policy with neighbouring 
Leningradskaya Oblast in June 1997.84 The Leningrad delegates heavily criticized the idea of 
greater decentralization, arguing that it would increase injustice in the system as it was not possible 
to predict in advance where expenditures would be most needed. In effect they claimed an equity 
justification for the non-transparent process run by the all-powerful central accountant. They also 
maintained that it was pointless to concentrate energy (and money, as school directors have to be 
retrained) on a process which will not affect the basic problem the system faces, lack of funds. The 
Novgorod delegates refused to accept that there were implications for equity, while arguing that the 
new system would not only mean more efficient use of funds, but would also lead to an increase in 
the total available, as there would be more incentive for school directors to raise their own 
additional funds. I go into this in more detail in Section 3.4.5 below. In practice this impact on 
fund-raising activity is likely to be the main effect of the move to independent school budgets in the 
immediate term. Ability to determine the direction of budgetary resources has even less real 
meaning for the moment for schools than for raions, because of the context of shortage of funds. In
82 Meeting with G.V.Bashkina, Deputy Head of Department of Economics in the MGPE, Moscow, April 
18th 1997.
83 ‘On Objectives and Directions of the Education Reform in Russia (Analytical Note)*, draft proposal 
prepared by Deputy Ministers Tichonov, Asmolov, Dmitriev (Ministry of Labour), Summer 1997.
84 Conference on ‘Education Policy in Novgorod and Leningrad Oblasts’, Novgorod, June 25th 1997.
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practice funds reach both raion budgets and school budgets already earmarked, as will become 
clear below.
3.4.2 Raion disparities in education finance
How large then are disparities across the oblast in education financing, and how do they compare 
to disparities in other sectors? Figure 3.2 shows the ratio between the highest spending and lowest 
spending raions in various sectors, and that between the third raion from top and third from bottom 
(to get rid of outliers). Expenditure includes capital spending (insofar as there is any) and is 
measured per capita, except for education expenditure which is measured per person under twenty 
(a category imposed by the population data: in fact pupils move onto higher education -  and 
therefore out of the raion’s sphere of responsibility -  at seventeen or eighteen).85
The raion spending most on education spends about 80% more per child than the lowest 
spender, and the third highest 50% more than the third lowest. As the figure shows, this is a level 
of difference very similar to that for total expenditure and for the sum of all social expenditures, 
but considerably lower than for other spending categories, among them other social categories such
Figure 3.2
Measures of disparity in raion expenditure, by raion (Novgorod
Oblast 1996)
ALL SOCIAL EDUC SOCPOL HEALTH LAW4ADMIN NAT ECON
E x p e n d itu r e  c a te g o ry
85 The difference in results if education expenditure is measured per capita as opposed to per child is 
minimal.
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as health and social policy.86 It looks as though education is being protected better than other 
spheres. The fact that the sum of all expenditure shows roughly the same level of disparity as 
education is strange, however, given the much greater disparity in other categories. This is 
particularly so as ‘national economy' (mostly spending on housing) takes up a large share of the 
total raion budget — 35% on average compared to just under 30% on education. One explanation 
may be that all raions give education the same priority — the basics cannot be cut — whereas other 
spheres are valued differently in different areas. Finally, it is worth noting that the scale of 
disparity observed here in all sectors is much lower than that between oblasts. The highest per 
capita level of expenditure in European Russia in 1995 was over five times greater than the lowest 
level; while per child spending on education varied by a factor of 2.6.87
All the same, an 80% difference in per child education spending is not inconsiderable. The 
highest spending raion, Borovichsky, borders the lowest spending, Okhulovsky: it appears that a 
school in one village could be enjoying almost twice the funding per child as a school in a 
neighbouring village. Given the importance played by the ‘minimum budget* in determining raion 
revenues, however, it is plausible that some of this difference results from differences in provision 
costs. Fixed costs mean that raions with fewer children or a more scattered population are likely to 
have to spend more per child on education, and if this was taken into account in the Soviet 
allocation mechanism it would also affect revenue allocations now. Table 3.8 shows the results of 
some simple OLS regressions which aim to measure the impact of revenue on education spending if 
these cost factors are held constant. It is striking that while budget revenue seems to explain about 
60% of variation in education spending, the two control factors have almost no impact. The share 
of the rural population has no bearing at all on the sum spent per child, while slightly more is spent 
per child in raions with a smaller total number of children. However, neither of these factors 
diminish the size or significance of the revenue variable.88 (A quadratic term for the revenue 
variable was experimented with but proved insignificant.)
86 However, health expenditure is difficult to interpret because of the growing importance of the 
centralized Medical Insurance Fund, which is not included here.
87 Figures calculated for the 35 oblasts of the North-West, Central, Central Black Earth, Volga and Volga 
Vyatskiy Regions. The North Caucasus, Urals, Siberia and the Far North and Far East were excluded to 
minimize differences caused by variation in provision costs.
88 In a separate regression, it was established that none of the variation in budget revenue per child could 
be explained by the number of children in the raion or the rural population share, so if these factors do 
affect the minimum budget the impact is negligible.
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Budget Rev per 
child SQ'D  
(lOOOrbles)





1 0.23 353.7 0.59
(5.6) (1-7)
2 0.25 -0.004 285.1 0.61
(6.0) (-1.6) (1.4)
3 0.25 -0.003 0.15 274.4 0.60
(5.8) (-1.2) (0.1) (1.2)
Notes: The t-statistics are given in brackets. N=22.
This still leaves over one-third of the variation explained by neither budget revenue nor 
(apparently) higher provision costs. This suggests an element of choice in raion budget allocation, a 
possibility supported by the variation in the percentage of the raion budget spent on education: 
variation is between 24 and 37% of the total, and none of this disparity is explained by the 
percentage of the population which is of school age (the correlation between the two series is 0.02). 
Furthermore, the share of education in the budget is positively correlated (0.34) with per child 
rouble expenditure: that is, raions spending more on education are spending a higher share of their 
budgets on education; it is not just that they have more to spend.
Care has to be taken, however, in interpreting expenditure disparities on the basis of data from 
a single year. On the one hand, the differences could represent a long term trend in which some 
raions spend more than others. But another explanation is that they represent one-off financing of 
urgent repairs in particular raions. In a situation in which funds are extremely limited, the 
replacement of a school roof in one raion could affect the relative expenditure figures.89 More 
seriously, perhaps, financing of these one-off items might explain not only part of the variation in 
education expenditure not explained by variation in revenue, but also some of the variation in 
revenue itself. This is because the oblast has more discretion over revenue allocation in practice 
than appears to be the case in theory. This is primarily due to the haphazard and piecemeal nature 
of financing, which is received and allocated bit by bit, with some never received at all (executed
89 This was in fact a point made to me in Shimsk Raion, about disparities in raion funding to different 
schools. However it is possible that it might also be relevant at the level of the raion itself.
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revenues tending to fall short of planned revenues). This forces the oblast to engage in a degree of 
prioritizing. As noted in Section 3.3, allocation of official oblast transfers to raions varied between 
59 and 68% of their planned level in 1996. How did the oblast determine which raions should be 
given precedence? In essence the rule appears to be simply that the most urgent requests are met 
first. Protected items take priority, followed by essential repairs. So once all raions are able to 
cover wages, food and medicine, a raion with a school with a collapsed roof would be first in line 
to receive its share of transfers. A second mechanism open to the oblast is the oblast reserve fund, 
through which loans are made in emergency cases. Again, prioritizing seems to take place along the 
same lines.
The point is that there may be some element of reverse causation: a raion may have higher 
revenues and therefore higher education expenditure not just because of its minimum budget 
(leading to a greater allocation of transfers) but because it has gone to the oblast with an urgent 
expenditure item which cannot be put off (so it receives a greater share of its allocation). 
Unfortunately, without a series of data over time, it is hard to know whether an oblast spending 
money on repairs is doing so because it has the money or has the money because it is doing so. 
Even data showing the breakdown of expenditure by item (presented in Section 3.4.3 below) cannot 
help to answer this. However, I was given the raion plans for expenditure for 1996, and hoped that 
this might shed light on the matter: if it is true that prioritizing on the basis of emergency need is 
important, planned expenditures should show much less disparity than executed expenditure.
It turns out to be true that planned expenditure figures show less inter-raion variation than the 
executed figures, although only slightly less: the ratio of maximum to minimum is 1.68 (compared 
to 1.78) and the ratio of third highest to third lowest 1.35 (compared to 1.46). However, two points 
are interesting. First, no raion spends more than 100% of its plan, although this does not of course 
mean that there was no emergency expenditure, just that what there was displaced other planned
Table 3.9. Correlation matrix: planned and actual raion revenues and education expenditure
Planned revenue Planned ed. exp. Actual revenue Actual ed. exp.
Planned revenue 1
Planned ed. exp. 0.20 1
Actual revenue 0.74 0.29 1
Actual ed. exp. 0.47 0.59 0.78 1
Notes: N=22.
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education sector spending. More surprising is the fact that planned education expenditure is very 
badly explained by planned revenues» with a correlation of 0.20, compared to 0.78 between actual 
revenues and actual education spending (see Table 3.9). Indeed, if the OLS regressions in Table 
3.8 are run using planned revenue and expenditure figures, the only variable significant is the 
percentage of the population which is rural, as shown in Table 3.10. A higher rural population 
seems to mean a raion will plan to spend more per child on education (although, as we have seen, 
this factor is irrelevant in determining what is actually spent by the end of the year).
Why are planned revenues so unimportant in determining planned education expenditure, while 
executed budget revenue is the driving factor behind actual education spending? One possible 
explanation of this is that planned education expenditure is planned at the lowest essential level, 
regardless of planned revenue. Raions have to spend a certain basic amount per child (a bit more 
per child in rural areas) to keep the schools running. With this covered, they cannot afford to plan 
more as there are numerous other services that need attention, which is why education spending 
bears no relation to revenues in the plan. In practice however what happens is that executed 
revenues fall way below plan (on average actual raion revenues were some 70% of the plan for 
1996), so that only the real necessities can be covered, of which education is one. The result is that 
education spending falls only a little below plan (as can be seen below in Table 3.11) compared to 
spending in other sectors which fall considerably under; while education spending also ends by 
being closely related to actual budget revenues, as it is one of the areas on which revenue is spent 
as it comes in. This story is consistent with the idea of higher raion revenues being explained by 
greater need, as suggested above. Although clearly not conclusive, it supports the idea that it would 
be unwise to attribute too much significance to the disparities in budget spending on education 
noted. This was backed up by what I was told within the oblast: the overriding problem as seen
Table 3.10. OLS regression results fo r  planned raion education expenditure (thousand roubles 
per child)
Planned budget No. o f  ch ildren Rural pop Constant R2
rev per child 
(1000 rubles)
(%)
1 0.03 0.0 4.3 1398.1 0.20
(0.8) (0.0) (2.3) (4.9)
Notes: T statistics arc given in brackets. N=22.
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from the ground is not differences in the funds available to different raions. but a shortage of funds 
which affects everyone. Some more evidence for this is presented in the next section.
3.4.3 Allocating resources within the education budget
Allocation by item
Once the raion education committee has its budget, in theory it is free to determine allocation as it 
wishes, both to different institutions and on different items, provided it covers protected items first. 
As already implied however, financial reality imposes sharp constraints on the decision-making 
process. Even the money for protected items comes in in trickles during the yean several raions had 
wage arrears in July 1997 dating back two or three months. After these items, attention can be 
turned to maintenance of the buildings and urgent repairs. The officials I spoke to claimed that 
once protected items were covered there was very little money left, and that the direction of what 
there was was dictated by the urgency of repairs.
There are two illustrations of the tight situation in which the education budget finds itself. 
First, as noted above, actual raion revenues averaged some 70% of planned revenues, resulting in 
cuts across the board in a budget already considered to be insufficient. Table 3.11 gives the 
executed budget in 1996 as a percentage of the budget as planned. All sectors end up spending less 
than had been planned, some substantially less. The education sector fares less badly than many.
Table 3.11. Executed as a percentage o f planned raion expenditure in selected sectors 1996, 
Novgorod Oblast (sum o f all raions)
Execution (%) Execution (%)
Total expenditure 71 Total social expenditure 77
Administration 97 Education 85
Law enforcement 83 Health 67
Industry 67 Social policy 73
Agriculture 68 Physical culture 99
Transport 57 Culture 77
Market infrastructure 46 Housing 61
Environment 70 Mass media 90
Note: 22 raions in total.
The second indication is the breakdown of raion education expenditure by item. What is of 
particular interest is the amount of money spent on non-protected items (equipment and textbooks), 
and the amount spent on capital repairs. Surprisingly, the share of Novgorod education spending 
which goes on the main protected item, wages, is actually fairly low in comparison to other 
countries. The wage share varies across raions between 35% and 55%, excluding payments to the 
wage funds; if those were included the sum would be more like 45% and 70% (assuming the wage 
funds to be roughly 25% of the wage bill). In Britain around 70% of current account spending goes 
on teacher salaries (MacKinnon and Statham, 1995, p.139), while in less developed countries the 
percentage can reach 80 or 90% (Mingaat and Tan, 1992, cited in Klugman, 1997). Clearly low 
wages are keeping the wage bill down despite high teacher numbers. Similarly, the limited evidence 
on the amount spent on equipment and textbooks themselves suggests reasonably high levels of 
spending on these items relative to spending on wages, although with considerable regional 
disparity (unfortunately, I was only able to gather this information from two raions, Novgorod City 
and Shimsk Raion). In Novgorod City the equivalent of some 10% of what was spent on teacher 
salaries in general schools (excluding wage funds) is recorded as having been spent on textbooks, 
with an extra 4% on equipment and ‘soft supplies' (stationery etc.). In the rural raion of Shimsk 
just 4% of the wage bill was spent on these categories together, but this still compares reasonably 
well with a figure of about 6% for England and Wales in 1991-92 (MacKinnon and Statham, 1995, 
p. 139)*
However, while these figures may suggest that the situation is far from desperate, two points 
need to be borne in mind. First, the cost of a textbook in Novgorod is extremely high relative to the 
wage. As noted in Section 3.4.1, the retail price of a textbook was about one quarter of a teacher’s 
monthly wage at the start of 1997. Second, while in England and Wales expenditure on textbooks 
mostly goes on replacing those worn out, in Russia the introduction of a new curriculum means 
that the entire stock of textbooks needs to be replaced. For both reasons, the share of spending on 
this item really needs to be much higher for the moment than in comparison countries in the West.
The other interesting question is what has happened to capital expenditure. As a share of total 
expenditure, the amount spent on capital repairs in Novgorod in 1996 was in no raion greater than 
two percent, with six of the 22 raions spending nothing. Variation in capital construction was 
higher, but largely because of one raion, Khvoininsky, where a new school was built. In 
Khvoininsky 16% of the total education budget went on construction, but everywhere else 
construction expenditure varied between zero and three percent of the total, with the majority of
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raions (fourteen) spending nothing. The bigger towns tend to have done slightly better than average 
with respect to capital spending, with Chudova spending 5.1% on capital repairs and construction, 
Novgorod City 1.8% and Borovich 2.4%. Khvoininsky is a smallish raion with no outstanding 
characteristics other than a 53% increase in the number of school students since 1989, the highest 
increase in the oblast. (Total pupil numbers in the oblast have risen 20% over this period). The new 
school is the result of an oblast level decision and is the first school to be built in the oblast for five 
years. Previously the policy was to finance one new school in each raion every year.
What then happens to the rest of the education budget? Five to ten percent is spent on food, but 
the other protected item, medicine, is so small as to be invisible in most areas. This suggests a 
relatively large amount is left over for other items. However, utility bills are likely to take up the 
bulk of this. Unfortunately, I was not able to obtain separate data on expenditures on utilities, but 
these have become substantial in recent years with the lifting of price controls on fuel.90
Allocation between institutions, and the impact on pre-schools in particular 
The conventional method of allocating funds from the raion budget to school institutions has been 
described in Section 3.4.1 above. I explained there that, while raion authorities are free to develop 
their own local mechanisms for allocating funds to schools,91 in practice raions seem to follow the 
same method; basing this year's allocation on last year's, with adjustment made for changes in the 
contingent of children. Whatever the arguments for and against this method, one effect of it should 
be that the distribution of funds across education levels remains fairly constant over time. This was 
the response in Novgorod when 1 asked if the financing of kindergartens had deteriorated relative to 
that of general schools in recent years. I had wondered whether, given the lesser obligation on 
raions to provide pre-school education (in part because of its non-compulsory nature and in part 
because the law gives it slightly less protection92), they were taking the obvious step of squeezing 
pre-schools to support compulsory schools. But I was told at both oblast and raion levels that pre­
school institutions were treated just the same in the allocation process as other institutions, and that 
while all levels of education had suffered, cuts had been inflicted on all levels fairly evenly.
90 At the OECD Review of Education Policy in the RF, G. Bashkina (Deputy Head of the Department of 
Economics in the MGPE) claimed that huge tariffs were now paid for utilities and that these took up the 
lion’s share of funds allocated to schools (Moscow, June 16-17 1997).
91 Federal Law on Education, Article 31. Article 41 suggests that there are federal minimum norms to 
adhere to, but in practice these seem to exist only for protected items.
92 Federal Law on Education, Articles 5 and 18. Article 18 states that a network of pre-school institutions 
exist to help with the upbringing of young children, and guarantees access to these institutions to all 
sectors of society, but Article 5 on the child's right to education does not mention pre-school.
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In practice, however, the pre-school level overall is clearly receiving a smaller share of the total 
than previously, simply because more and more kindergartens have closed down. In 1996 there 
were 410 kindergartens in operation, compared to 513 five years earlier. (These figures include 
both municipal and enterprise kindergartens: all but a handful of enterprise kindergartens have now 
been divested to the raion authorities.) Closures are in part due to falling fertility rates, but 
enrolment levels have also fallen: in January 1990 the percentage of children aged between one and 
six (inclusive) attending kindergarten varied across raions between 84% and 50%, by January 1997 
the maximum was 74% and the minimum just 28%. Overall enrolment in the oblast has fallen from 
71% to 56% of this age-group. Demand factors still seem to be the direct cause; supply of 
kindergarten places now outstrips demand for the first time in the Oblast Administration’s memory. 
Both rising unemployment and the cost of attendance are likely to be encouraging parents to keep 
their children at home: under federal regulations kindergartens can charge parents up to 20% of the 
average cost of a child’s place, and may also demand assistance in kind, as explained below.93 The 
cost of a child’s place is an indeterminate concept, but the rule seems to be interpreted to mean that 
the kindergarten can use fees to raise up to 20% of what it spends: that is, it can charge up to 20% 
of the average cost of a child's place.
Yet while demand factors may be the direct reason for closures, the supply side policies 
followed by the raion can themselves affect demand. In particular, raions can influence the level of 
charges in their local kindergartens. Although the amount to charge is a decision made by the 
institution, the raion can offer to cover part of the fee itself as an additional payment to the 
kindergarten, keeping the charge to parents down if pre-school education is considered a priority. I 
was told that in practice fees charged vary across the oblast between 6% and 12% of the provision 
cost. One raion, Staraya Russa, was held up as a shining example by the kindergarten experts in 
the Oblast Administration: the kindergartens there charge 2,000 roubles a day against the average 
charge of 3,000 roubles, and Staraya Russa -- about average in terms of education spending per 
capita -- has an enrolment rate of 72%, second only to Novgorod City. Note that 3,000 roubles a 
day makes 60,000 roubles a month, compared to an average per capita income in December 1996 
of 832.00094: i.e., not an impossible amount, but a large enough chunk of average income for
93 The 20% limit was set by Presidential Decree and could be changed by a similar decree.
94 Data from the Centre for Economic Conjuncture.
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demand to be highly price-elastic. (In addition to the fee there may be other hidden costs, as 
explored in Section 3.4.5 below.)”
Despite the apparently standard allocation mechanism* it seems then that raions can and do 
exercise influence over the relative position of pre-school institutions, and naturally individuals will 
have different priorities about where money should be spent. This was underlined for me at the 
conference on educational policy mentioned above. One Novgorod raion was praised by the 
kindergarten lobby for having succeeded in increasing its enrolment rate over the last few years 
against the trend. The Chair of the Education Committee responded that that particular raion also 
had among the worst records on teacher wage arrears. It was clear which he thought more 
important. It is likely then that some raions are indeed squeezing kindergartens to try to soften the 
difficult conditions facing other schools.
3.4.4 Disparities in non-monetary measures: evidence of an urban-rural split?
An oblast level study provides a good opportunity to explore what evidence there is for an urban- 
rural distinction in education provision. As we have seen, total education expenditure was 
uncorrelated with urbanization in Novgorod in 1996, although planned spending per child was 
higher in raions with larger rural populations. In this section I ask whether other indicators of 
standard of educational provision suggest any bias against rural schools. The four indicators which 
were examined are kindergarten enrolment, pupil-teacher ratios, the percentage of teachers with 
higher education and the percentage of 17 year olds going on to higher education.
The results for kindergarten enrolment are the most interesting. Kindergarten enrolment among 
one-to-sixes in 1996 was higher where education expenditure per child was higher, and higher also 
in larger raions, suggesting possible economies of scale; but urbanization was insignificant. 
However, both of the latter results were driven in part by the influence of Novgorod City. With 
Novgorod City excluded, both spending and raion size were still significant, but so was 
urbanization: remarkably, raions with higher rural shares in the population tended to have higher 
kindergarten enrolment. The degree of explanatory power of these variables is limited: in a 
regression run on enrolment in all raions but Novgorod, only about a third of the variation could be 95
95 It is worth noting as an aside here that the 20% policy naturally means extra money for kindergartens 
which are already able to spend more. An examination of the amount spent on kindergartens in Novgorod 
City and Shimsk Raion suggests that the average kindergarten in Novgorod could charge 6% of average 
cost and still get 2,000 roubles a day, while a Shimsk kindergarten (spending much less per child) could 
only charge 1,000 roubles even if it demanded the full 20%.
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explained by all three factors together, while the correlation with urbanization alone was just 
0.13 (negative). However, the fact that enrolment has no positive relationship with urbanization 
remains surprising.
Pupil-teacher ratios in general schools are available not only by raion but also with an urban- 
rural breakdown within each raion. As would be expected, there is a significant difference between 
the two. In urban areas averages range across raions from 11 to 16 children per teacher employed, 
while in rural areas the maximum is 11 and the minimum just 4. Once the degree of urbanization is 
taken into account, expenditure has no impact, although the size of the raion is relevant (smaller 
raions having lower ratios). However, it is worth noting that while pupil teacher ratios have fallen 
in urban areas since 1990 (from 15.4 on average to 14.2), supposedly because of ageing pupil 
populations, they have risen in rural areas (from 7.6 to 8.5), as schools have been closing down. So 
there does seem to be a process of rationalization going on, presumably at the price of longer daily 
journeys for some rural pupils.
The percentage of teachers who have a higher education tends to be slightly higher in urban 
areas, though within group variation is also high. The percentage varies between 67 and 90% in 
urban areas and between 60 and 84% in rural areas. There is no correlation with education 
spending.
Finally, there is no clear explanation of the percentage of 17 year old school leavers going on 
to higher education. There are two outliers here, Novgorod City at 74% and (for reasons which are 
unclear) Solyetsky Raion at 67%, with all other raions lagging behind between 16 and 50% (with a 
mean of 35%). Among this majority group there was no relation with urbanization, nor indeed with 
proximity to Novgorod City, where the higher education institutions are found. I was told in 
Novgorod that there are special policies to make higher education entrance easier for pupils from 
rural areas, and it may be that these are reasonably successful. For example, it seems that rural 
pupils can gain automatic entry to Novgorod State University in the faculty of their choice. A 
professor in the new faculty of Fashion and Design told me her star student was a boy from a rural 
raion who turned up and took advantage of this policy: over 100 local students took exams in fine 
art to compete for one of ten available places, while this student walked in having never drawn 
anything before in his life. Such cases may explain some of the feeling I was surprised to find 
among residents of Novgorod City that rural pupils were actually relatively privileged. On the other 
hand these cases are clearly fairly rare; and Novgorod City still finds itself in a different league to 
he rest of the oblast on this as on other indicators.
4
3.4.5 Non-budgetary sources of finance
So far this chapter has been concerned entirely with budgetary resources, but in practice extra­
budgetary or private sources of funding are becoming increasingly important. These can broadly be 
divided into two types: fees charged by non-govemmental institutions, and extra-budgetary funds 
raised by state institutions to supplement their budget allocations.
To date fee-paying institutions play a relatively minor role in Novgorod. There are three 
gymnasia and one kindergarten which charge fees, covering in total about 1% of all children in the 
oblast.96 These institutions are referred to as 'non-govemmental* rather than private as in principle 
they need not necessarily charge pupils but may raise funds through charity or sponsorship. The 
difference from state institutions is that they have the right to demand fees if they wish to, while 
government institutions are obliged to provide at least the basic curriculum free of charge. One 
striking fact is that, as long as they receive state accreditation, non-government schools are eligible 
for budgetary financing on the same basis as other schools97; a remarkably free market approach to 
education provision, in which resources follow the child even if the child chooses to opt out of state 
provision. However, I was told that in practice non-govemmental institutions always receive less 
than others as they are never given priority for repairs etc. Fees for both gymnasia and kindergarten 
were about 250,000 roubles a month in the first half of 1997, compared to a teacher’s average 
wage of less than 400,000. These schools are all new -- there is no opt-out policy for current 
governmental institutions. But it seems that anyone can start a school, although accreditation may 
not be so easy to achieve.
State schools are obliged to provide the basic curriculum, as laid down in federal law, free of 
charge. Beyond this, however, they can raise additional funds in almost any way they like. The 
Federal Law on Education confirms that schools can set up extra-budgetary funds and engage in a 
number of different types of money-making activity,98 and the oblast authorities in Novgorod have 
made a point of encouraging this activity. As noted above, part of the purpose of giving budget 
autonomy to school directors was to encourage fund raising by reassuring school directors that any 
funds raised would not be ‘crowded out’ by cuts in budgetary allocations. Furthermore, as long as 
the money raised is spent on the institution it is not treated as profit and is not taxed.
96 However, this is higher than the share of children in private schools in Russia as a whole, estimated at 
under 0.5% by M.Leontyeva, Head of the Department of General Secondary Education in the MGPE 
(OECD Review of Education Policy in the Russian Federation, Moscow, 16-17 June 1997).
97 Federal Law on Education, Article 41.7.
98 Articles 45 and 47.
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School money-making activity tends to take two forms: provision of ‘additional paid 
educational services* over and above the basic curriculum, and fund-raising through ‘voluntary 
contributions*. Examples of paid extra services include after-school clubs, music and dance, extra 
languages and coaching for university entrance. The basic curriculum includes one foreign 
language, for example, so most schools will provide English free and then, if they have qualified 
staff, provide French or German for a charge. In some schools in Novgorod City university 
lecturers give lessons after school to the graduating class to prepare them for university entrance 
exams. (Arrears in university salary payments are even higher than in the compulsory school 
sector, so some lecturers survive by doing this.) I was also told by parents that some state schools 
have two parallel classes for all subjects; a fee-paying one and a free one.
The second standard method for both schools and kindergartens is to call on ‘voluntary* 
contributions from parents to repair and redecorate school buildings and to buy new furniture and 
equipment. This is in effect a compulsory fee which parents seem resigned to paying; it also turns 
out to be nothing new and was typical during the Soviet era. In Novgorod City parents told me they 
paid 20,000 roubles a month: if this is the case for all parents, it would add up annually to about 
10% of what is spent from the budget. Parents are also expected to turn out to help with painting 
and repairs, as are children from older classes. One fifteen year old told me her class sometimes 
had to ‘volunteer’ to stay after class to help mend the furniture. She said one could always refuse, 
but then ‘they look at you badly*.
Another Soviet era way of economizing is for schools to grow food on their own plots of land 
for school meals, or in a few cases to sell for extra funds. The children will help in the garden as 
part of a practical lesson, or parents are brought in to help. This applies mostly to rural schools; in 
urban areas parents might donate something from their own allotments. As seen above, raions must 
provide schools with a certain amount per child for school meals, but this is a tiny sum, enough for 
about half a loaf of bread per child per month. Some schools in Novgorod City also charge for 
school meals, although parents told me that whether they charged or not the result was minimal, 
and that most children took their own food from home.
‘Gifts’ such as televisions or computers are a third type of in kind assistance. There appears to 
be some feeling however among parents and pupils that such gifts are a way of buying a child 
greater attention, better marks or even entrance to an institution. One Novgorod City mother in 
search of a kindergarten for her child told me that at each one she visited she was asked openly 
what she and her husband could do for the kindergarten; when the family’s economic circumstances
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became clear she was told the kindergarten was full for the foreseeable future. She eventually 
secured her daughter a place by agreeing to make costumes for the children's plays.
Parents also help by buying textbooks. The authorities claimed that the situation was bad but 
not desperate, and that for the moment books were provided, but parents told me that at least in 
older classes it was standard to buy one's own. At the beginning of the year teachers provide the 
class with a list of necessary books as a matter of course. Textbooks are extremely expensive — as 
much as 100,000 roubles each, which is about $17, or one eighth of average per capita income at 
the end of 1996. If a child's parents cannot afford to buy the books he or she works with friends or 
copies from the teacher's book after class.
Another type of contribution which schools are entitled to pursue is to attract sponsorship. So 
far this is seen in the Soviet light of having close links with an enterprise which helps the school 
out, which means that for now there is virtually none as all but one or two of the old state 
enterprises are bankrupt. I was interested to know whether sponsorship could be interpreted in a 
more Western manner, allowing, for instance, Pepsi Cola to come along and match budget funding 
in exchange for blanket advertising inside schools. The oblast administration found the idea of 
Pepsi wanting to do such a thing highly entertaining, but it does not seem completely implausible.99
Finally, schools also have the right to engage in ‘profit-making activity’, where this includes 
trading in goods, dealing in shares, and renting out their property. For the moment these activities 
do not seem to be very common, and certainly from the school property I saw I couldn't see renting 
being an option for the near future. But, like sponsorship, it raises some disturbing possibilities for 
the future. Schools may well prove happy to hire out their playgrounds in the interests of their 
classrooms.
Much of the evidence presented above is, of course, anecdotal, but the overriding impression I 
got from talking to parents, pupils and local education authorities was that all schools and 
kindergartens are out to make money or find equipment from wherever they can. Given the budget 
figures seen above, which suggest that there is almost no money available for equipment, books, 
furniture, decoration or even repairs, this is not surprising. But it is clearly worrying for equity, 
and on two different counts. First, there is the obvious question of individual equity if children are 
unable to find a kindergarten place or have a fair shot at university entrance exams without paying
99 For instance, instead of the quickly forgotten ‘Project Blue’ campaign in April 1996, Pepsi could have 
doubled the year's education funding in five oblasts of Novgorod's size. 'Project Blue' consisted of 
repackaging Pepsi in blue cans and cost $500 million. ('Turning Pepsi Blue*, The Economist, April 13th 
1996). Novgorod Oblast spent the equivalent of about $60 million on education in 1996.
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for them. Second, all the money that is available from parents is concentrated in the big towns, so 
there is also a regional equity issue. Budgetaiy allocations may be equalized across raions. but as 
non-budgetary sources become more important so will the differences in funding between urban 
and rural schools.
How important are these additional sources of finance? Novgorod City Department of 
Education estimated off-budget sources to provide about 10% of total financing in government 
schools (although this must be a very rough estimate, and probably excludes the value of in-kind 
assistance). In rural Shimsk Raion on the other hand the Head of the Education Division thought 
the idea of offering parents extra classes for a charge a bit laughable, given that many of the 
parents are unwaged while few of the teachers are qualified to teach extra languages and skills. He 
did say that it was common practice for parents to be mobilized to paint the classrooms and carry 
out basic repairs and also to make a donation to the cost of materials, adding that it was a practice 
he was opposed to, but that if the raion could not afford to do the work itself it could hardly object. 
Putting pressure on the parents was a better alternative to dirty classrooms and broken 
bookshelves. This attitude seemed to sum it up. The fact that schools are turning into mini­
businesses out to exploit parents for everything they can is disturbing, but at the same time it is not 
clear what options they have.
3.5 Conclusions
The main aim of this chapter was to explore the extent of differences in the provision of education 
between raions in Novgorod Oblast. To some degree the chapter’s findings are optimistic. First, 
despite considerable disparities between raions in own revenues raised, disparities in final revenues 
and hence in budget expenditures per capita turn out to be relatively small. The oblast has a strong 
transfer mechanism to support poorer areas, and those differences in final revenues which remain 
are better explained by the minimum budget calculated for each raion by the oblast than by the 
raion’s own initial economic position.
The result is that raion disparities in budgetary expenditure on education are also lower than 
might be expected. Disparities that do exist are hard to interpret as in part they may represent the 
impact of one-off expenditures on essential repairs rather than a persistent trend towards higher 
spending in some raions over others. The urgency with which repairs are required could affect not 
only how a raion chooses to spend its revenues, but also the level of revenues themselves; as
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although theoretically transfer allocations are determined by formula, m practice L-d» 
are insufficient and the oblast is forced to prioritize. Naturally it pvt* precedence to lv 
expenditures it considers to be most pressing. This could mean that disparities are les» vtim  than 
they appear. Furthermore, neither budgetary nor non-budgeiary measures of dopant) repealed « 
bias against rural areas.
However, the chapter also points to some more worrying tendencies. First, it confirms that 
education expenditures are at a disturbingly low level. If budgetary expenditures are fairly o tn  
across raions, it is because in all areas they are close to the same subsistence level in »huh mly 
the very most essential items are covered. Resources arc earmarked for »ages, nvunuiurxe i* 
urgent repairs before they have even arrived in raion or school budgets. There appears to be almmi 
no money available for equipment, furniture or school supplies.
This situation is leading schools to engage in frantic fund raising activity, actively encouraged 
by the oblast authorities, who see no other solution. Schools seems to be exploiting every pmvible 
opportunity to raise money and in-kind assistance from parents. This is understandable. but raises 
serious concerns about both individual and regional equity, as parents able to make gifts »huh »ill 
benefit the whole school community (televisions, computers) »ill all be found in the mam urban 
centres. Schools in Novgorod City in particular are likely to benefit from this lype of assistance 
On the other hand, pupils in rural areas at least all find themselves in the same boat Their whols 
may be in worse condition, but they do not face unfair competition from children »ith ruber 
parents.
Finally, however, we need to ask how typical Novgorod is. How much of this scenario is likely 
to be unique and how much generalizable to other areas? The formula mechanism used to 
determine transfers to raions is based on the federal transfer formula and as such is likely to k  
standard. However, in Novgorod the transfer fund is simply formed from the transfers the oblast 
itself receives from the federal fund, and how widespread this is as a practice is not dear If it is 
the norm, the implications are interesting, as it would mean that poorer regions like NovgonxJ 
would automatically have stronger internal redistribution systems.
In terms of education expenditure, evidence of both the severe lack of funds and the attempts 
by schools to supplement their incomes just confirms reports from other parts of the country. For 
example, the Examiners’ Report of the OECD Review of Education Policy in Russia lists as cause 
for concern a series of cases similar to those observed in Novgorod (OECD. 1997. especially 
pp.63-64). It mentions the prevalence of special clubs and extra-curricular activities for children
whose parents can afford to pay; ‘desirable’ schools which admit pupils on condition that parents 
make a substantial donation to the school; and cases of teachers tutoring students, including their 
own, for pay. What is not so clear is whether in all regions oblast and raion authorities are so 
forthright in encouraging schools to engage in this type of activity. Certainly the granting of budget 
autonomy to school institutions, which is an important prerequisite to encouraging schools to find 
their own funds, appears to be proceeding much more quickly in Novgorod than elsewhere. More 
than this, the OECD Review discovered that some oblasts actually have laws prohibiting schools 
from fund-raising (OECD, 1997, p.65). This practice (though a contravention of federal law) 
should help prevent some of the unfair practices outlined above, but, as the Examiners’ Report 
argues, at the cost of aggravating poor financial conditions yet further. It seems that there may be a 
split between oblasts which try to preserve equity of provision even if this means deteriorating 
standards for all, and those like Novgorod which, for better or worse, maintain that the urgency 
with which additional funding is needed justifies the exploitation of any source.
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Conclusions
My aim in this thesis was to explore the extent to which the recent decentralization of fiscal 
responsibility in Russia has led to growing disparities in the provision of government services 
across regions, and in particular in the provision of education. The three chapters of the thesis each 
examined a different aspect of this question. Chapter 1 focused on provisions for intergovernmental 
transfers to support less well-off regions, and the degree to which they have been successful in 
achieving their stated aim of equalization. Chapter 2 turned to look at disparities in regional 
spending on compulsory education and tried to assess how far these disparities have increased over 
the period. Finally, Chapter 3 moved down to address these same questions at the sub-oblast level, 
through a case-study of a single oblast, Novgorod.
The main findings of the thesis can be summarized as follows.
• The intergovernmental transfer system was found to have several points in its favour. The 
transfer allocation mechanism was shown to be basically equalizing, with transfers per capita 
consistently higher to regions with lower per capita own revenues, higher infant mortality and 
smaller and more rural populations.
• Furthermore, none of the variables intended as proxies for political influence proved significant 
in determining transfers after the introduction of the formula system in 1994. In particular, 
once the four 'special status' regions had been controlled for, there was no evidence that 
regions with republic status did better than other regions, despite widespread belief that 
republics have received preferential treatment.
•  Finally, I found results for 1993 to be very similar to those for 1994 and 1995, suggesting that 
the introduction of the formula represented a formalization of existing arrangements rather
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than a change in priorities: transfers were essentially equalizing even under the murky closed- 
door allocation of 1993.
• However, despite the fact that they flow broadly in the right direction, I found transfers to be 
too small in size and too thinly spread to have made a significant difference to the pre-transfer 
revenue distribution. In addition, the assistance offered to the worst-off regions seems to have 
actually diminished over the period. Equalizing transfers formed 8-9% of total oblast revenues 
in all three years 1993,1994 and 1995. But in 1993 these transfers were divided between 55 of 
the 76 regions analysed, in 1994 between 61 regions and in 1995 between 69 regions. The 
result was that in 1994 and 1995, holding all other characteristics constant, a region which fell 
below average per capita revenues by one hundred roubles received just five roubles in 
transfers in compensation. In 1993 a similar region would have received ten roubles.
• Chapter 2 looked at how the developments in the revenue system have affected regional levels 
of expenditure on compulsory education. I found strong evidence of a growing role played by 
budget revenues in determining levels of education spending: provision cost factors, including 
number of pupils, urbanization and temperature all dropped in significance between 1991 and 
1995. While in 1991 some 40% of spending variation seemed to be attributable to variation in 
provision costs, in comparison to about a quarter of variation attributable to revenue 
disparities once costs were controlled for, in 1995 provision costs explained virtually nothing. 
Hence widening disparities in nominal spending levels appear to reflect growing real 
disparities, and are not explained away by growing differences in provision costs. Indeed 
nominal measures may underestimate the true scale of the increase. Education is relatively 
protected within regional budgets: an elasticity well below one supported the hypothesis that it 
is treated as a necessity. But it is not cushioned from all the effects of divergence in regional 
economic conditions.
• Furthermore, while there has been some reshuffling of winners and losers over the period 
(resource-rich regions, for example, tend to have begun with poor conditions and to be doing 
relatively well now) I found that some of the regions which have experienced the biggest falls 
in education spending over the period are also those which had the worst conditions to start 
with. Two regions in southern Russia were highlighted: Kalmykia, where spending fell to 27% 
of its 1991 level by 1995, and Tiva, where it fell to 45%. In both regions, fewer than 10% of 
schools started the transition equipped with central heating, sewerage and running water.
•  Chapter 3 presented some encouraging information from the sub-oblast level. Revenue 
disparities between the raions of Novgorod Oblast are not only much lower (as is natural) than 
those at the national level, but redistribution mechanisms within the oblast also tum out to be 
much more effective than national mechanisms.
•  However, the study highlighted at least two potential problems with the allocation mechanism. 
First, using the same principle as that used to allocate federal transfers, transfer allocation to 
raions in Novgorod is heavily dependent on the raion’s expenditure level in the past, which 
appears to be neither fair nor efficient. Second, the Novgorod transfer fund is made up entirely 
of receipts from the federal transfer fund passed down to the raion level. If this is general 
practice, it raises questions about what happens in regions which receive fewer or no transfers 
from the federal level.
• Chapter 3 also provided disturbing evidence on the state of the education system in Novgorod, 
confirming reports from other parts of the country that spending on education is at a 
worry in gly low level. Budget funds cover salaries (usually, and with some delay), utilities and 
the most urgent repairs, but little money is left over for general maintenance, equipment, 
furniture or textbooks.
• This in tum is leading schools and kindergartens to engage in frantic fundraising activity, a 
practice actively encouraged by the oblast authority. This has implications not only for 
individual equity, as richer parents can buy their children better treatment even within 
government schools, but also for regional equity, as the sources of additional funding are 
concentrated in the larger towns. However, it also presents a policy dilemma. It is difficult to 
argue that this type of fund-raising should be prohibited when no alternative sources of finance 
are available.
What, though, could Russia do to increase regional equity in the provision of education and, by 
extension, other social goods? I take this opportunity to highlight three ways in which the system of 
intergovernmental transfers could be improved. First, a new approach is needed to the way in 
which regional expenditure needs are determined. The current system, which has oblast and raion 
‘minimum budgets* based largely on past levels of expenditure, seems both out of step with 
international practice and unfair. Its survival appears due, not to a belief in the allocative justice of 
the Soviet era, but rather to inertia — that this is the way things have always been done. In practice, 
there is evidence that substantial regional variation in public service provision did exist prior to
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transition; hence this system just exacerbates past inequalities. The collapse in education financing 
in already deprived regions like the Kalmykia Republic and Tiva Oblast may be a good illustration 
of this. The transfer system is clearly failing to pick up regions in urgent need of support.
Russia ought to move to a more generally accepted system in which expenditure needs are 
measured from scratch on the basis of direct indicators of need. This should become the norm at all 
levels of the fiscal system, to be used by the centre to estimate the requirements of oblasts and by 
oblasts to work out the relative needs of raions. However, initiative for the change needs to come 
from the top. My experience in Novgorod suggested that much greater uniformity persists at 
regional level than is prescribed by law, and that regions are unlikely for various reasons to 
establish their own norms for local financing. Once adopted at the federal level, however, a new 
approach is likely to spread right down through the system, affecting even the methodology used to 
calculate school budgets.
The development of a new needs-based formula system might help solve a second problem, 
that of the very high share of regions currently qualifying for transfers. Under the current system, 
regions qualify for transfers if current revenues fall below past expenditures, which means that 
nearly all regions appear to be in need. In Chapter 1 I pointed out that a system of equalizing 
transfers is by definition about relative need, and that it is therefore unhelpful to classify every 
single region as in need of assistance, even if all are struggling. Building a formula on the basis of 
direct indicators of need might simplify the prioritization of regional demands.
However, it is true that there may in fact be certain advantages to a system in which every 
region receives transfers. In a situation in which regions have been known to question the benefits 
they receive from federation membership it may make good political sense to have revenues 
flowing two ways for all regions, blurring the potentially dangerous divide between ‘donors’ and 
‘beneficiaries’. Indeed, in other federations, as noted in Chapter 3, it is not uncommon for all 
regions to contribute to a central budget and then for all to receive transfers of varying sizes in 
return. But if the Russian system is to follow this route, the size of the transfer fund needs to be 
much larger. In Chapter 1 we saw that, as a percentage of total government spending, transfers 
from federal to regional level in Russia are less than half of the OECD average. The small size of 
the Russian transfer fund might therefore suggest that its role is that of emergency fund, bailing out 
the worst off regions; yet its broad coverage implies it has a wider purpose. Russia needs to decide 
which way to jump and to reshape the transfer system accordingly, either cutting the number of 
beneficiaries, or increasing substantially the level of transfer funds.
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Finally, there may be room for additional federal intervention in the workings of sub-oblast 
transfer mechanisms. Chapter 3 showed the Novgorod authorities doing a good job of achieving 
equalization under difficult conditions (aside from concerns about the calculation of the minimum 
budget, discussed above). Regional officials also seemed deeply motivated by the need to protect 
less well-off raions; perhaps not surprising given that they knew the conditions in each area first 
hand. If Novgorod can be taken as typical, leaving regional authorities in charge of internal 
redistribution may therefore be an effective approach to the problem: the federal government 
concentrates on inter-oblast redistribution and the oblasts take care of the rest.
However, one further point of interest that emerged from the Novgorod study is that the degree 
of intra-oblast equalization that takes place there is arbitrary in the sense that it depends on the size 
of transfers received from the federal transfer fund. In fact, as Novgorod’s receipts from the centre 
turned out to be insufficient in 1996 to ensure that all its raions reached their minimum budgets, 
the raions ended up below the minimum. If this method of funding internal redistribution is 
common practice, it implies, perversely, that redistribution will be stronger in poorer regions — 
those where transfer receipts are higher. Further research is needed to establish whether other 
regions do follow this same strategy (as well as what happens in donor regions which receive no 
transfers), but it may be that federal authorities need to lay down clearer guidelines about where 





A note on regional price variation
Price levels and inflation rates have varied considerably across the Russian Federation in the last 
few years. The result of climate, high transportation costs and, in the early stages of the transition, 
local price controls, variation has been large enough to make it crucial that the local price level is 
taken into account in any work on Russia which compares monetary variables.
The aim of this appendix is to summarize what we know about price variation in Russia since 
1991, and to give the details of the two main price deflators used in the thesis. It begins by 
introducing the available price indices and goes on to explore the extent of regional differences in 
both price levels and inflation rates. The last section explains the construction of the two indices 
used: the regional CPI and the regional CPI adjusted by the cost of a basket of 19 basic goods in 
December 1992.
The data available100
1. The 19 goods basket
Two regional price measures are made openly available by the Russian State Statistical Committee 
(Goskomstat). The first is the cost of a basket of 19 basic food products (or 18 food products plus 
a cigarette allowance) in the administrative centre of each subject of the federation. The content of 
the basket is the same for all regions, with the amount of each good included intended to be roughly 
that considered necessary for a year: among other things the basket contains 146kg of potatoes, 
42kg of beef, 25kg of sugar and 96 packets of cigarettes. The cost of the basket is available by 
region for December of each year between 1992 and 1994 but it appears that the measure may 
have been discontinued since then.
Goskomstat insists that the 19 good basket is not intended to represent a survival minimum: for 
this they claim an alternative basket of 25 goods is calculated, where choice of goods and their 
weights are based on internationally accepted practice. (This basket contains less meat, sugar and 
fat, more fruit and vegetables and no cigarettes.) Unfortunately and for reasons which are unclear 
the 25 good basket does not appear to be published, so it is of little relevance here.
100 The information in this section draws heavily on Goskomstat (I996d).
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2. The CPI
The second measure available is a regional Consumer Price Index (CPI). This is an index of ihe 
cost of a far more extensive basket covering food products, non-food products and sen-ices in 
nearly 300 categories. Prices of every day goods and services are collected in a number of 
population centres in each region; prices of more expensive and luxury goods are collected only in 
the regional administrative centre as that is where they are available. Where prices differ across the 
region the average regional price of a good is determined using population weights. Prices are 
registered weekly on a Monday but published for the month and the quarter (as the value of the 
index at the end of the given period).
The exact goods included in each region and the weights assigned to them in the basket are 
determined at the regional level, though within fixed categories decided at the centre. According to 
Goskomstat, regional composition and weights are determined with reference to current research on 
household expenditures on goods and services (presumably the Family Budget Survey), retail 
turnover rates, production data and expert estimation. Using a regional weighting system rather 
than imposing a national one makes sense in such a large and heterogeneous country, although the 
representativeness of the weights chosen may vary across regions. The implications for a 
comparative price study however are serious: the regional CPI can only be used to measure 
regional differences in inflation rates, not price levels. As each basket of goods is different the cost 
of the basket can only be compared over time and not across the country at any given point. The 19 
good index is therefore the only published index which allows comparison of price levels across 
regions. This is a shame as the prices of these goods are unlikely to be very representative, both 
because the basket is so small and because the prices of the food products it contains are likely to 
have remained under administrative control for longer than prices on other goods.
The CPI in its current form was developed during 1991 and 1992. Prior to that prices were 
measured using a retail price index, which took into account only state retail trade. (The RPI also 
had the disadvantage of being a Paasche index, in which weights varied from month to month, 
making the chaining of monthly inflation data distortionary. The CPI is a Laspeyres index in which 
weights remain fixed).101 The nationally aggregated CPI is published from a starting point of 
December 1991=100, but the regional CPI only appears to be available from the last few months 
of 1992.
101 For the detailed construction of each index, and on the weaknesses of the RPI, see Koen and Phillips 
(1993) or Granville and Shapiro (1994).
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Patterns of price variation
In this section some basic statistics and charts are presented which illustrate the degree of regional 
disparity in each of the two main measures introduced above.
1. The 19 goods basket
The price of the 19 goods basket varied in December 1992 from 1,926 roubles in Ulyanovsk in the 
Volga region to a maximum of 7,929 roubles in Sakhalin in the Far Hast; a four-fold gap between 
the top and the bottom region. By December 1993 and December 1994 this gap had widened to a 
five-fold gap. The regions found at both extremes are predictable: Ulyanovsk is famous not only as 
Lenin's birthplace but as the last administration to release price controls; while prices are generally 
much higher than average in the Far East, largely it seems as a result of transport costs (Sakhalin 
Oblast itself is made up of a series of islands to the north of Japan). Once the extremes are 
excluded however variation is much lower and did not increase noticeably over time. This is 
illustrated by the 90/10 and 75/25 decile ratios given in Table A.1 and by Figure A.l which plots 
the price levels for December 1992 against those for December 1994.
Figure A.l also shows that continuity in price levels over time was high. High price regions in 
December 1992 were likely still to have a relatively expensive basket two years later: the 
correlation between the price of the basket in 1992 and that in 1994 is 0.84. The regional pattern of 
price variation at the start of the period is illustrated in Map A .l, which shows quartiles for the 
cost of the basket in December 1992 (Chechnya, Ingushetia and Autonomous Areas left blank).











Dec 1992 7,929 1,926 4.1 1 .6 1.3
Dec 1993 79,062 15,924 5.0 1 .8 1.3
Dec 1994 239,835 50,355 4.8 1.7 1.3
Figure A.1
Cost of a basket of 19 basic foodstuffs in December 1992 and December
1994, by region
2. The Consumer Price Index
As noted, the CPI cannot be used as a cross country measure but only to track changes in price 
levels over time. Table A.2 gives descriptive statistics for annua) inflation rates for each year 
between 1992 and 1995. For the first two years statistics for change in the 19 good index are given 
for comparison purposes.
As the table shows, inflation rates themselves varied substantially, particularly between 1992 
and 1993 when inflation was at its highest. The highest recorded rate of inflation over that period 
(Kalmykia Republic in the Volga region) was two and a half times the lowest (St. Petersburg). As 
inflation has fallen so also has the rate of variation; by 1994-95 the region with the highest 
inflation had a rate only 50% greater than the lowest. Table A.2 also shows that changes in the 19 
good index were lower than changes in the CPI between 1992 and 1993, with a lower minimum 
and a lower maximum value; but were greater in the following year. This may be explained by the 
fact that in many regions price controls were kept on key goods well into 1993, and this included 
many of the goods in the 19 good basket.
Finally, it is worth noting that inflation rates in particular regions were very varied over time, 
with low or even negative correlation between the change over one year and that over the next; a 
region with high inflation between 1992 and 1993 was as likely as anywhere to have a relatively
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Mean Maxiumum Minimum 90/10 ratio
CPI ¡9g CPI I9g CPI 19 g CPI 19 g
1992-93 984 739 1,680 1,272 700 528 1.5 1.5
1993-94 304 337 387 418 229 252 1.1 1.3
1994-95 237 269 188 1 .2
low level of inflation the next year. However total inflation over the period December 1992 to 
December 1995 still varied between 5,000 to 12,000 percent, as shown by the dispersion over the 
y-axis of the data points in Figure A.2. Figure A.2 also illustrates that there was only a weak 
positive correlation between price levels in 1992 and the rate of inflation over the full three years, a 
point further reflected in a comparison of Maps A. 1 and A.2. Map A.2 shows the geographical 
pattern of inflation over this three year period, the darker areas those to have experienced the most 
rapid rates of inflation. There is a certain overlap between dark areas in the two maps, but high 
inflation areas are more likely to be found across the southern-most parts of the country than in the 
North and Far Hast.
Figure A.2
Relationship between basket of 19 goods December 1992 and change in
C P11992-95
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Adjusting the available to the requirements of this thesis
Both of the indices introduced above have serious drawbacks when it comes to the deflation of 
budgetary items, and particularly of budgetary items from 1991 onwards. First, they are simply 
inappropriate as measures of the type of change we want to capture. The CPI will not accurately 
measure change in the cost of provision of government goods and services as the household 
consumption basket contains quite a different set of products to the government basket: one can 
imagine that the price of, say, medicines and medical equipment might have risen at a completely 
different rate to that of food and clothing. In addition, some goods which are common to both 
household and local authority demand are priced differently in the two markets: for example, utility 
bills for households are still heavily subsidized while government institutions have, at least in 
principle, faced market prices for some years.
These problems are relatively minor, however, beside the failings of the 19 good index as a 
measure of the cross-regional differences in costs faced by local authorities at any point in time. 
This small basket of goods is unlikely to be very representative of the true costs facing regional 
consumers, let alone those facing education authorities.
The second problem is that even these flawed indices are not available for the full time period 
required, nor in the format which might be preferred. First, they are published monthly, so that we 
must deflate annual budget figures using the December on December increase in the price index, 
rather than a regional average. Second, as noted above, the 19 goods basket is only available for 
December 1992, December 1993 and December 1994, and the regional CPI monthly from 
December 1992. This stops us from deflating Figures back to 1991, which is essential to Chapter 2 
in particular. Only a national CPI (December on December) is available for this purpose.
However, some working solution has to be reached using these data as no ideal alternatives 
exist. I therefore use them to construct two indices which allow us to deflate monetary variables 
from 1992 to 1995 into ‘1991 prices’ — or as close as we can get to these. The first is simply the 
regional CPI December on December, tacked on to the national CPI for deflation from December 
1991 to December 1992. This creates an index which allows deflation of monetary terms across 
time but not across regions (i.e. we can deflate back to December 1991 prices for each region). The 
second index builds on this one, but adjusts regions against each other using the December 1992 
cost of the 19 goods basket; the idea being that the CPI (as the more reliable of the two) should be 
exploited as far is possible, but that the 19 goods basket is essential if at least some attempt is to be 
made to deflate terms across regions as well as over time. This time deflation is back to Moscow
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prices in December 1991. Both indices are used at different points in the thesis. Details of the 
construction of each, followed by some summary statistics, are given below.
1. Index 1 (CPI)
This is straightforward. We simply use the regional price index as published by Goskomstat, which 
is just the cost of the Consumer Price basket in year t in oblast i, if the cost of the basket in 
December 1991 in oblast i was 100 roubles. That is, CPI„, where:
CPljt = [(Cost of Consumer Price basket)jt /  (Cost of Consumer Price basket)j 1 9 9 ] ]*100.
The only complication is that for t=1992, all regions will have the same value of CPI,t, which is 
2610 (the nationally aggregated inflation rate for December 1991 to December 1992), as regional 
deflators are not available. For t=1993, 1994 or 1995, however, each region i will have its own 
value of CPI*, allowing us to take account of regional variation in inflation from 1992 onwards, 
though not of variation in price levels across regions.
2. Index 2 (CPI adjusted bv the 19 goods basket)
Here we take CPI*» as defined above and adjust it as follows:
Let 19gf be an adjustment coefficient based on the relative cost of the 19 goods basket in 
each oblast in December 1992, i.e.:
19g| = 19giDEC92^ 19£bDEC92
where 19gj£)EC92 is the cost of the 19 goods basket in oblast i in December 1992 and 
19gbDEC92 IS the cost of the basket in a base region in December 1992 (Moscow City is 
used as the base region).
Then CPI19it = CPIit * 19gj
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so that CPI19jt is an oblast specific price index with 1991 as a base, adjusted by a coefficient 
for December 1992 to made the index comparable across oblasts as well as over time.
3. Summary statistics
In Table A.3 I give summary statistics for these indices. It is clear that adjustment by the 19 good 
index will remove a lot of additional variation in monetary indicators, although mostly at the 
extremes. Regional values of Index 2, the CPI adjusted by the 19 goods index so that Moscow 
1991 is 100, are illustrated in Map A.3.
Table A.3: Summary statistics fo r  two price indices (the CPI and the CPI adjusted by the cost of 
the 19 goods basket)
Mean
Index I Index 2
Max/Min
Index I Index 2
90/10 ratio 
Index 1 Index 2
75/25 ratio 
Index I Index 2
Dec 1991 - 82.2 — 4.1 — 1 .6 — 1.3
Dec 1992 2,610 2,145 1 4.1 1 1 .6 1 1.3
Dec 1993 25,557 2 1 , 2 2 0 2.5 5.1 1.5 2 .1 1.3 1.4
Dec 1994 77,642 64,710 2.4 6.7 1 .6 2 .1 1.3 1.5
Dec 1995 183,791 152,488 2 . 6 6.9 1.7 2 .1 1.4 1.5
Note: Index 1 is the regional CPI from December 1991 onwards and the national CPI for December 1991 to December 
1992. Index 2 adjusts Index 1 for the regional cost of the 19 goods basket in December 1992, taking all regions back 
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Terms of the transfer formula used to allocate the Federal Fund for 
Financial Support 1994 and 1995102
Round 1: Regions in need of support
Qualification
Using data for the base year (1993 in both cases), oblasts are classified as being in need of support 
if:
B1. Rev0jj < RevRF * 0.95
where:
Rev0b = per capita tax revenue in a given oblast, adjusted for cunent conditions;
RevRp = per capita tax revenue in the RF for the same period of time, adjusted for cunent 
conditions; and
0 . 9 5  is the so-called ‘coefficient of incentive*, used to encourage oblasts to find their own resources 
for expenditure financing.
The decisive factor then is simply the oblast’s per capita revenues in relation to the national 
average. ‘Adjusted for current conditions’ means taking into account changes in assigned revenue 
sources since the base year; that is, what would have been raised in 1993 had revenue assignment 
been the same as in the year in question. (This adjustment is what makes it difficult for us to 
recalculate an oblast’s entitlement precisely.)
How large is the subvention?
If an oblast qualifies as being in need of support, the size of the transfer it should receive is 
calculated as follows, again using data for the base year (1993):
B2. TranNs  -  Popw / 0  * (R«VRF - Rev0 b) * (ExpER / RevRF)
l02From Boiko and Lavrov, 1995; Khodorovich, 1995; World Bank, 1995.
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where:
TranNS - total rouble amount of the transfer to the oblast in need of support (in Round 1 only): 
Popw/o -  oblast population excluding the population of ‘closed cities* (which come directly under
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Nuclear Energy and are financed 
separately);
Exper  = average per capita regional expenditures (excluding capita) investment) of all oblasts in 
the same ‘economic region* (North, North-West, Central, Volgo-Vyatskiy, Black Earth, Volga, 
North Caucasus, Urals, Western Siberia, Eastern Siberia and the Far East), adjusted for current 
conditions.
The amount of the grant is thus determined by the difference between the oblast’s per capita 
revenues and the national average, weighted by the ratio of expenditures in the region as a whole to 
average revenues in the Federation. ‘Adjusted for current conditions’ means taking into account 
changes in expenditure responsibilities since the base year; that is, what would have been spent in 
1993 if expenditure responsibilities were as they are in the year in question.
Round 2: Regions In need of considerable support
Qualification
Oblasts are classified as being in need of ‘considerable support* if:
B3. Tranks + (PoPw/o * Revob) < TotExpGb
where:
TotExp0b = total expenditures of the oblast budget excluding capital investment, adjusted for 
today’s conditions.
Thus to qualify oblasts simply need to have total revenues (after the first theoretical round of 
transfers) less than total expenditures.
How large is the subvention?
Eligible oblasts are then entitled to an additional transfer calculated as:
160
B4. Tranc s  = TotExp0b - (TranNS + Pop * R e v ^
i.e. simply the amount which will enable them to cover their expenditures. Note that oblasts do not 
need to qualify for the first round of transfers in order to be eligible for the second round. An oblast 
with very high per capita revenues but even higher current expenditures would classify as an oblast 
in need of ‘considerable support*, and qualify for a rouble sum sufficient to allow it to cover these 
expenditures.
Adjusting for total available funds
In a final stage, the calculated transfers are adjusted to be consistent with the total funds available 
in the year in question. This is done as follows:
B5. FinTranjvjs = TotalFundsjsJs * (Tranjsjg /  X Tranks)
B6 , FinTrancg = TotalFunds^s * (Tranks /  X Tranks)
where:
FinTranjsjs/cs = final amount of transfer made to region in need of support/considerable support; 
TotalFundsp4s/CS = total amount available to all oblasts found in need of support/considerable 
support;
Tranjqg/cs = amount of transfer to oblast in need of support/considerable support as calculated 




Term s o f the transfer form ula used in N ovgo ro d  O blast 1996'03
Round 1: Regions in need of support
Raions are classified as ‘in need of support* if their predicted per capita revenue in the year in 
question is less than the predicted average per capita revenue in the oblast as a whole. Predicted 
revenues are calculated by taking 1995 revenues and adjusting for changes in tax and retention 
rates for 1996 (expected changes in the economy do not appear to be taken into account).
In practice, and unlike in the federal system, all raions classify as such, as the average revenue 
level is calculated to include all revenues staying in the oblast, among them those passed up to the 
oblast level. The raion's theoretical transfer is then calculated a s :
C l. T !r = (1 - (REVr /  RHV0)) * EXPr * POP*
where:
T 1R = total transfers to raion R in stage !;
REV0  = predicted per capita revenues in the oblast as a whole (including those going to the 
oblast budget);
REVr = predicted per capita revenues staying in the raion;
EXPr = per capita expenditures estimated to be needed in the raion (the ‘minimum 
budget*); and
POPr = the raion population.
The level of transfer per capita is thus a positive function both of the degree to which raion per 
capita revenues are expected to fall below oblast per capita revenues, and of the level of per capita 
expenditures estimated to be needed in the raion. The latter (the minimum budget) is calculated by 
taking expenditures in 1991 and adjusting for inflation, for changes in raion responsibilities, for 
changes in federal norms on social assistance and benefit payments and for changes in the numbers 
of school children and orphans.
103 As explained to me in the Budget Department of the Finance Committee of the Novgorod Oblast 
Administration, and with the assistance of the Budget Department note on ‘Method for calculating sum of 
financial assistance (transfers) from the Fund for Financial Support to local authorities in 1996*.
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Round 2: Regions in need of considerable support
In the second stage raions are labelled ‘in need of considerable support’ if their revenues including 
first stage transfers are still going to be insufficient to meet their estimated necessary expenditures. 
In that case they are allocated the difference, that is:
C2. T2r = EXPr -(R EV r + T1r)
where T2r are total transfers to raion R in the second stage. (If necessary expenditures are less 
than revenues including first stage transfers, naturally no transfer is made.)
Adjusting for total available funds
The total transfer made in theory is in then simply the sum T1R + T2R. However, the role played by 
the minimum budget in both stages of the formula means that there is no guarantee that total 
transfers to be made will be matched by available funds, as minimum budgets are calculated quite 
independently of oblast revenues. So the sum T1R + T2r really determines, not a fixed rouble sum, 
but the share the raion should receive of the funds that are available in practice. In other words, 
despite the law, raions will only be sure of covering their minimum budgets if transfer funds allow. 
In Novgorod the oblast authorities take the transfers 
fund (the Federal Fund for Financial Support to the 
them on to the raions using this formula.
which they receive from the federal transfer 
Subjects of the Federation), and simply pass
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Appendix D
L ist of m ain  officia ls met in Novgorod  O b last June-July 1997
Oblast Administration
Nina Fyodorova, Deputy Head, Oblast Administration
Education Committee
Vladimir Averkin, Chair
Tatyana Pavlova, Deputy Chair
Nina Ivanova, Head of Finance Department
Head, Department of Education Statistics
Finance Committee
Tatyana Belova, Head of Budget Department 
Vera Yakolevna, Chief Accountant
Economics Committee
Vladislav Alexeev, Department of Development of Small Enterprises
Raion Administrations
Novgorod City Administration
Natalya Ribnikova, Deputy Chair, Education Committee
Shimsk Raion Administration
Nikolai Golubev, Head, Department of Education
Valdai Raion Administration 





Addonizio, Michael F. (1991) ‘Intergovernmental Grams and the Demand for Local 
Educational Expenditures*, Public Finance Quarterly, 1991, Vol. 19, No. 2. pp.209-232
Bahl, Roy (1994) ‘Revenues and revenue assignment: intergovernmental fiscal relations in the 
Russian Federation*, in Wallich (1994)
Bahl, Roy, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Sally Wallace (1993), ‘Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Relations in Russia*, Policy Research Center, College of Business Administration. Georgia 
State University (mimeo)
Barrow, Michael (1997), ‘Structure, Governance and Finance of Education in Central Europe,’ 
Background Paper for the UNICEF MONEE Regional Monitoring Report on Education
Batley, Richard and Gerry Stoker (1991), Local Government in Europe: Trends and 
Developments, Government Beyond the Centre Series, Macmillan
Bergstrom, Theodore C. and Robert P. Goodman (1973). ‘Private Demands for Public Goods*. 
American Economic Review. Vol.63, No.3, pp.280-296
Bird, Richard M., Robert D. Ebel and Christine I. Wallich, ed. (1995). Decentralization o f the 
Socialist State: Intergovernmental Finance in Transition Economies. World Bank 
Regional and Sectoral Studies. Washington, D.C.
Birkenes, Robert M. (1997) ‘Economic Causes and Consequences of Center-Periphery 
Conflicts in the Russian Federation*, Paper presented to UNICEF ICDC, Florence, January 
7 1997, mimeo
Bogacheva, O. (1995) ‘Stanovleniye Rossiiskoi modeli budzhetnogo federalizma’ (The 
development of a Russian model of fiscal federalism), Voprosi Ekonomiki, 1995 No.8 , 
pp.41-51
Boiko, T. and A. Lavrov (1995) ‘Budzhetniye otnosheniya v Rossii’ (Budget relations in 
Russia), Eko, 1995 No.l, pp. 162-178
Brown, Byron W. and Daniel H. Saks (1983) ‘Spending for Local Public Education: Income 
Distribution and the Aggregation of Private Demands*. Public Finance Quarterly. Vol. 11, 
No. 1, pp.21-45.
Buchanan, J.M. (1950) ‘Federalism and Fiscal Equity*, American Economic Review, Vol. 40, 
No. 4, pp.421-432
Bungey, Mel, Philip Grossman and Peter Kenyon (1991) ‘Explaining Intergovernmental 
Grants: Australian Evidence*, Applied Economics, Vol. 23, pp. 659-668
167
1
Burtless, Gary (1996) Does Money Matter? The Effect o f School Resources on Student 
Achievement and Adult Success. Brookings Institution Press. Washington. D.C.
Card, David and Alan B. Krueger (1992) ‘Does School Quality Matter? Returns to Education 
and the Characteristics of Public Schools in the United States', Journal o f Political 
Economy, February 1992, Vol. 100, No. 1, pp.1-40
Card, David and Alan B. Krueger (1996) ‘School Resources and Student Outcomes: An 
Overview of the Literature and New Evidence from North and South Carolina’, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Fall 1996, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp.31-50
Chemichovsky, Dov, Gur Ofer and Elena Potapchik (1996). ‘Health Sector Reform in Russia: 
The Heritage and the Private/Public M ix'. MOCT-MOST. Vol. 6 , No. 3, pp. 125-152.
Council of Europe (1997), ‘Local Finance in Europe’, Local and regional authorities in Europe 
No. 61, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg
Cragg, J. (1971) ‘Some Statistical Models for Limited Dependent Variables with Application 
to the Demand for Durable Goods', Econometrica, Vol. 39
De Masi, Paula and Vincent Koen (1995) ‘Relative Price Convergence in Russia’, IMF 
Working Paper WP/95/54
Deaton, Angus and John Muellbauer (1980), Economics and Consumer Behaviour, Cambridge 
University Press
Deaton, Angus and John Muellbauer (1980a). An Almost Ideal Demand System. American 
Economic Review. Vol. 70-2, pp.312-326.
Dmitriev, Mikhail (1996), ‘Byudjetnaya Politika Rossii v Usloviyakh Finansovoi Stabilizatsii* 
(Russian fiscal policy in conditions of financial stabilization), Moscow Carnegie Centre, 
mimeo
Dmitriev, Mikhail (1997). ‘Budjetnaya Politika v Sovremennoi Rossii’ (Fiscal Policy in 
Contemporary Russia), Moscow Carnegie Centre, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace
Dmitrieva, Oksana (1996). Regional Development: The USSR and After. UCL Press, 
University College, London.
Dmytrshyn, B. (1977), A History o f Russia, Prentice Hall
EBRD (1997). Transition Report.
Feldstein, M.S. (1975). ‘Wealth Neutrality and local choice in public education*. American 
Economic Review. Vol. 65, pp.75-89.
Glendening, P.N. and M.Mann Reeves (1984) Pragmatic Federalism, Palisades, California
Goskomstat (1993) Social Development o f the Russian Federation in 1992, Moscow
168
Goskomstat (1994) Sotsio-ekonomicheskoye Polozheniye v Rossisskoi Federatsii (The Socio- 
Economic Position of the Russian Federation)» Moscow 
Goskomstat (1995) Rossiskii Statistischeskii Yezhegodnik 1994 (Russian Statistical Yearbook
1994) , Moscow
Goskomstat (1995a) Ekonomicheskoye Polozheniye vRegionakh Rossii ¡994 (The Economic 
Position of Russia's Regions 1994), Moscow
Goskomstat (1995b) Osnovniye Pokazateli po Statistike Truda (Basic Indicators on Labour 
Statistics). Moscow.
Goskomstat (1996) Rossiskii Statistischeskii Yezhegodnik 1995 (Russian Statistical Yearbook
1995) , Moscow
Goskomstat (1996a) Demographicheskii Yezhegodnik Rossii (The Demographic Yearbook of 
Russia), Moscow
Goskomstat (1996b) Obrazovaniye v Rossiskoi Federatsii (Education in the Russian 
Federation). Moscow
Goskomstat (1996c) Chislennost’ i oplata truda rabotnikov za 1995 goda (Employment and 
Salaries in 1995). Moscow
Goskomstat (1996d) Methodologicheskie Polozheniya po Statistike (Methodological 
Regulations on Statistics), Moscow.
Granville, Brigitte and Judith Shapiro (1994) Russian Inflation: A Statistical Pandora's Box.
Royal Institute of International Affairs Discussion Paper 53 
Greene, William H. (1993) Econometric Analysis, Macmillan, New York 
Grossman, Philip J. (1994) ‘A Political Theory of Intergovernmental Grants’, Public Choice 
Vol. 78, pp.295-303
Gunlicks, Arthur B. (1986), Local Government in the German Federal System, Duke 
University Press, Durham
Hanson, Philip (1994) Regions, local power and economic change in Russia, Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, London
Hanson, Philip (1996) ’Russia's Regions, or The Mysteries of the 89 Organisms’, Paper 
presented at the annual conference of BASEES, Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge 30 March 
-1 April 1996, mimeo
Hanushek, Eric A. (1986). ’The Economics of Schooling: Production and Efficiency in Public 
Schools’. Journal o f Economic Literature. Vol. 24, p.l 141-1177 
Hanushek, Eric A. (1996), ’Measuring Investment in Education’, Journal o f Economic 
Perspectives, Fall 1996, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp.9-30.
169
Hashimoto Keiji and Julia A. Heath (1995). ‘Income Elasticities of Educational Expenditure by 
Income Class: The Case of Japanese Households.* Economics o f Education Review. Vol. 
14, No. 1, pp.63-71.
Hofman, Bert and Wang Yuan (1993) ‘The Economics of Fiscal Federalism: Issues and 
International Experience*, Background paper for the seminar on ‘Improvement of 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Budget Relations in the Russian Federation’, Moscow, October 
1993, mimeo
Holcombe, Randall G. and Asghar Zardkoohi (1982) ‘The Determinants of Federal Grants’, 
Southern Economic Journal Vol. 48, 1981 -82, pp.393-399 
Inman, Robert P. (1971). ‘Towards an Econometric Model of Local Budgeting’. Proceedings 
o f the 64th Annual Conference o f Taxation. National Tax Association, pp.699-719 
Jackman, Richard and John Papadachi (1981) ‘Local authority education expenditure in 
England and Wales: Why standards differ and the impact of government grants’. Public 
Choice, 1981, Vol. 36, pp.425-439
Khodorovich, M.I. (1995) ‘Problemi mezhbudgetnix otnoshenii v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ 
(Problems of interbudgetary relations in the Russian Federation), Finansi, October 1995 
Kim, H.Youn (1988). ‘The Consumer Demand for Education*. The Journal o f Human 
Resources. Vol.23, No.2, pp. 173-192.
King, Timothy and Tanya Proskuryakova (1996). ‘Changes in Health and Education 
Expenditures in Russia Since 1991*. World Bank, mimeo 
Kirkow, Peter (1996) ‘Distributional Coalitions, Budgetary Problems and Fiscal Federalism in 
Russia*, Communist Economies and Economic Transformation Vol. 8, No.3, pp.277-298 
Klugman, Jeni (1995) ‘Equity Aspects of Fiscal Federalism in Russia’, Paper prepared for 
Conference on Equity and Intergovernmental Relations in Developing Countries, 
Australian National University, April 1995, mimeo 
Klugman, Jeni (1997), ‘Education and Equity in the Former Soviet Republics: Disruption and 
Opportunities in Financing and Governance’, Background Paper for the UNICEF MONEE 
Regional Monitoring Report on Education
Koen, Vincent and Steven Phillips (1993) Price Liberalization in Russia: Behaviour o f Prices, 
Household Incomes and Consumption During the First Year. IMF Occasional Paper 104, 
June 1993.
Laporte, Bruno, Augustine Papali and Dena Ringold (1996). Trends in Education Access and 
Financing in Central and Eastern Europe*, World Bank Social Challenges of Transition 
Series (draft)
170
Lavrov, Alexei (1994) ‘Budzhetniy federalizm v Ross»' (Fiscal federalism in Russia).
President’s Analytical Centre, Moscow, October 1994, mimeo 
Lavrov, Alexei (1995) ‘Budzhetniy federalizm i finansovaya stabilizatsiya’ (Fiscal federalism 
and financial stabilisation), Voprosi Ekonomiki, 1995 No.8, pp.30-40 
Lavrov, Alexei (1995a) ‘Mezhbudzhetniye otnosheniya i finansovaya stabilizatsiya* 
(Intergovernmental relations and financial stabilization), EJfco, 1995 No.9, pp.93-115 
Lavrov, Alexei (1995b) ‘Otsenka budzhetnoi samostoyatel'nosti sub’yektov Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii’ (An evaluation of the budgetary independence of the subjects of the Russian 
Federation), President's Analytical Centre, Moscow, April 1995, mimeo 
Le Houerou, Philippe (1994) ‘Decentralization and Fiscal Disparities among Regions in the 
Russian Federation’, World Bank Internal Discussion Paper, January 1994 
Leser, CJE.V. (1963) ‘Forms of Engels Functions', Econometrica, 1963, Vol. 31, pp,214-221 
Lotz, Joergen R. (1981) ‘Social Needs Equalization: The Distribution of General Grants to 
Local Governments in Denmark’, in OECD (1981)
MacKinnon, Donald and June Statham (1995), Education in the UK: Facts and Figures, Open 
University, Hodder and Stoughton, Norfolk 
Maddala, G.S. (1977). Econometrics. McGraw-Hill.
Marshalova, A.C. and E.A.Marchuk (1995) ‘Novaya metodika raspredeleniya transfertov’ (A 
new means of distributing transfers), Eko, 1995 No.9, pp.l 16-120 
Maximov's Companion to the ¡995 Russian Parliamentary Elections (1996), Maximov 
Publications, Moscow
McAuley, Alastair (1996) ‘The Determinants of Federal Regional Fiscal Relations: equity or 
affluence?’. Paper prepared for Conference on Government in Economic Transition, New 
Economic School, Moscow 4-6 September 1996, mimeo 
Mendras, Marie (1993) ‘Les Trois Russie: Analyse du referendum du 25 Avril 1993’, Revue 
Française de Science Politique, Vol.43 No.6 
Musgrave, Richard (1959) The Theory o f  Public Finance, McGraw-Hill, New York 
Noah, H. (1966) Financing Soviet Schools. Studies of the Russian Institute, Columbia 
University. Teachers College Press, New York.
Norton, Alan (1994). International Handbook o f Local and Regional Government: A 
Comparative Analysis o f Advanced Democracies. Edward Elgar. Great Britain.
Novgorod Oblast Committee of State Statistics ( 1996), Novgorod Oblast in Figures 
Oates, Wallace (1972) Fiscal Federalism, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York 
Oates, Wallace (1994). ‘Federalism and Government Finance’, in John M. Quigley and Eugene 
Smolensky, Modem Public Finance. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
171
WMmWUUIIIlWHJUlMJUU i JUIAJUIMJ
OECD (1981) Measuring Local Government Expenditure Needs: The Copenhagen 
Workshop, OECD Urban Management Studies No. 4, Paris
OECD (1997). ‘Reviews of National Policies for Education — The Russian Federation. 
Examiners’ Report*. Directorate for Education» Employment, Labour and Social Affairs. 
Education Committee, OECD. May 1997.
Peterson, Paul E. (1995) The Price o f Federalism, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.
Petrov, V.A. (1995) ‘Sovershenstvovaniye mekhanizma mezhbudzhetnikh otnosheniiy’ 
(Perfecting the mechanism of intergovernmental relations), Finansi, 1995 No.9
Prais, S.J. and H.S.Houthakker (1955). The Analysis o f Family Budgets. Cambridge 
University Press.
Ptitsin, B.l. (1996) ‘Budzhentniy federalizm i sovershenstvovaniye mezhbudzhetnikh 
otnosheniiy’ (Fiscal federalism and the perfection of interbudgetary relations), Finansi, 
1996 No.9
Rao, M.Govinda and Tapas K. Sen (1995) ‘Intergovernmental Transfers and Equalization in 
India’, Paper prepared for Conference on Equity and Intergovernmental Relations in 
Developing Countries, Australian National University, April 1995, mimeo
Rich, Michael J. (1989) ‘Distributive Politics and the Allocation of Federal Grants’, American 
Political Science Review, Vol.83, No. 1, pp. 193-213
Rondinelli, D, J. Nellis and S. Cheema (1984) ‘Decentralization in Developing Countries: A 
Review of Recent Experience*. World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 581. Washington, 
D.C.
Russian Academy of Science/Novgorod Oblast Administration (1995), Ekonomika 
Novgorodskoi Oblasti na puti v rinku (The Economy of Novgorod Oblast on the Path to 
the Market)
Schiffer, Jonathan (1989), Soviet Regional Economic Policy: The East-West Debate over 
Pacific Siberian Development, Studies in Soviet History and Society, Macmillan, 
Hampshire
Searle, Robert (1995), ‘The Australian Fiscal Transfer System: Equity and the Commonwealth 
Grants Commission’, Paper for the Workshop on Equity and Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Relations in Developing Countries, Australian National University, Canberra, 10-11 April 
1995 (mimeo)
Solnick, Steven L. (1995) ‘Federal bargaining in Russia’, World Wide Web at 
http://law.lib.uchicago.edu/CSCEE/eecr/v4n4/solnick.txt
Stewart, Mark and Kenneth F. Wallis (1981). Introductory Econometrics. Second edition. 
Blackwell, Oxford.
172
Stone, J.R.N. (1954). ‘Linear expenditure systems and demand analysis: An application to the 
pattern of British demand’. The Economic Journal. Vol. 64, pp.511-527.
Sutherland, Douglas and Philip Hanson (1996). ‘Structural Change in the Economies of 
Russia’s Regions’. Europe-Asia Studies. Vol.48, No.3, pp.367-392.
Treisman, Daniel (1995) ‘The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in Post-Soviet Russia’, 
Harvard University Russian Research Center, April 1995, mimeo
Turnbull, Geoffrey K. (1987). ‘Alternative Local Public Education Expenditure Functions: An 
Econometric Evaluation.’ Public Finance Quarterly. Vol. 15, No. 1, pp.45-60.
Van Haecht, Anne (1996), ‘The division of responsibilities at national, regional and local levels 
in the education systems of twenty-three European countries’, Council of Europe 
Publishing, Strasbourg
Wallich, Christine I. (1994), ed. Russia and the Challenge o f Fiscal Federalism, World Bank 
Regional and Sectoral Studies, Washington, D.C.
Weber, William L. (1991). ‘Fiscal Neutrality and Local Choice in Public Education’. 
Economics o f Education Review. Vol. 10, No.l, pp.37-44.
West, Loraine A. and Christine P. W. Wong (1995) ‘Fiscal Decentralization and Growing 
Regional Disparities in Rural China: Some Evidence in the Provision of Social Services’, 
Oxford Review o f Economic Policy, Vol. 11, No. 4
World Bank (1992) ‘Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the Russian Federation’, Report No.
11302-RUS
World Bank (1995) ‘Fiscal Management in the Russian Federation’, Report No. 14862-RUS
173
û
ttutíaúüÉMm tÉÉM
m



